were the Minamoto (Genji) and the Taira (Heike). Both claimed direct or indirect descent from members of the imperial family who, in accordance with ancient custom, had been sent to the provinces when there had been “no place for them at court.” Usually, such exiled royal subjects changed their names after six generations. The fourteen families of the Minamoto clan traced their origins to the emperors Saga (786-842) and Seiwa (850-80), while the four families comprising the Taira clan claimed Emperor Kammu (737-806) as their ancestor. These claims, however, must be studied critically in view of the fact that any new center of power usually tries to link itself to the tradition of the older, supplanted power in order to justify, reinforce, and consolidate its position. The strong reaction of the court to the new leaders, who were often spitefully referred to in imperial decrees as being “people of all ranks,” indicates that in most cases we can presume the claimed relationship to have been nonexistent. This historical probability is further confirmed by the emergence of leaders from the lower social strata in later times—men such as the warlords Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, among others, who prepared the way for the Tokugawa dictatorship, which was to emerge in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, even when extant, such a relationship did not prevent the independent formation of these new and formidable clans, which were led by strong, ambitious men of arms and organized militarily within their own provincial areas.
Their independence during the early part of the Heian period had become so absolute that, according to Sansom, numerous imperial decrees (largely ignored) were issued from 889 to 897, referring to the fact that “people of all ranks” in the provinces were oppressing farmers, defying the officers of the imperial court, and generally running things to suit themselves. The same scholar also states that by the middle of the Heian period the court could no longer keep peace among the provincial clans and that twice it was even threatened directly by their rebellious policies. In 939-40, Taira Masakado, who had been sent as an officer of the crown to supervise the eastern provinces, found them so well organized and militarily prepared that he decided to place himself at their head and turn against the central government. In a short time, he and his forces occupied most of the Kanto plain. He was killed in a battle against hostile clans before an imperial general (hurriedly appointed to quell the revolt) could even arrive on the scene. Then Fujiwara Sumitomo, appointed by the crown to deal with piracy and sedition in the provinces and along the coastline, led local pirate bands against government forces and seized control of large areas along the Inland Sea. In both cases it was clearly shown that provincial forces could challenge the central government and that such challenges could not be met successfully by an imperial response, but only by relying upon similar groups of armed men led by their own local leaders. In this way, ironically enough, the emperor himself, as well as the rest of the nobility and the ancient families of regents, eventually came to rely upon the forces of these feudal barons for their very survival during the dramatically intense struggles which followed. Unfortunately, like the unleashing of ills from Pandora’s box, the military forces released from and within the provinces proved to be largely uncontrollable in spite of various attempts in this direction on the part of the imperial court and other exalted patrons. Moreover, these forces were seemingly not able to come to terms even among themselves, but turned against one another, each usually fighting not for the emperor or an aristocratic family, but for itself alone.
By the early part of the twelfth century, clashes were occurring regularly between the largest and most powerful associations of feudal barons—one led by the Taira and the the other by the Minamoto. The Hogen War of 1156 was still fought in the name of the imperial heirs, Goshirakawa and Konoe (sons of the retired emperor Toba), who were competing for the throne. But the Gempei War of 1180-85 was clearly a direct confrontation in which the forces of the Minamoto were dealt a crushing defeat. The head of the Taira clan, Kiyomori (1118-81), consolidated his power at court through a series of skillful manipulations and marriages which finally put one of his nephews, Antoku, on the throne at the age of two. This feudal baron, who had at last reached the apex of power through force of arms, defended his position ruthlessly against any threat, from any source. One of the major obstacles he encountered was the resistance offered by certain religious communities who had armed forces of their own, which they used to control the vast and productive territories assigned to them over a period of centuries by many different emperors. Without the slightest hesitation, Kiyomori moved against them, putting to the sword the priests and monks of Todai-ji and Kofuku-ji before sacking their monasteries in Nara.
The age of supremacy of the Taira clan is known as the Rokuhara period (1156-85). It came to an end when Minamoto Yoritomo (1148-99), whose life had been spared after the defeat of his clan in 1160, succeeded in rallying and uniting the clans hostile to the Taira. Under his leadership, these forces defeated the Taira at Ichinotani (1184), Yashima (1185), and Dannoura (1185). This interesting military leader, who had been raised in Izu by vassals of the Taira clan (the clever Hojo family), usually employed skilled generals to great advantage on the battlefield—men such as his younger half-brother Yoshitsune and his cousin Yoshinaka. Both of these men and their families, however, were promptly dispatched (either forced to commit suicide or killed outright) after they had won great victories for him. Yoritomo then assumed the title of Seii Tai-shogun. This title appears to have evolved from the ancient imperial commission Seii-shi (“sent against the barbarians”) and the title taisho, denoting the general-in-chief of an army. The latter title appears in the records of the ninth century in relation to the commanders of the imperial guards. It had been assigned by imperial decree to earlier leaders of renown, such as Sakanoue Tamuramaro, who, after scoring impressive victories at the end of the eighth century, promptly returned the title to the emperor. With Yoritomo, however, it became a hereditary right of his house, and it was assumed and retained by a long line of military dictators who ruled Japan in the name of the emperor until the late nineteenth century. In its abbreviated form, such rulers were generally known throughout the land as shogun.
Yoritomo established the center of his military command, characteristically known as camp office or tent headquarters (bakufu), in Kamakura. From his stronghold there, once he had expropriated the Taira’s estates (as well as those of the feudal barons who had unwisely allied themselves with that doomed clan), he placed constables or guards (shugo) in each province and district headmen (jito) in every taxable area, thus establishing the financial basis which made it possible for his clan and the clans of his allies to maintain military forces in a permanent condition of professional readiness. The period during which his clan ruled the country (through a succession of military leaders) is known as the Kamakura period and lasted from 1185 to 1333. The ancient system of landownership, characterized by the myoden and the shoen and based upon a chain of owner-manager-tenant-laborer, became more military in structure and function. The members of the new territorial units controlled by each clan were expected to be familiar with and practice the use of traditional weapons of combat. The leaders of the clans, naturally, either maintained or assumed for themselves a position of privilege, and this, in time, became despotically absolute and practically unassailable.
When Yoritomo died in 1199, the power held by the Minamoto clan was wielded by the Hojo family, whose members, once vassals of the Taira, had sheltered him in Izu. Rewarded munificently by him, they proved to be exceptional statesmen during the troubled Kamakura period, maneuvering skillfully to crush a revolt of the nobility in 1221, reorganizing the selection of emperors and the election of domestic court officials, redistributing confiscated lands to loyal barons, issuing one of the first feudal codes of law (the Joei Shikimoku), reorganizing the administrative and fiscal machinery of the state, rallying the clans against the Mongols in 1274 and 1281, developing the arts and literature (mostly epic and martial), and promoting the Zen school of Buddhism, whose austere simplicity of thought and action was to prove so congenial to the pragmatic soul of the warrior.
The efforts
