documents was a challenging letter from Vermont Colonel Eben Walbridge. In a convoluted manner, it essentially repeated Vermont’s claim to the Western Union and refuted New York’s right to intercede. “Should these proposals be rejected, and the people who profess to be citizens of Vermont, be imprisoned, and their property destroyed, I cannot be answerable for the consequences.”
To this was added two affidavits given by men who had been with Colonels Yates and Van Rensselaer at Sancoick. They had volunteered to go to Bennington for intelligence and when there discovered that Vermont troops had been ordered out to oppose the Yorkers’ attempts to quell the insurrection. They saw one hundred men under arms and heard a major in conversation with General Ethan Allen declare “that he would with his life and fortune protect the new union, and … that a General should not let his enemy know when he intended to strike, but give the blow and think afterwards.” Allen answered, “Now you begin to talk something like and declared himself to be of the same sentiments.” Further, a doctor “had been on the east side of the mountain where the people told [him] that they were jealous that the people of the west side were in alliance with the enemy in Canada; that the said doctor returned to Bennington on making enquiry, found that it was absolutely true.” On the men’s return to Sancoick, they came across a number of armed men and a fieldpiece drawn by four oxen inside the twenty-mile line and a few miles further on, saw armed men going to join the insurrectionists.
Gansevoort’s second report told of the actions he had taken since receiving the governor’s directions. He had gone to Saratoga to ask General Stark for a fieldpiece and a detachment of Continentals to assist his men at Schaghticoke and Hoosic. With these additions, he thought he could dislodge the insurgents from their blockhouse; however, Stark did not think a detachment was justifiable unless ordered by General Heath and, in any event, his men were almost naked and in no condition to march. Gansevoort doubted the validity of these reasons and suspected that Stark was adhering to Chittenden’s demand that he not interfere in the affair.
Gansevoort had gone to Schaghticoke to take command of his militiamen and, shortly after his arrival, the Albany sheriff came with a warrant to apprehend the insurgents. Half an hour later, his troops from Sancoick appeared, having been ordered to retire by Lieutenant-Colonel Yates in compliance with Gansevoort’s instructions not to risk an action unless their prospects of success were good. Colonel Henry Van Rensselaer arrived to report that reinforcements from Vermont had been in sight when he left. In case the reinforced rioters attempted to cut him off, Gansevoort decided to retire an additional five miles to Schaghticoke town where he could house his men from the inclement weather and secure his route of retreat. Papers were served on four captured rioters and they were jailed. He wrote a letter to the Vermont commander asking under what authority he brought a military force in “the interior parts of this State.” He was sure he knew the answer, but thought that having it in writing might prove useful to the legislature and Congress.
By sunset on December 19, no answer had been received, nor had his messengers returned. He only had eighty men on hand from four different regiments and they had been “out” for a considerable time without provisions. He was convinced there was not the least prospect of success if he engaged the insurgents and he could not expect to be reinforced “in due season.” He suspected that even if his and Van Rensselaer’s whole brigades were turned out, they would not have been sufficient to suppress the insurrection, as “the people from the Grants” had intervened. He had been misled into thinking that Vermont would not interfere, but Chittenden’s letters and the appearance of her troops “undeceived” him and he dismissed his men. Gansevoort was concerned for the people who had taken an active role in attempting to put down the uprising. They daily expected to be confronted by Vermonters and forced to swear allegiance to the republic or abandon their holdings. Indeed, several had already been faced with that dilemma. New York’s attempts to enforce her jurisdiction through military intervention had clearly failed.33
Also on December 21, Brigadiers Gansevoort and Van Rensselaer reported to the governor that “a great majority” of the five field officers and twenty-two principal gentlemen surveyed about the defence of the western frontier had decided “that 200 men would be needed before spring.”34
Stark wrote to Heath on December 22 hoping that General Hazen was on his way north to assume command and presenting a request by the New Hampshire colonel, George Reid, for leave to go home to address pressing family affairs. Reid and Stark had a long history of serving together, beginning with the militia concentration outside Boston in 1775, and both had fought at Breed’s Hill. In January 1776, Reid had been appointed a captain in Stark’s 5th Continental Regiment and, in 1780, had taken command of the 2NH as lieutenant-colonel commandant. His letter to Stark, requesting leave, gave a depressing image of duty on the Mohawk River. “A dismal gloom overspreads this quarter at present. However, two damned Indians favored me [with] a piece of venison, on which I intend to dine to-morrow … I am invited to keep Christmas with Mr. Ensign. I think that man must be a Christian…. If you have not already wrote to General Heath, I pray you to write as soon as possible, representing my situation, and the pressing necessity of my being at home.”35
Lieutenant-Colonel George Reid of New Hampshire. During the first half of 1782, Reid’s battle with Willett over senior command of the Mohawk region made the task of raiding much easier for British Indians and troops.
An Indian council was held at Niagara on December 20. A Detroit Wyandot, two Onondagas, and some other Confederacy representatives delivered speeches recommending that a message be sent to General Haldimand for his assistance to mount a strike against Fort Pitt in the spring. How little the natives understood the paucity would of the governor’s resources.36
Captain Mathews wrote to Colonel John Campbell of the Quebec Indian Department on December 21 to inform him that Haldimand had rejected Dr. Kerr’s claims as the surgeon to the natives on the Ross expedition. Whether this was because of the odd nature of his submission or for some other technicality was not stated.37
The next day, chief engineer Twiss reported to Haldimand on the state of the Yamaska blockhouses. Other than some improvements to the officers’ apartments, there was nothing remarkable at the lower post; however, he had much to say about the upper blockhouse near Missisquoi Bay, which the governor had ordered built the previous winter to hinder invasion attempts from that quarter. Twiss had located the new blockhouse on a hilltop near the bottom of a cataract located twenty-one miles from the lower post. Work had begun early in the year and by the time of his inspection, the forest was cleared 250 yards around the fortification and a nearby island was being cleared for a garden. He wrote, “the Work is exceedingly well finished, and by having a bomb-proof cellar, and being surrounded with a picketing and glacis, may be considered a Post of considerable defense.”38
Késkètomah, an Onondaga Sachem. Although probably too young to have held this role during the Revolution, this sachem exhibits the dignity reported to have been common to native politicians.
Sometime in December, Powell addressed the governor’s suspicions that had been aroused by Ross’s complaints. Haldimand had noted that only 150 Rangers had been sent to Ross from Niagara, despite Butler having returned
