Government of Canada could delay no longer. It was time to establish a CT force of its own. The initial discussion of whether the new CT force should be based in the military or the police became a struggle between the CDS and the RCMP commissioner. Neither wanted the responsibility of creating or owning the force. The commissioner of the RCMP felt the proposed entity was more a military commando unit than a police organization. The CDS was of the mind that the type of individual created in such an organization could be problematic. He feared that once they were done their tour of service they would invariably become mercenaries of one sort or another, and he did not want that type of fallout. As a result, he did not want that type of unit within his Canadian Armed Forces.[98]
In the end, the CDS had his way because the Solicitor General believed the CT task was a policing function. As a result, the following year, in 1986, the RCMP created the seventy-five-member strong Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) as Canada’s first hostage rescue (HR)/CT organization. The unit quickly established itself, drawing its personnel from existing trained police emergency response teams (ERT) from across the country. They received comprehensive training, much of it initially from a number of international CT experts. Although SERT was constantly busy, it was never deployed for an actual mission.
By the early 1990s, the continuing efforts of the federal government to combat its enormous deficit led to continuing deep budget cuts to all government departments. The RCMP was not immune. Faced with financial constraints, the requirement to pay overtime to members of the SERT, a force that had been in existence for years but had not yet deployed, as well as the requirement to continually rely on military airlift and other support provided the impetus for change. Moreover, the military in the post–Cold War era was also amenable to taking on new roles.[99] The deputy minister at the time, Bob Fowler, was instrumental in pushing for the DND to take on the role. And so, in February 1992, senior governmental, RCMP, and DND decision-makers decided to transfer the HR/CT responsibilities from the RCMP SERT to a military organization. As such, JTF 2 was born.
The challenge for the unit was immense. It had to select and train its personnel, and establish a new unit and be operational by April 1, 1993. The tight timelines meant that the first CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Romses, had little choice but to utilize the RCMP SERT model for pre-selection , selection, and qualification standards. The RCMP SERT was composed of two distinct entities. Its Dwyer Hill Training Centre was run by an RCMP inspector who was responsible for the infrastructure and training. However, the command and control of the actual SERT was vested in another RCMP officer. Romses, however, would be responsible for both the operational and training functions.
The RCMP trained the first group of JTF 2 personnel. The newly trained military members now became the training cadre, and from the second serial onward, took control of instructing the remainder of the military personnel. Increasingly, the RCMP SERT members maintained less and less responsibility.
Timelines were tight, but JTF 2 was ready for the April 1 stand-up date. A formal handover parade and mess dinner were held at Dwyer Hill on March 31, 1993, to mark the handover of the HR/CT role from the RCMP SERT to the CAF JTF 2. The following day, the unit was already undertaking operational tasks.
From the beginning, the CO realized that the unit would have to evolve. The RCMP SERT had been content to remain strictly a police HR type organization. Initial time constraints meant that JTF 2 had to take on that paradigm and the police culture that accompanied it. However, with the “black” (i.e., CT) role came the issue of utility. How often would it be used? Romses realized this could also create retention issues. Moreover, for JTF 2 to provide utility to the greater CAF a “green” role (i.e., a traditional military SOF role, such as direct action and strategic reconnaissance) would need to be developed.
As a result, the unit began to evolve in the mid to late-1990s , developing a more typical military SOF orientation and capability; however, HR/CT remained JTF 2’s primary focus. In 1994, the CDS approved growth for JTF 2, as well as a transition from a pure “black” CT role to other special operations tasks. As a result, the unit undertook tasks around the globe that gave its members both experience in foreign locations, and exposure to senior military and civilian decision makers.
Although the unit was expanding to include a green component, as already mentioned, its focus was still almost exclusively on black skills. A green phase during initial training was largely an introduction to fieldcraft for the non-combat arms volunteers. Within the unit, there was also tension between those who favoured retaining the exclusive black role and police culture, and those who wanted to push JTF 2 to be more akin to a military organization such as the British SAS and U.S. Delta Force. External events provided the catalyst for change.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, millions watched their television screens mesmerized as events unfolded in New York City. In the early morning hours, a passenger jet had ploughed into the top stories of the World Trade Center (WTC) in the financial core of the city. As most were trying to absorb what happened, a second large commercial airliner came into view and slammed into the twin tower of the WTC. It would only be a short time later that both towers collapsed onto themselves and crumpled to the ground, killing all those inside. A third aircraft slammed into the Pentagon, killing and injuring hundreds more, and a fourth hijacked jetliner, heading for Washington, D.C., slammed into the ground in Pennsylvania, short of its objective, failing on its mission due to the bravery of its passengers. In total, almost three thousand people were killed in the attacks .
Within days, it became clear that the Americans would take military action to strike at the terrorists who planned and conducted the attack and those that supported and abetted them. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization, sheltered in Afghanistan by Mullah Omar and his Taliban government, quickly became the centre of attention. Not surprisingly, the Americans, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), paramilitary forces, and US SOF, in conjunction with the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban resistance movement, quickly launched an offensive to oust the Taliban and capture bin Laden and his associates.
The Canadians quickly moved to support their American allies. The CAF mobilized to send ships, aircraft, and ground forces in support of the U.S. mission, titled Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Part of the CAF force package was a special operations task force (SOTF) that deployed as part of OEF and was under operational control of the American commander of the Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command. Their tasks included direct action, special reconnaissance, and sensitive site exploitation.[100]
The JTF 2 based SOTF was deployed in theatre from December 2001 to November 2002.[101] At the time, JTF 2 was largely an unknown quantity and its role in theatre was initially marginalized. “They were curious because they [Americans] didn’t really know us,” conceded one member of the Task Force. He explained, “At the beginning, people said, ‘Who the f--- is JTF2?’”[102]
However, it took only one mission to demonstrate their skill sets, and very quickly they became a force of choice. According to U.S. military officials, the JTF 2 SOTF had conducted “[forty-two ] reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as [twenty-three ] direct action missions.”[103] Tasks included “snatching senior Taliban officials,” manning high-altitude observation posts, and combing mountain cave complexes.[104] Their performance earned them the trust and respect of the U.S. commanders in theatre. As stated earlier, the American SOF commanders at first were, quite frankly, reluctant to use them. By the end of the tour, the JTF 2 SOTF had become the designated coalition theatre direct-action reserve force, with American sub-units allocated to it under tactical control (normally Rangers or 82nd Airborne and aviation assets). In the end, the JTF 2 SOTF executed more missions than any other coalition SOF force assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force — South (CJSOTF-S ).
In fact, U.S. Navy commander Kerry Metz, director of operations for CJSOTF-S , told Congress, “We were fortunate to have the finest special operations … and we challenged our operators to conduct missions in some of the most hostile environments ever operated in.” He
