On May 25, 1943, the name was changed to reflect this. It was re-designated the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion and it represented the Canadian element of the joint U.S./Canadian First Special Service Force (FSSF).[50]
Nonetheless, its genesis originated in England with Lord Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) and Prime Minister Churchill’s personal support. The original concept, code-named Operation Plough, was of a guerrilla force capable of operations in Norway to attack the hydroelectric and heavy water plants in that country, in order to disrupt the German war industry and the Nazi atomic weapons program.[51] Some thought was also put to using the force to destroy the Ploesti oil fields in Romania and hydroelectric facilities in Italy. In all, the planners reasoned that in destroying any of these targets a hard-hitting raiding force would not only damage Germany’s vital war industry, it would also tie up German forces required to protect facilities and chase down the guerrilla force.[52]
The Americans accepted the project and Prime Minister Churchill and Lord Mountbatten very quickly convinced the Canadians to participate as well. As a result, a U.S./Canadian brigade-sized formation was created, with Americans and Canadians serving side by side, wearing the same American uniform, in a military command that was completely integrated. At any given moment, it was impossible to differentiate Canadian from American and vice versa. Each had officers commanding troops of the other nation. At inception, the Canadians contributed 697 all ranks to the formation, representing approximately a quarter of the total number of troops.[53]
As was the case with 1 Cdn Para Bn, the Canadian Army took their commitment seriously and attempted to pick the best soldiers possible for this unique endeavour. Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the American commander of the FSSF, made it clear that he preferred that Canadian volunteers be chosen in the “lower ranks between 18 and 45 [years old], physically rugged and mentally agile, physically able and willing to take parachute training.”[54] It became obvious to everyone concerned that superior physical fitness, experience, maturity, and youth were the cornerstones on which the FSSF would be forged.[55] In addition, Frederick also stressed that it was imperative that each man be able to work efficiently independently or in small groups, regardless of the tactical situation or operational theatre. Ross Munro, the renowned Canadian war reporter, noted that the First Special Service Force “will be a continental edition of commandos of the British Army.” He added, “In selecting the men to make it up, emphasis will be placed on ‘youth, hardness and fitness.’”[56]
As the initial focus of the FSSF was to be sabotage, raiding, and guerrilla-type warfare, the “Forcemen” were trained in a wide spectrum of skills, including parachuting, demolitions, unarmed combat, weapons handling, mountaineering, and arctic warfare. Physical fitness very quickly became the decisive selection tool. Only the hardest of men could successfully complete the training. For instance, members of the FSSF were expected to be “capable of marching [thirty-five ] miles a day across rough country or [ninety] miles without rest.”[57]
But, after all, the force was to be ready to deploy to Norway on December 15, 1942, for an arduous and very dangerous mission. So, even as the FSSF was in the process of establishing itself, its training regime was in overdrive. Upon arrival, members undertook their jump training, which in some cases, was all of forty-eight hours as opposed to the more standard three week course. In August 1942, journalist Don Mason captured the contemporary image of the force that was being created in Helena, Montana, where they were based: “The cream of Canada’s hard-fighting army youth is training in the United States today for ‘aerial commando’ raiding which one day soon will make the German and the Jap think cyclones have struck where they thought they were safe and secure.”[58]
However, by late 1942 it became clear that Operation Plough was not going to happen. There were three major impediments. First, Frederick’s request for the temporary diversion of 750 Lancaster bombers to insert his formation hit an immediate wall. The intractable architect of Britain’s strategic bombing campaign, Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal of the Royal Air Force (RAF), responded, “That is our best bomber.” He continued, “if you can show us where Plough can accomplish more in its operation than one thousand Lancasters could do on the bombing runs, we shall consider the plane for your uses.”[59]
Frederick’s next dose of reality occurred when the Combined Operations Command planners briefed him on the Commando raiding program and, more important, the work of Brigadier Colin Gubbins’s Special Operations Executive and their Norwegian sabotage campaign. Although the SOE had never even heard of Operation Plough, or the FSSF for that matter, they, too, had plans for sabotaging most of the targets that the FSSF was theoretically earmarked to destroy. Significantly, Gubbins’s plan required very few aircraft and only two or three Norwegian soldiers for each target.[60]
The final nail in the coffin resulted from Colonel Frederick’s discussion with Major-General Wilhelm von Tangen Hansteen, the commander in chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Hansteen bluntly informed Frederick that the king and prime minister of Norway opposed the concept of Operation Plough. They were concerned that the large-scale destruction of power would create a greater hardship for the Norwegian people than it would for the Germans. Moreover, although they welcomed any assistance in ousting the occupying German forces, they did not wish to do so by destroying the vital industrial infrastructure that was key to Norway’s economic well-being .[61]
And so, with no aircraft, no host country support, and a competing organization that appeared to have a more efficient, more precise, and less resource-intensive means of achieving the same goal, Colonel Frederick quickly realized that Operation Plough was doomed. Any doubt he may have harboured was quickly dashed when he returned to London to meet with Lord Mountbatten prior to his flight to Washington, D.C. The chief of Combined Operations candidly explained to Frederick that Operation Plough was no longer a pressing issue.
By this time, Combined Operations and the whole raiding concept was under siege by the War Office. The Allied effort, particularly as a result of American might and industrial capacity, was slowly beginning to turn the tide of the war. Raiding and subversive activities, never fully supported by the mainstream military, were further marginalized as large-scale conventional operations such as the invasion of Northern Africa took shape.
Moreover, Mountbatten had no means of influencing the release of aircraft and he conceded that SOE provided a more economical means of achieving the desired result, not to mention at a more politically acceptable price for the Norwegian government in exile in London. As such, both men agreed to let Plough die. Frederick quickly sent a message to his formation in Helena, Montana. True to Frederick’s character — it was short and to the point:
Suspend effort on present line.… New plan may be radically different and not concerned with hydroelectric or other industrial installations…. Cease training on hydroelectric installations and … stress general tactical training, to include attack of fortifications, pill boxes, barracks, and troop concentrations. Change in weapons may be necessary to provide greater firepower, so suspend further small arms training pending a decision.[62]
On his return to North America, Colonel Frederick briefed General Marshall, the American army chief of staff. He then left for Montana, unsure whether the FSSF would be continued or scrapped. That decision was now left with the General Staff to get a political decision. By October 8, 1942, the Canadian chief of the General Staff forwarded a telegram to Lieutenant-General McNaughton, Canada’s overseas commander, informing him of the latest turn of events. The Canadians were now waiting for the Americans to make known their intentions prior to articulating their continuing support.
However, Major-General Murchie’s missive provided some telling clues. The alternatives considered were:
1 continue with special service force if Americans so desire;
2 amalgamate with 1st Parachute Battalion;
3 disband and disperse personnel; and
