National Executive submit to the Ard Fheis proposals for a positive line of action on partition’.66
It was with this sense of despondency and frustration that members of the Ó Cléirigh cumann penned the memorandum. Its central thesis was the advocacy of physical force as a legitimate method to secure Irish unity. Its preamble declared that de Valera’s recent Ard Fheis speech, ‘made it clear’ that partition could not be ended by ‘diplomatic measures’. Therefore, the only ‘policy open to us which gives reasonable hope of success’, it explained, was the use of force.67 ‘Outside the Organisation’, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum declared:
There is a noticeable and growing discontent with National Inaction in relation to Partition. This Cumann believed that this feeling is particularly widespread even at present, and that the question of Partition will become a major issue for the younger generation of Irish people, at any rate within the next five years ... At present, young people who feel strongly on this question of Partition have not outlet [sic] for their feelings of national outrage except the IRA ...We believe it is the duty of the Fianna Fáil Organisation to provide the leadership and the organisation of such national feeling, and that if it should fail to do so, it will be responsible for the consequences.68
In the context of understanding the genesis of Haughey’s attitude to Northern Ireland, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum offers fascinating evidence, which has only come to light in recent years.69 Four recommended policies stand out for particular attention. First, the memorandum suggested that the Irish government, in conjunction with the Irish army, should enact a campaign of guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland. It argued that:
An important preparation would, of course, be in the military sphere. While there is a reasonable hope that negotiations could be forced before the necessity for military action arose, nevertheless it would be criminally negligent to embark on the campaign without having made preparations in our power to deal with every contingency likely to arise. In this connection, we advocate the lying-in of the greatest possible stocks of arms and ammunitions suitable for guerrilla warfare, the closest possible study of British military installations likely to be of particular importance in relation to the areas in which the campaign will be carried out ...70
The Ó Cléirigh memorandum envisaged that the Irish government-sponsored guerrilla warfare campaign would concentrate its resources on one or two areas in Northern Ireland with Catholic majorities (probably situated in counties Derry and Armagh). It noted that the following advantages could hence be won:
(a)From the point of view of the international propaganda, we can claim that we are merely trying to enforce the will of the people in the area; and
(b)The area or areas concerned being contiguous to the Border can be more easily dealt with and kept in communication with the other portion of the Six-Counties.71
It explained that an objection to this policy might be advanced on the grounds that the ‘concentration of our efforts on one or two nationalist areas would be tantamount to the abandonment of the remainder of the Six-Counties’. ‘Such an argument,’ it noted, ‘would be unrealistic, since there is ample precedent for a step-by-step policy in our past history, e.g. the taking over of the ports was not regarded as an abandonment of our claim on the Six-Counties.’72
Second, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum proposed that once the guerrilla campaign was underway that the Irish government, with the support of Northern Ireland Catholics, should commence a campaign of civil disobedience (in those selected areas). Such a campaign, it noted:
Should be controlled and directed by the Irish Government, either openly or secretly. The object of such a campaign would be to create an international incident which could not be ignored by the British Government. The campaign would be based on that adopted by Sinn Féin, i.e. non-recognition of British or Stormont sovereignty in the area or areas selected; non-recognition of the Courts, and the setting-up of ‘Sinn Féin’ Courts; the withholding of rates and taxes...73
Indeed, at the 1954 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, during a private meeting, Colley had asked de Valera’s opinions on the possibility of creating an ‘incident on the border’, which would bring international attention to partition. De Valera was quick to reject Colley’s hypothesis. He rhetorically inquired if Colley would be prepared to be a ‘G [Green] Special’, who like the B-Specials, would have to enforce the rule of law on the Protestant population of Northern Ireland?74
The campaign was to be based on that adopted by Sinn Féin during the War for Independence. Paradoxically, the concept of arranging a programme of civil disobedience had also been considered by the leaders of the IRA in the run up to the renewed activity of the mid-1950s, but the army council decided under Seán Cronin’s influence to opt for a guerrilla campaign.75
Third, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum explained that Northern nationalists or ‘local forces’ should be organised and supplied with arms and ammunition. It was envisaged that these ‘local forces’ would:
Work in conjunction with the Army in making simulated and diversionary attacks on British military installations if required, plans for the destruction of official British and Stormont records in regard to rates and taxes in the selected areas, etc. It would of course be essential to organise nationalist opinion in the Six-Counties in general and in the selected areas or areas in particular. We believe that given a positive policy with full support from the South, both materially and spiritually, the necessary co-operation will be obtained from the Northern Nationalists.76
The similarities between the IRA campaign at the time and the proposals put forward by the Ó Cléirigh memorandum were interesting. Both advocated a method of guerrilla warfare against their ‘oppressors’. This entailed a policy of the destruction of vital communications and a concentration of superior numbers of men at a decisive time and location. To foreshadow events in the near future, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum’s reference to the importance of British military installations was to become a key aspect of the IRA’s ‘Operation Harvest’ campaign. The campaign commenced in 1956, focusing on the destruction of British transmitter posts, road and rail and any ‘enemy’ vehicles that were found.77
Finally, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum also envisaged the establishment of a committee to examine social welfare, education, industry, taxation and ‘current laws that would be necessary upon the anticipated assimilation of one or two of the border counties of Northern Ireland and in the eventual reunification of Ireland’.78 It noted that:
A committee of experts on International Law should also be asked to advise on the legal effect of open support by the Irish Government of persons engaged in the campaign of civil disobedience; the question of the use of our regular armed forces in Six-Counties; and aiding and possibly arming of irregular forces on active service in Six-Counties, etc. and the pointing out of loopholes whereby difficulties involved can be overcome. In this connection, your attention is drawn to the action of the Egyptian Government, which unofficially organised a liberation army, consisting of irregular volunteers, but which is believed by many to have consisted mainly of regular army units.79
The contents of the Ó Cléirigh memorandum and Haughey’s leading role in its formation, provides compelling, if not conclusive, evidence that he believed that the use of physical force to secure Irish unity, in the right circumstances, represented legitimate Fianna Fáil policy. Furthermore, it reveals that since at least the mid-1950s, he harboured a deeply conceived ideological commitment to securing a united Ireland.
This memorandum is all the more significant when one seeks to understand the rationale behind Haughey’s decision-making process during the Arms Crisis of 1969/1970; a subject examined in detail in the following chapter. His calls around the Irish cabinet table in August 1969 for the Irish army to cross into Northern Ireland and his involvement in supplying Northern Catholics with guns and ammunition were extremely similar to those
