well-trodden argument that when the conflict erupted in Northern Ireland in the summer of 1969, Haughey’s actions were dictated solely by political opportunism, that prior to this period he ‘had shown no signs of republican sympathy’ (except for his VE Day protests in 1945), is false.80 Of course, Haughey saw the developments in Northern Ireland in 1969 as a perfect opportunity to further his objective of securing the leadership of Fianna Fáil. Yet, as is argued in the next chapter, this is only part of the story of Haughey’s lifelong association with the Northern Ireland question.
The Ó Cléirigh memorandum offers a unique insight into the mind of Haughey as he entered his early thirties. Like so many of his generation, by the mid-1950s he had become disillusioned and impatient by the empty promises routinely offered by Irish politicians such as de Valera. Haughey believed that the older generation within Fianna Fáil had become complacent on the subject of partition, that the party had abandoned its number one aim to secure a united Ireland. In a fashion that would become synonymous with his leadership qualities in later life, Haughey was no longer content to fudge the issue, to keep the subject of partition away from public scrutiny. On the contrary, he wanted to get the job done. He wanted action. Acknowledging this conviction helps to explain his role in formulating the Ó Cléirigh memorandum. If Fianna Fáil’s peaceful endeavours to end partition, in the words of de Valera, had thus far ‘come to nought’, then Haughey believed that the alternative option, the use of physical force, was a legitimate solution.
A lost opportunity: Haughey and Fianna Fáil’s standing-committee on partition matters, 1955
The response from the Fianna Fáil hierarchy to the Ó Cléirigh memorandum on partition is unknown. Lemass, however, decided that the Fianna Fáil leadership had a responsibility to clear up any confusion regarding the party’s official stance on Northern Ireland. As noted above, during this period, a small, but vocal, minority within Fianna Fáil had publicly criticised the party’s perceived inability to make any inroads on partition and were particularly aghast by de Valera’s public admission at the 1954 party Ard Fheis that it was not ‘possible to point out steps’ that would ‘inevitably lead to the end of partition’.81 Consequently in November 1954 at a meeting of Fianna Fáil’s national executive, on Lemass’s suggestion, an agreement was reached that de Valera would nominate a committee to ‘deal with all aspects of the matter [partition]’.82 The committee was to become known as the ‘standing-committee on partition matters’.83
Early the following year, in January 1955, Cork-man Thomas Mullins, the so-called ‘third-grandfather’84 of Fianna Fáil and general secretary of the organisation, sent letters to Lemass, Frank Aiken, Seán Moylan, Seán MacEntee, Kevin Boland, Liam Cunningham, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Feehan and, significantly, Haughey. The letters notified the eight men that on de Valera’s instructions each had been appointed to a new standing-committee on partition matters.85 The members were a mixture between the old brigade of Fianna Fáil and a new breed of the party’s members, commonly referred to in political circles as ‘Mohair-suited Young Turks’.
Lemass was appointed chairman of the standing-committee. The presence of Aiken, MacEntee and Moylan on the committee was predictable. These three Fianna Fáil TDs (except for de Valera and Lemass) had held the most influential portfolios in previous Fianna Fáil governments. Liam Cunningham’s appointment had more to do with geography than anything else. He was a border-county Fianna Fáil deputy for Inishowen, Donegal North-East – an essential factor if the committee was to have credibility among party deputies. Subsequently described by the British Embassy in Dublin as holding extremely strong views on partition,86 in December 1954, Cunningham wrote to Fianna Fáil headquarters to request that the organisation make a greater effort to end partition.87
The presence of Boland and Feehan on the standing-committee was further example of Lemass’s determination to bring some ‘new blood’ and ideas into Fianna Fáil. During the early months of 1954 they had been appointed to the party’s organisation committee with the task of helping Lemass with his plan of revamping the party. Kevin Boland, son of Fianna Fáil stalwart and party TD for Roscommon Gerald Boland,88 was a well-respected figure within the party for his hard-working ethos and was elected to the organisation’s committee of fifteen at the 1954 Ard Fheis. Feehan, a founding member of the Sunday Press, was known to be close to Lemass. In late January 1954, on the instruction of Mullins, Feehan produced a memorandum outlining his views on partition.89 Five pages in length, the majority of his points were consistent with Fianna Fáil’s strategy towards Northern Ireland at the time, namely, that the use of force to secure Irish unity was ‘out of the question’ and that concessions would therefore need to be offered to Ulster unionists.90
The decision by the Fianna Fáil leadership to appoint Haughey on the standing-committee is interesting. Like Boland and Feehan he too had been appointed by Lemass to Fianna Fáil’s organisation committee the previous year. As noted above, in January 1955 (the same month he was appointed to the standing-committee on partition matters) Haughey had sent the Ó Cléirigh memorandum on partition to the Fianna Fáil national executive. Although it is difficult to decipher, the circumstantial evidence would suggest that on reading the Ó Cléirigh memorandum on partition Lemass, alarmed by its content, decided to appoint Haughey to the standing-committee in order to ‘educate’ his son-in-law on the futility of violence in the attainment of a united Ireland. Indeed, before the inaugural meeting of the standing-committee on partition-matters, Lemass ordered that each member receive a copy of the Ó Cléirigh memorandum.91
Between the first meeting of the standing-committee in early February 1955 and the second gathering in early April, detailed research was carried out by the committee members concerning Fianna Fáil’s Northern Ireland policy.92 Stemming directly from the two meetings, a thought-provoking memorandum was produced by Lemass and his colleagues. The memorandum recorded that committee members, including Haughey, fully endorsed the proposals contained within and instructed the Fianna Fáil national executive to ‘issue a statement on Partition on the following lines or alternatively to incorporate such a statement in any publication dealing with Fianna Fáil’s policy and programme’.93
The memorandum proposed eight practical policies that Fianna Fáil should follow vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. The points represented a victory of pragmatism over dogma. It categorically ruled out the use of force, instead insisting that only peaceful means could deliver the Holy Grail of Irish unity. At the heart of the memorandum was the thesis that only through a process of co-operation and mutual respect between Belfast and Dublin could the long-term attainment of a united Ireland be achieved. The memorandum’s preamble declared:
It was the purpose of Fianna Fáil to advocate and apply the following policy towards the realisation of the primary aim of the national effort as set out above
1.To maintain and strengthen wherever possible, all links with the Six-County majority, especially economic and cultural links, to encourage contacts between the people of both areas in every field, and to demonstrate that widespread goodwill for the Six-County majority can be fostered by such contacts;
2.To discourage and prevent any course of action which would have the effect of embittering relations between the people of both areas, or making fruitful economic and cultural contacts more difficult;
3.To keep constant in mind, in relation to all aspects of Twenty-Six County internal policy and administration, the prospect of the termination of partition and so to direct them as to avoid or minimise the practical problems that may arise when partition is ended;
4.To eliminate as far as possible all impediments to the free movement of goods, persons, and traffic across the Border and particularly to alter the Customs Law so as to permit of the entry into the Twenty-Six-counties free of Customs duty and subject to no more onerous conditions than apply to Twenty-Six County products, all goods of bona fide Six-County origins;
5.To encourage the establishment of joint authorities to manage affairs of common interest,
