from hostage rescues to acting as bodyguards for VIPs (like me!) to operating for long periods of time on their own in enemy territory.”[116]
With such endorsement, the Government of Canada authorized the deployment of a JTF 2 SOTF to Afghanistan in support of OEF on June 1, 2005. Its mission was “to conduct combat operations in the Afghanistan theatre of operations (ATO) in support of U.S.-led operation Enduring Freedom for a period of one year.” CANSOF was back at war.
Later that year, a JTF 2 SOTF was back in country supporting OEF. Although originally committed for only a year, the mandate was continually extended, lasting in the end until the end of Canadian operations in Afghanistan in 2011. Their mission, however, remained largely unchanged. General Hillier affirmed that Canadian SOF had established a presence on Afghanistan battlefields and that they were effective disrupting the Taliban leadership.[117] He declared, “What we want to do is take out the [Taliban] commanders who are engaged in orchestrating, facilitating, paying, leading, planning, and driving folks to attack us or attack the Afghans or attack the innocent.” He added, “And our special forces are focused very much on that.… I said, during a recent speech, that we had removed from the battlefield six commanders who were responsible for the deaths of [twenty-one ] Canadian soldiers.” Hillier explained, “Well that’s changed. We’ve removed seven commanders who have been responsible for the deaths of [twenty-seven ] soldiers.”[118]
Canadian scholars have reinforced Hillier’s declarations. A team studying operations in Kandahar Province noted that “insurgent operations in 2007 were increasingly characterized by lack of co-ordination and poor planning, which could be attributed to the growing effectiveness of ISAF’s special operations forces.” They explained:
SOF units from all ISAF contributor nations in the south were pooled for the task of arresting known bomb[-]making cell leaders [and] drug lords, and a legal case [was] prepared for their arrest[.] Canadian (and other ISAF) SOF troops would [then] be deployed to apprehend the suspect. As often as not, if the target was a Tier 1 Taliban leader, he would try to shoot his way out, with predictable results. Consequently, Taliban command-and -control capacity in the south in 2007 was less effective than the previous fall.[119]
In addition, conventional commanders also spoke to the influence CANSOF was exerting in theatre. A Canadian battle group commander noted the impressive effect SOF had on his area of operations in Kandahar.
The SOF strikes had a chilling effect on the Taliban. In one strike they killed an important leader and [sixteen] of his fighters. The Taliban leadership in Kandahar City felt a lot of pressure from SOF. They were moving every day so we saw a reduction in activity. They [Taliban] were being disrupted — they were on the move, on the run.[120]
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