for a week without incident.
Stark believed that none of the insurgents were “old” Vermonters. Using Pendleton’s term, they were “Cattermounters.” He hoped the upstarts would seek compromise and avoid bloodshed. “Congress would do well to pass some severe and decisive edicts, and see that they are put in execution before spring; otherwise, the consequences may be exceedingly serious, and perhaps dangerous.”
He then reverted to issues he had raised in earlier letters. He was sorry to hear that other troops suffered more than his, “but, since some are more wretched, we must submit to our fate like good soldiers.” It was not practicable for the 2NH to be sent to the Mohawk River until they were clothed. Indeed, only thirty-six “three years” and “during the war” men, including serjeants, were fit for duty in both regiments; the remainder were so bereft of clothing they could not even obtain fuel for their own use and he had found it necessary to retain a number of Levies to perform camp duties. He hoped there was a possibility of sending some blankets, shirts, overalls, stockings, and shoes, which would provide temporary relief. Buried deep in his report was some shocking news:
My predictions in my last were realized on the evening of the 10th instant. The troops mutinied; but, by the seasonable interposition of the officers, it was quelled very easily. But, sir, this may be but a prelude to an insurrection of a more serious nature.
Some of the most forward of the mutineers are in custody, and are to be tried by court-martial. Mutiny is certainly a crime that deserves the severest punishment, but to punish one soldier for it, is unjust and cruel to the last degree.
Whenever possible, he would send the second regiment to the Mohawk River posts, but he cautioned Heath that he “must not expect impossibilities.” He reported that Willett had between eighty and one hundred three-years’ men to garrison the posts until the Continentals were clothed. Presumably, these were men over and above Wright’s little company. After some comments about being unaware of any Continental arms being issued to the militia, he added a telling postscript that emphasized that the war was far from over.
I never saw a thanksgiving before that was so melancholy. I may, I believe with safety, affirm that there will not be a thankful heart in this garrison, nor one that has cause to be satisfied with his circumstances. It may be argued that it is a blessing to have trials; but life without enjoyments, and replete with misery, is rather … a curse than a blessing.
In his turn, Heath wrote to Stark again, promising that there would be ample supplies of clothing sent north, but he re-emphasized that it would be late in coming. The two New Hampshire paymasters were confident that clothing could soon be made up for the men, which suggested it would be prepared before being sent. They had drawn hose, shoes, some overalls, and shirts “for the most necessitous men,” and these would be sent to Albany in a few days when the various detachments set out to join their regiments.
A supply of forage had at last been settled upon and a quantity of writing paper was on the road from Philadelphia. As he had no knowledge that a mutiny had occurred, he wrote, “The good temper and patience of the troops, exhibited on all occasions, does them honor. I am happy in having the evidence of a prospect of their being well fed and well clothed; and I hope they will receive some pay.”
Heath reported he was investigating whether or not Willett’s three-years’ men would remain in the Mohawk region over the winter and, almost word for word, reiterated Clinton’s opinions on the posts to be occupied over the winter.
As to Stark’s request for leave, “I wish to gratify your inclination in visiting your family, but wish you to remain a few days, as I hourly expect General Hazen in this quarter. As it may be equally agreeable to him to spend the winter at Albany, and as I should prefer having a general officer in the northern district, I will request him to repair there; if he declines it, Colonel Reid must exercise the command.”
Colonel Peter Yates wrote to Brigadier Gansevoort on December 12 from Sancoick. The general’s last instruction had given Yates permission to enter into any agreement he thought best to bring an end to the insurrection, but he thought a resolution was unlikely and enclosed an affidavit to support his contention. The affidavit had been sworn that same day by Bezalial Phelps before Justice John Younglove at Cambridge. To wit — Phelps had at times been taken into the confidence of General Safford and others from Bennington who vowed they would disperse Yates’s party either by killing or taking prisoner Yates, John Van Rensselaer, Bratt, etc. … and holding them until Vermont’s laws were in force. The agitators made several other violent expressions. From this, Yates concluded that talks were fruitless and begged for more troops, as he only had eighty on the ground and the insurgents had 146 in a blockhouse. He requested a fieldpiece and some artillerymen to resolve the issue. As to the “old” Vermonters, he thought they would do nothing more than make a great show. Stark had promised to “march his whole camp,” but he preferred that Gansevoort would come at the head of his brigade. Clearly, Yates was in over his head. Worse, the season was very troublesome and his men were restless and wanted to either fight or go home.
The governor wrote to answer Heath’s queries about three-years’ men, advising that Willett had recruited a number out of the nine months’ Levies, but their clothing was worn out and they would be of little service until supplies arrived. He had instructed Willett to appoint officers to take charge of them and to place their companies to the best advantage along the Mohawk. Although he had received no regular return, he understood there were too few to form a regiment, but it would be a loss to the public to discharge those engaged, which must be done if they were not supplied with clothing. Clinton reminded Heath that Congress had agreed to pay, clothe, and subsist these men for whom the state had made no provisions.24
Continental artillery captain, Andrew Moodie, who had served in the Mohawk Valley throughout the 1781 campaign, wrote to Governor Clinton from West Point to advise that he had enlisted nine men from the state Levies into his company for the war’s duration and to apply for the same bounty that was paid by the militia classes when a Levy volunteered for the duration in a regular infantry regiment. He had promised the men that he would discharge them if they did not get the payment before January 1782.
Moodie reported that when Lieutenant-Colonel Abraham Van Alstyne of Kinderhook had recently visited the Point, he said that all of his regiment’s classes were delinquent and it may be that those classes would be willing to hire the nine men. He opined that it would be injurious to the service if the men had to be discharged and it would incur a great cost to him personally, as he had clothed them when they joined. Three days later, Clinton’s secretary wrote to Van Alstyne with this proposal, but the outcome had not been determined yet.
Stark wrote to Meshech Weare, one of New Hampshire’s most notable politicians of the time. With considerable bitterness, the prickly general said that, although his letters were “treated with silent contempt,” his mind always turned to Weare when affairs seemed out of order, such as Vermont’s “late riotous conduct” in claiming jurisdiction of southeastern New York and eastward to the Connecticut River. He blamed Vermont for the Sancoick uprising, an act “in open defiance and violation of the rules of Congress.” He had seen the proceedings of Vermont’s legislature on the subject of admission into the union and found:
[T]hey have not only rejected the resolutions of Congress, but in reality have disavowed their authority; and I farther perceive
