Whatever the constitutional details, which are unattested for this period, it is clear that the Aitolians were engaged in a politics of cooperation. The aim of the ensuing Lamian War was nothing short of the liberation of all Greece from Macedonian rule.3 The Boiotians initially refused to support the movement, fearing that if it was successful, the Athenians would restore Thebes, but they were eventually persuaded to join.4 The Greek forces were finally defeated at the battle of Krannon in September 322.5
When Antipater and Krateros forced the Greek allies to come to terms city by city, only the Aitolians and Athenians refused.6 For their initial recalcitrance the Athenians paid with nothing less than the loss of their democracy, their Samian cleruchy, and control of Oropos, which became independent until 304.7 The Aitolians suffered an abortive invasion of their territory by Antipater and gained and then lost control of much of Thessaly. Two details emerge from the narrative of these years that are important for our purposes: the Aitolians now had citizen forces, suggesting an Aitolian army associated with a single Aitolian state, and they were already interested in trying to acquire control of central Greece east of the Pindos Mountains.8
The Lamian War briefly united most of central Greece against Macedonian rule; thereafter they became divided by the wars of Alexander’s successors. The Aitolians, believing in Polyperchon’s declaration that the Greek cities were free to return to the governments they had known under Philip and Alexander, continued to support him even after the murder of his ally Olympias and the rise of Cassander.9 They thus became willing allies of Antigonos Monophthalmos in 314/3, when he likewise promised freedom, autonomy, and freedom from garrisons in his bid to challenge Cassander.10
Cassander found a different strategy for gaining support, declaring his intention in 316/5 to rebuild Thebes.11 Cassander probably had several motives. The only ancient explanation we have is that he acted out of hatred for Alexander. It was certainly, in part, a bid to gain further support in central Greece; his political enemies complained bitterly about it later.12 The restoration promulgated the message that Cassander was committed to the freedom of the Greek cities, a message that he probably intended to spread beyond central Greece—at least to the Peloponnese, where many cities were under the control of his rival Polyperchon. The profile of supporters for the reconstruction of Thebes is interesting: the Athenians, probably motivated in part by a desire to see the many Theban exiles in Athens return home, were joined by the people of Messene and Megalopolis, two cities that owed their very existence to the Thebans.13 Finally, the strategic position of Thebes, situated between the passes of Thessaly and the rest of central Greece, is obvious; the new city retained a Macedonian garrison for many years after its restoration.14
For our purposes there are two particularly important questions about the reconstruction of Thebes: How did the other Boiotian poleis feel about it, and how did it affect the Boiotian koinon? It is worth remembering that those cities that had most bitterly resented Theban hegemony in the fourth century—Plataia, Orchomenos, and Thespiai—all helped Alexander’s forces to raze the city to the ground in 335. Diodoros says, somewhat ominously, that Cassander persuaded the Boiotians before he began to refound the city, implying that there was serious opposition. This was certainly political, but it was probably also economic: after the city was destroyed, Alexander had distributed the land among the neighboring Boiotians, who were “deriving great proceeds from the land.”15 It was probably the combination of Cassander’s strategic intentions in refounding the city and the Boiotians’ reticence toward its renewed existence that prevented it from immediately becoming a member of the Boiotian koinon upon its refoundation.16 It is clear that in 313 the Thebans (still garrisoned by Cassander) and Boiotians were acting independently of each other. Indeed it is likely that it took nearly three decades for the Boiotians to accept the return of Thebes, the old hegemon, into the koinon. I shall return to this later.
The Peloponnesian cities became cruelly trapped between the shifting alliances of the successors in these tumultuous years. Both Polyperchon and Cassander held cities in the region by force, triggering a bloody series of events that resulted, ultimately, in the possession of all Achaia by Antigonos.17 But the rivals who had garrisoned different cities in the region had violently splintered the recent political unification of Achaia; although we cannot trace that process in detail, these were the conditions that necessitated what Polybios later spoke of as a refoundation of the koinon in the late 280s.18
The Aitolians did not pin all their hopes on external support; they continued to attempt to build up their power in central Greece. A boundary dispute with their Akarnanian neighbors led to an Aitolian attack on the polis of Agrinion, which may at this time have been incorporated into the koinon.19 Despite—or perhaps because of—a terrifying invasion by Cassander in 313, the Aitolians formalized their alliance with Antigonos, and the Boiotians followed suit.20 But that was a difficult alliance to preserve with Thebes still garrisoned by Cassander. In a sham gesture of autonomy the Thebans now made a formal alliance with him, while Cassander managed only to squeeze an armistice out of the rest of the Boiotians.21 The polis of Thebes and the koinon of the Boiotians remained distinct entities. In 312 Antigonos rewarded the Boiotians with Chalkis and Oropos, seized from Cassander, and then secured his control over the region by expelling Cassander’s garrison from Thebes and professedly freeing the city.22 Although it has frequently been inferred that at this moment Thebes was reintegrated into the Boiotian koinon, there is in fact no solid evidence for the claim, and indeed there are good reasons for thinking that the reintegration occurred significantly later, in or shortly after 287.23 The Boiotians and Aitolians then operated quite independently of Macedonian intervention, while the poleis of Achaia, under the close watch of Ptolemaic garrisons at Corinth and Sikyon, struggled individually to recover from the violence of the last two decades.24 All were nominally free, but the events of 304 show that old Greece was still regarded as a source of power to the successors.
After abandoning his unsuccessful year-long siege of Rhodes, thanks at least in part to the diplomatic efforts of the Aitolian koinon and the Athenians, Demetrios Poliorketes sailed to central Greece with the intention of undermining Cassander’s power in the region.25 Again the propaganda was that he had arrived to protect the Greeks against the unmitigated depredations of Cassander and Polyperchon.26 His arrival represented a blow to the Boiotian koinon, which lost both Chalkis and Oropos; the latter was given to the Athenians, who retained it until Demetrios lost his kingdom in 287.27 The Boiotians were forced (perhaps without too much difficulty, given their history of hostility) to surrender their allegiance to Cassander and make a new alliance with Demetrios.28 Having secured the allegiance of the Athenians as well, Demetrios moved on to Aitolia, where he found willing allies in his war against Cassander and Polyperchon.29 He then moved into the Peloponnese, where their power was more firmly entrenched, and managed to take both Sikyon and Corinth as well as several Achaian and northern Arkadian poleis.30
The massive defeat suffered by Antigonos and Demetrios at Ipsos in 301 had important ramifications in central Greece. The Aitolians, guessing that it would yield great gains for their longtime enemy Cassander, seem to have in some way taken control of Phokis and forged an alliance “between the Boiotians and the Aitolians and the Phokians with the Aitolians”; fragmentary copies of the treaty were found at both Thermon and Delphi (T53, B10).31 It was probably by this means that the Aitolians secured a foothold in the Parnassos region, and particularly at Delphi, which soon gave the persistent Demetrios a specious cause to declare war against them. It should be remembered, however, that the Aitolians’ collective relations with Delphi had been quite close since around 335/4, when the Delphians granted all Aitolians the right of first consultation at the Delphic oracle.32
The independent alliance of the Boiotians and Aitolians, who now somehow included the Phokians in their state, presented a real threat to those Macedonian
