even after the power to rule had been nominally restored to the emperor in 1868 and Japan had officially become a “modern” state. The laws issued in 1869, for example, replaced the feudal system of the buke with a “new” order listing court nobility and feudal barons (daimyo) as aristocrats (kazoku), the warriors or former samurai as gentry (shizoku), and lumping all the other subjects of the nation (such as farmers, artisans, merchants, and even outcast groups) under the single qualification of commoners (heimin).
Under the Tokugawa, the titular emperor and his court nobles were forced to live in virtual seclusion in Kyoto. There they were kept under continual, direct surveillance by appointed officials of the Edo government, and their financial affairs were strictly regulated in such a fashion as to deprive them of the necessary means of rallying dissenting clans to their banner or of subsidizing independent forces of their own. Their political relevance thus became almost nil, although their excellence in the cultural achievements of the age continued to be encouraged and widely admired. As related by Webb, the main outline of Tokugawa policy in regard to the emperor was that of, on the one hand, rescuing him from the depths of utter destitution into which he had fallen during the previous age of continuous warfare, while, on the other hand, simultaneously isolating him to insure his continuing political irrelevance. As this author so aptly expressed it: “Though Ieyasu may be said to have constructed a prison and housed emperors there, it was a prison that had all the dignity and splendor of a cathedral” (Webb, 58).
Kept under equally strict surveillance after their ranks had been decimated during the Ashikaga (Muromachi) and Momoyama periods, forbidden to gather together ever again to form those large communities which had proved so uncontrollable in the past, the priests and monks of the various religious sects of feudal Japan formed another class, relegated almost exclusively to spiritual and educational dimensions.
As for the commoners (heimin) who formed by far the largest and the most productive segments of the nation,
however rich they were or however wise and intelligent they were, whether they wished or not, [they] had almost no political right whatsoever. Their condition is summed up by Mr. Dickins in his “Life of Sir Henry Parkes,” in the following words: “The people were scarcely items, politically speaking, in old Japan. Their business was to grow, make, carry, multiply and—above all—pay taxes.” (Hayashi, 70)
During the reign of the Tokugawa clan, the military class formed “an immense standing army” numbering “over 400,000 families.” In Brinkley’s words: “It was an exceptionally costly army, for the families of the samurai had to be maintained as well as the samurai themselves; and the officers, that is to say, the feudal nobles and their chief vassals, enjoyed revenues far in excess of any emoluments ever accounted elsewhere on account of military service” (Brinkley1, 116). The country was divided officially into provinces and districts, over which the Tokugawa exercised the powers of military government and fiscal control, either directly through special agencies or indirectly through the provincial lords (daimyo) of certain powerful military clans who had been appointed or reconfirmed as regional governors by the Tokugawa after 1600. These provinces irradiated like spokes from the political center of the nation, Edo, where the shogun resided with his government and the cohorts of warriors under his direct command. The size and location of each province depended upon the political importance of the governor appointed by the Tokugawa to rule there: governors belonging to clans unswervingly loyal to the Tokugawa were positioned closer to the center, while those considered less trustworthy were relegated to provinces further away, at the periphery of the kingdom.
The central part of Japan, including the Kanto Plain on the East and the old capital in the West, was held directly by the Tokugawa themselves, by various branches of the family, and by the feudal lords and warriors who had backed Ieyasu in the great battle for supremacy in 1600. This central area was strategically the heart of the country. It contained most of the larger plains and most of the best agricultural land of Japan, and also a large proportion of the commercial towns and cities. (Reischauer1, 81)
The shogun ruled supreme from Edo over all these territories. His government, in accordance with the military traditions of the class he represented, was called bakufu—a denomination which, as previously noted, was the ancient name for the generalissimo’s headquarters or tent on the battlefield during the Kamakura period. This term was used until the Restoration to designate the headquarters of successive dynasties of Tokugawa leaders.
The shogun resided in a mighty castle in Edo—a vivid contrast to the dwelling place of the emperor in Kyoto. As described by Brinkley, the shogun’s immense fortress was surrounded by a triple barrier of huge moats, “the outermost measuring nine and a half miles in length, the innermost one and a half, their scarps built up with colossal blocks of granite” (Brinkley1, 10).
Even the gardens inside these walls, with their sophisticated grace intended to be reminiscent of Heian culture, could not conceal the military nature of the roads and paths leading to the central buildings. They constituted a veritable labyrinth whose pattern was a heavily guarded secret, and they passed beneath bridges or were lined with bastions in such a way as to expose any unwelcome guests, regardless of their number, to a concentrated attack with bows and arrows, cross-bows, or firearms. Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco (1564-1636), who visited this castle in 1609, remarked upon its huge moats with their openings for guns, its massive drawbridge and ramparts. At the first gate he passed through two thousand warriors armed with harquebuses (guns with hooks) and muskets, divided into two ranks. At the second gate stood four hundred warriors armed with pikes and lances; three hundred more, armed with the curved spear (naginata), stood at the third gate. The same author relates that the armories of this enormous military compound contained enough armors, spears, swords, and muskets “to equip one hundred thousand men” (Cooper, 141).
According to Yazaki, the construction of this elaborate stronghold began before 1607 and was completed in 1639 under Iemitsu, third shogun of the Tokugawa clan. Lavishly furnished, its central sector covered 181.4 acres. Moreover, it could easily accommodate, in the splendor to which they had become accustomed, “over 260 daimyo, together with 50,000 standard-bearers if necessary” (Yazaki, 177).
Oda Nobunaga had realized that the numerous fortifications scattered all over Japan represented a basic challenge to the attempt of any lord or clan to attain national supremacy. Each castle, in fact, formed a base of operations not only for defensive purposes but, more importantly, for launching invasions or revolts. Nobunaga, therefore, issued directives (ikkoku-ichijorei) ordering all provincial lords who had sworn allegiance to him to see to it that there should be “but one central castle in each province” (Yazaki, 129); all other fortresses and outposts were to be dismantled promptly. Ieyasu implemented the edict during the Genna era (1615-24) with a thoroughness that left most provincial lords without any defensive castle (shiro-kengo), leaving them only “provincial strongholds” (tokoro-kengo). In relation to himself and his most loyal warlords, however, as the records would seem to indicate, the edict was not applicable.
Of all the warriors concentrated in Edo, almost one-half were kept in a state of constant readiness under the direct command of the shogun. They were called “direct retainers” of the bakufu (bakushin) and were divided into two major categories: the hatamoto and the gokenin. The other half (baishiri) included warriors from all the provincial clans who served their lords in the capital, or waited upon the shogun after having been delegated to him by their lords for specific duties or a certain period of time.
The title of hatamoto is generally translated as “banner knight” or “standard-bearer,” and it was traditionally assigned to personal bodyguards of the military commander who rode with him and protected him in battle. The Tokugawa assigned this title to retainers (okunishu) who had served Ieyasu when he was still Lord of Mikawa, as well as to retainers who had pledged their loyalty to him after he had left that province (kingokushu) or after he had settled in Edo (kantoshu). It was also bestowed by the Tokugawa upon descendants of families of illustrious lineage or “men of exceptional learning and
