to the incursion of the enemy during the winter, and when and in what numbers the troops will be most advantageously cantoned”.
On receiving Heath’s advice that only two New Hampshire regiments were available, Clinton wrote to Albany County’s brigadiers Peter Gansevoort and Robert Van Rensselaer reminding them that the state legislature had lately empowered him to bring into service militia levies from any of the districts any time he deemed it necessary.
Considering that the United States and their French ally had just achieved a monumental victory in Virginia and their army in the north had successfully warded off two expeditions from Canada, the governor’s message betrayed amazing anxiety. He spoke of New York’s “present distressed situation” and his earnest desire to avoid burdening the inhabitants with unnecessary expenses and trouble. He reported Heath’s plan to leave the New Hampshire brigade in the north to garrison posts on the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers and requested the opinions of each brigade’s field officers and principal gentlemen whether it was necessary to make a levy before spring and, if so, what number of men would be required to protect the frontiers of Albany, Charlotte, and Tryon counties for the winter. The governor clearly recognized the enemy was not yet defeated in the north.
Clinton gave Heath his agreement on December 4 that the two New Hampshire regiments, if as strong as reported, should answer the purpose, particularly if the season was not milder than usual; however, the addition of Hazen’s regiment would ease the burden of the duty, which might otherwise be severe, and give greater security and confidence to the exposed settlements. He listed the posts that were usually occupied over the winter: Saratoga (from where detachments could be made to White Creek and Ballstown); Fort Herkimer, Fort Rensselaer, and Johnstown (from where small detachments were occasionally made to small posts in their vicinities), and Schoharie. He was unable to comment on the relative troop strength required at each place, but thought it best to distribute the largest regiment to the western posts, without making detachments from it to Albany or Schenectady to secure public stores. He thought the Saratoga frontier was neither as extensive, nor as exposed, to the enemy and it was able to “derive more speedy & effectual succor from the militia. The western frontier of Ulster & Orange being more remote from the enemy’s posts & of course less liable to their incursions, expecially in the winter season, may with greater ease be defended by the militia of those counties who are remarkably well affected & favorably situated for the purpose.”8
Well affected, perhaps, but not very motivated or capable, to judge from the raid of the previous August.
There was some upset in the Royal Yorkers’ two battalions. Robert Leake had been appointed 2KRR’s paymaster and requested a list of commission seniorities from Quebec City headquarters, while at the same time he indicated to Captain Mathews the likelihood of a protest from Thomas Gumersall about his seniority relative to Leake’s. He also argued for the seniority of his independent company’s second lieutenant, William Fraser, relative to the ensigns who had been promoted from 1KRR.
Major Gray reported there was some quibbling over the men to be brought to the Royal Yorkers from the Queen’s Loyal Rangers by Lieutenant Jeremiah French and the men of McAlpin’s to be brought by Ensign James McAlpin. Such issues were minor inconveniences in the army’s administration, but very important to those involved.9
On December 1, Butler reported to Mathews that he had taken an inventory of Indian stores and found several critical articles missing. He had asked Powell for permission to purchase them from the merchants, but was told the governor prohibited it; however, the brigadier agreed to allow the exchange of some coarse cloth of little utility to the Indians for some vital items; however, this scarcely met the greater need. Accordingly, Butler enclosed “a list of articles we are principally in want of.” Powell had also supplied a quantity of powder and had promised more, on the understanding that it would be replaced from Indian stores in the spring.
The natives had come earlier than usual to request provisions and gave as their reason the “trifling quantity of Indian corn I issued … for planting.” They claimed that, if they had received plenty of seed last spring, they would have been able to maintain themselves over the winter. “The chief part of the Onondagas are already come in, and I fear many of the different nations will follow their example.” He had recommended hunting to all the natives as an alternative to war, but they were not pleased, so as a compromise, he counselled them “to keep out small parties that the enemy might not think them asleep.”
Surgeon Kerr had earlier reported that refugees were draining the garrison’s provisions, but Butler refuted this charge, saying they were not allowed any, nor were the farmers on the Canadian side, nor the families of the Rangers, except each company’s customary two women.
As the cold season had been moderate, the farmers had been able to clear and till ground for planting and sowing early in the spring. If they waited until summer, the growing season was too short and they would fail to subsist themselves. He believed the farmers would soon be of great use to the post, as they had maintained themselves since September and had only been allowed a half ration from the outset of the project.
He then made a surprising request. As his Rangers had not been given ammunition to practice marksmanship, the corps’ many new recruits made this an essential.10
At Montreal on December 3, Major Gray reported to Brigadier de Speth that the 2KRR detachment ordered for Carleton Island had been unable to leave Lachine until January 22, as they could not be provided for earlier. They had been detained at Point Clair by severe weather and left three days later and went to The Cedars that night. Gray had not heard from them since and was concerned that severe frost and snow had prevented further travel.
Four days after Gray’s report, Ross wrote to advise that the detachment had arrived at Coteau-du-Lac after an inexplicable delay and could go no farther. Haldimand’s reinforcement had come to naught and Ross hoped the battalion would be united at Carleton Island in the spring. He reported that the neck of land below Fort Haldimand had been fortified to protect both the shipping that would winter in the bay and the storehouses on the point.
Mathews notified Gray that the men enlisted by French would be ordered to accompany him to 2KRR; however, a handful had been “made over” to French by Sherwood and were presently employed in the Secret Service and would continue in that role, but be credited to the second battalion. McAlpin’s claim was quickly dismissed, “His Excellency appointed the Young Gentleman in Consideration of His Fathers Services, as a provision for him, but that He does not consider that He has the least inherent Right to the Men who Entered in that Corps while Mr McAlpin was a Child.”11
Captain William Twiss, Canada’s chief engineer, made a tour of lower Quebec’s various fortifications. Of his visit to the troublesome Prison Island off Coteau-du-Lac, he wrote, “We found the Côteau Island extremely well arranged for the accommodation, and security of Prisoners of War, and I think your Excellency will not hear of any making their Escape from thence: the buildings as they now stand have Births for 216 Men, with a separate Room for an Hospital, and another for the Surgeon’s Mate, each room has a Fire Place, and contains only 12 Men … these Buildings are commanded by a Blockhouse, and Guard House…. I judge the distance … to the Island to be about 500 yards.” (How wrong his predictions about no more escapes would prove to be.)12
