The Korean Mind. Boye Lafayette De Mente

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      Chaegim 책임 Chay-geem

       Dealing with Responsibility

      Korea’s traditional culture precluded the development of individualism and a sense of self. The Confucian system of filial piety and familism required that the self and the individual be merged into the family collective. Centuries of conditioning in the concept and practice of collective identity as opposed to individual identity resulted in Koreans’ failing to develop a clear sense of personal chaegim (chay-geem), or “responsibility.”

      Chaegim was seen as a family or collective thing, not as a personal or individual matter. The father and family as a whole were responsible for the attitudes and conduct of each individual member, particularly when the conduct was regarded as immoral or disruptive. When a member of a family committed a crime or transgression against someone else or against government authorities, the whole family was considered guilty and was subject to punishment.

      The demands on the “collective character” of individuals eventually became so strong that the personal pronoun I was seldom used. Koreans typically thought and spoke in terms of we, not I. In this environment, people generally did not think in terms of personal responsibility.

      Present-day Koreans are still being culturally programmed in the concept of family-centered collective responsibility, but not nearly as much as in the past. At the same time, they are also being taught to develop individual chaegim, particularly in high-tech, highly competitive businesses, where the ideas and efforts of individuals acting on their own can make the difference between success and failure. This does not mean, however, that foreigners dealing with Koreans in business or in politics can automatically expect individual Koreans either to act on their own or to take personal responsibility for projects—or even their own actions.

      Chaegim in Korean enterprises and institutions continues to be far more collective than it is in their Western counterparts. The Western practice of identifying and dealing with the “man in charge” often does not work in Korea. Typically there is no single individual company member who is directly and exclusively in charge of a particular matter. It is a section or group responsibility. There is usually a person in sections and divisions who has been designated as the “window” to the outside world. But he or she is generally an extension of the group and cannot act alone.

      However, there are very conspicuous exceptions to the rule of divided responsibility in Korean companies that are still being run by their founders as well as in family-owned and operated companies. In fact there is a specific shijo (she-joe), or “company founder,” syndrome in Korea that played a significant role in South Korea’s rapid development into an economic powerhouse. Most Koreans who founded companies between 1945 and around 1970 were totally traditional (Confucian) in their attitudes and behavior, meaning that they looked on their employees as family members who were expected to show them the utmost respect and obey them absolutely.

      These company founders typically worked seventy to eighty hours a week and expected the same of their employees. They ran their companies like feudal kingdoms, delegating very little authority to their subordinates. But anytime a company failed, all of the employees got a share of the blame—a factor that scholar-essayist Kyu Tae Yi explains in The Shape of Korean Life. He notes that when things are going well, Koreans who are involved in any way characteristically claim as much of the credit as possible, but when things go wrong they typically blame others.

      In present-day Korea, managers of departments and divisions in larger companies typically give an impression of authority and power because they are almost always surrounded by a retinue of aides who respond to their orders like well-drilled military teams. But this impression is usually deceiving. For the most part these managers can act only after arriving at a consensus with a number of other managers. Adds H. J. Chang, president of SEMCO International, a leading consulting firm in Seoul, “There is, however, a slow but nevertheless discernible shift toward the Western way of decision-making by individuals.”

      Although Koreans are assuming more and more personal responsibility for their actions in family as well as business affairs, there is little likelihood that collectivism will disappear entirely from the culture in the foreseeable future. Sharing responsibility is deeply embedded in the Korean character. They are acutely conscious of the fact that if a society is to survive and prosper in a harmonious environment, individualism must inevitably give way to group responsibility. They are not likely to discard that hard-earned wisdom.

      Chae-myun 체면 Chay-me’yuun

       Saving Everybody’s Face

      At the beginning of Korea’s Choson dynasty in 1392 the new government strengthened the divisions between the already segregated social classes by making a much sterner version of Confucianism the national political ideology as well as the state religion. The government made the system work by imbuing its religious aspects with a cultlike status that conditioned people mentally and physically to behave according to a precise etiquette and by severely punishing any dissent.

      Since this system made a carefully prescribed etiquette the essence of morality while also providing the social factors that gave people identity based on their sex, age, social class, and official position, it created in people a permanent obsession with making sure that others treated them with an exaggerated level of formal courtesy and respect.

      People became extremely sensitive to the behavior of others and to their own behavior because everything that was done or said impacted their highly honed sense of propriety, self-respect, and honor. Protecting and nurturing one’s “face” and the “face” of one’s family thus became an overriding challenge in Korean life and had a fundamental influence in the subsequent molding of the Korean language and culture in general. Chae-myun (chay-me’yuun), or “face saving,” often took precedence over rationality, practicality, and truth.

      In this face-sensitive society, speaking clearly and candidly became taboo. Speech became indirect and vague. Direct criticism, especially of superiors, was prohibited, and there were serious sanctions for breaking the ban. When something disruptive happened between individuals or groups, one of the institutionalized ways of “repairing” the damage was for a mutual agreement to opton kosuro haja (ohp-tohn koh-suu-roh hah-jah), which means “pretend it never happened.”

      During the long Choson dynasty (1392-1910), the practice of chae-myun contributed significantly to cultural, social, and economic stagnation because it did not permit open, free, and critical discussion of matters at hand. It was not only safer to say nothing and do nothing to change things, it was the spiritually and morally correct thing to do.

      Face is still of vital importance to Koreans. People continue to be extremely circumspect in their speech and behavior. The goal is to guarantee that everyone is in a constant state of anshim (ahn-sheem), which means “peace of mind” or “at perfect ease.” The first priority is to avoid any kind of direct confrontation by using only polite terms and refraining from saying or doing anything that would upset anyone. In business situations this may include not telling the truth about something, withholding bad news, and not bringing up mistakes that have been made. Naturally this kind of behavior can be very confusing and can mislead people who are not capable of reading between the lines. Foreigners dealing with Koreans may be especially disadvantaged.

      Well before the formal end of the Choson dynasty in 1910, however, public institutions and the government had lost their Confucian immunity to criticism. By the 1950s criticism and direct action designed to bring about change were not only common in Korea but also were engaged in with a special vehemence. Physical violence and bloodshed were often included in the overreaction to the centuries during which such behavior occurred only when people were oppressed beyond the limits of their endurance.

      Despite evolutionary changes in

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