b)Walsh’s introduction of “organic” schemata
c)Guyer: Schemata and temporality
5.2In response to the criticisms of the schematism chapter
5.2.1The necessity of schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason
a)The distinction between the function of the Transcendental Deduction and the task of the schematism chapter
b)“Knowing that and knowing how”
5.2.2The obscurity of the chapter
a)Subsumption
b)“To be” and “to do”: defining schemata
c)The distinction between categories and forms of intuition
d)Categories and schemata
e)Schemata and principles
f)Schemata and ideas
g)Judgement and its role between reason and understanding
5.2.3Space and time
a)Time, at least
b)Dynamic schemata
c)Difficulties within Kant’s text
Part II: After Kant
1. The philosophical reception and criticism of the schematism chapter
1.1The earliest receptions of Kant’s schematism chapter
1.2Idealism and post-Kantianism
1.3From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century
2. Kant’s distinction between philosophy and psychology
2.1Philosophy as a system of concepts
2.2Psychology: a doctrine of the inner sense
2.3Is Kant a transcendental psychologist?
3. Kant’s notion of a schema in twentieth-century psychology
3.1Schema theories
3.2Frederic Bartlett
3.2.1A pioneer of applied psychology
3.2.2Experimental method
3.2.3The topics of experiments
3.2.4Remembering
3.2.5Schematic settings
3.2.6Meaning
3.2.7Conclusion
3.3Jean Piaget’s interpretation of Kant’s notion of a schema
3.3.1An interest in both theoretical and empirical studies
3.3.2A “philosophical shock”
3.3.3Piaget’s notion of schemata
3.3.4An example of a schema: the object
3.3.5Experience as an organisation through schemata. Piaget’s perspective between empiricism and apriorism
3.3.6Piaget’s novelty and difference from Kant’s view
3.4Lawrence Barsalou’s reception of Kant’s transcendental schematism
3.4.1Cognitive psychology
3.4.2Categorisation
3.4.3Modal theory versus amodal theory
3.4.4Properties
a)Neural representations
b)Schematic perceptual symbols
c)Multimodal symbols
d)Simulators
e)Frames
f)Linguistic indexing and control
3.4.5Barsalou and Kant
3.4.6Psychology and philosophy
Conclusion
Schema: the history of an idea
The function of schematism
Schematisms’s legacy between philosophy and psychology
New perspectives
Bibliography
Lists of abbreviations for classical works
Primary literature
Secondary literature
Online resources
List of figures
List of tables
Index
The main aim of this book is to provide a critical and historical inquiry on Kant’s schematism chapter contained in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, I am going to argue that Kant’s schematism chapter is a necessary step within the project of the Critique. It deals with a problem of its own, one which is not the object of the previous chapters: how can categories be applied to intuitions? I will show that the term ‘schema’ has an interesting and long tradition of different philosophical uses that finds in the works of Kant a point of no-return. In the philosophical works written before Kant, the notion of schema did not have a specific and distinctive meaning and function of its own but was rather used in different contexts (from rhetoric to logic to psychology). After Kant, all philosophers who speak of schemata refer in one way or another back to Kant’s distinctive notion, which possesses a specific, epistemic meaning. Moreover, I aim to provide a contribution to the understanding of the relation between philosophy and the sciences. I will do this by means of demonstrating the importance of the schematism chapter, not only within the Critique, but also from a broader perspective, deriving from the fact that Kant’s doctrine of schemata
