Elites in the Lebanese and Syrian provinces displayed, however, great reluctance to follow through on the implications of these national visions and programs, and when in the first decades of the twentieth century developments in the Ottoman Empire threatened more directly the interests of local elites, the latter ratcheted up their opposition by promoting decentralization plans within the framework of the Empire that eventually fizzled out. Nationalist agendas and representations in the Arab provinces hence remained ambivalent and in flux up until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of War World I. It was only then that the ambivalent and inchoate reformist and nationalist programs of the elite crystallized into full-fledged nationalist agendas. The terms Ottomanism, Syrianism, Arabism, and for our purpose, Lebanism, aim hence to denote the development of national ideals and representations among the local populations of the Empire, which displayed some elements of modern nationalism but had not developed into articulate and coherent nationalist ideologies or movements.
A central contention of this study is that, contrary to conventional accounts, the appearance and evolution of nationalism in the Lebanese province followed in its broad lines developments in the rest of the Syrian provinces. In a similar vein, nationalist agendas and representations emerged and fluctuated in the Lebanese Mountain in conjunction with various schemes and reformist programs developed by the Maronite clerical and secular elite in Mount Lebanon to take advantage of, circumvent, or check the efforts initiated by the Ottoman government by mid-nineteenth century to reassert its authority in the Syrian provinces and to reorganize the Empire along new principles of government. These endeavors, accompanied by the growing intervention of the European powers in the domestic affairs of the region, initially led to a period of profound instability and protracted disturbances in the Lebanese Mountain, which culminated with the massacres of 1860. During this troubled period, schemes to establish a semi-independent Christian entity in Mount Lebanon were mooted by some Lebanese clerical circles in conjunction with French Catholic and liberal circles. These schemes, however, foundered, and the Ottoman government ultimately succeeded in its efforts to reestablish its authority over Mount Lebanon, which was granted a limited autonomous regime, known as the mutasarrifiyya, in 1861. Thereafter, the population of the Mountain accommodated to the new regime, which provided sixty years of “long peace” but failed to bring prosperity and stability. Dismal socioeconomic and political conditions in Mount Lebanon eventually led some members of the Lebanese elite and activists to devise, by the beginning of the twentieth century, reformist political projects and programs to cope with the growing problems of the Mountain. At the same time, they envisioned national representations in line with their reformist projects. Like their counterparts in the remaining Syrian provinces, however, Lebanese activists and members of the elite wrestled with several nationalist agendas and representations, which notably encompassed Ottomanism and Syrianism. However, in addition to the agendas contemplated by the other inhabitants of the Syrian lands, activists from the Lebanese provinces benefited from and considered another alternative, namely Lebanism, which presented an additional option to Syrianism and Ottomanism and denoted distinct projects to address the particular problems of their own province. And like their counterparts in the Syrian provinces, their national representations appeared and evolved in relation to the lines of the various political programs they formulated. The reform projects and national representations of the Lebanese elites varied according to the delicate fluctuations in the general situation of the Ottoman Empire, accounting for frequent shifts in political agendas and representations. The different national representations envisioned by local Lebanese and Syrian elites, notwithstanding strong assertions about the historical and actual reality of the purported nations they envisaged, represented potential ideals to be fulfilled in some undetermined future. During this period, this future was not as yet distinctly perceived by the elite and in any case did not appear as immediate. Furthermore, at the time, it still seemed possible to envision the association and coexistence of different national communities within the confines of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, members of the secular Lebanese elite remained reluctant to choose between their different political and national ideals, often combining several nationalist agendas and identities, which for them remained, until the end of the period under study, political options and potential alternatives that could be changed and revised.
Hence, the period preceding the demise of the Ottoman Empire did not witness the development of nationalist movements, Lebanese or otherwise, but a shifting and tentative quest for national representation among some members of the Maronite elite, as well as their Syrian counterparts, that evolved and fluctuated in relation with their diverse reformist agendas. Nevertheless, during this period, some core ideas and basic historical myths around which Lebanese nationalism eventually crystallized were formulated by members of the Lebanese clerical and secular elite. They only matured into coherent nationalist claims in the few months that preceded the establishment the Lebanese state.
The book reconstructs the complex process that led to the appearance of Lebanist national agendas and representations among certain clerical and secular circles within Mount Lebanon by the middle of the nineteenth century. It then follows the subsequent development and fluctuation of such ideas and attempts to assess their impact on the rest of the population. It deals with other national representations adopted by certain actors hailing from the Mountain, such as Ottomanism and Syrianism, underscoring the interaction of these differing views with, and their impact on, Lebanism itself. At the same time, the book examines the diverse forces and personalities who promoted such agendas within and without the Mountain. Indeed, as the nineteenth century unfolded, large numbers of the population of the Mount Lebanon began to move outside the Mountain, settling in the neighboring town of Beirut, in Egypt, and in the Americas. Their views greatly influenced those expounded by part of the elite within the Mountain and therefore need to be incorporated in this study. Hence, although this study concentrates on Mount Lebanon proper, and more particularly on the Maronite community, it follows the activity of certain Lebanese groups and personalities outside the confines of the Mountain, in Beirut, Egypt, or farther away, when and where their views are relevant to the analysis of the formulation of national ideals.
Chapters 1 to 3 cover the period stretching from 1840 until 1861, which witnessed a critical situation in the Mountain following the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali from Syria, the demise of the Emir Bashir II, and the reestablishment of Ottoman rule in the Syrian provinces. At that time, the aspirations of some local Maronite clerical circles to establish the dominance of their community in the Mountain converged with the romantic fantasies and projects of some French Catholic and liberal circles who dreamed of a Christian regeneration of the East in agreement with prevalent Western civilizing and expansionist presumptions. The interaction between these Maronite and French circles gave birth to vague political projects aiming at establishing a semi-independent Maronite entity in Mount Lebanon. The most elaborate formulations of such schemes surfaced in the years 1860-61, when projects supporting the establishment of an enlarged Christian Greater Lebanon and portending the entity established in 1920 were devised. At the same time, the interaction between some Maronite and French circles generated historical narratives depicting the Maronites as an historical nation, striving to attain self-determination and deserving to be helped by the Western, and especially French, powers to fulfill their objective.
The diverse political projects devised between 1840 and 1860 failed to materialize and were replaced by other political ambitions following the establishment in Mount Lebanon, in 1861, of the mutasarrifiyya regime. At the same time, the ideals and views that had sustained such schemes faded away; as the Maronite Church accommodated to the new regime, it revised and altered its political views and policies. It gradually abandoned its former semi-separatist schemes and aspirations and began to promote more conservative political views, articulated around the safeguard of the spiritual, social, and political autonomy of the Maronite community within the framework of a multinational and multireligious Empire along with a staunch commitment to the preservation of the special regime of Mount Lebanon that fairly secured this basic aim.
Chapter 4 deals with the revised views and aspirations of the Maronite Church during the mutasarrifiyya period, whereas chapter 5 to chapter 7 cover the views of the secular political and intellectual elite during this same period. By the beginning of the twentieth century, a new secular Maronite elite took the
