‘there was a government within a government’.51 As Diarmaid Ferriter noted with the establishment of this sub-committee, Haughey and his sidekick Blaney ‘deliberately kept other cabinet members in the dark’.52
Haughey combined his role on the new sub-committee with control of a special Northern Ireland relief fund of £100,000, voted for by the Dáil, to provide ‘aid for the victims of the current unrest in the Six-counties’.53 As minister for finance, he held the most power and was responsible for ensuring that the £100,000 was used for its intended purpose; what actually occurred, however, was that at the very least, approximately £50,000 was used to buy guns for Northern nationalists.54
On the same day that the Northern Ireland sub-committee was formed, 16 August, three Nationalist MPs, Paddy Devlin (Northern Ireland Labour Party MP for Belfast Fall), Paddy O’Hanlon (Independent Nationalist MP for South Armagh) and Paddy Kennedy (Republican Labour MP Belfast Central) arrived at Dáil Éireann demanding to see the taoiseach. They had come to Dublin in response to Lynch’s television address to the Irish nation three days earlier on 13 August. They believed that the taoiseach’s comments had been an explicit acknowledgement on behalf of the Irish government of Dublin’s willingness to help the Catholic minority to defend themselves against sectarian acts of violence. As Kennedy explained, the taoiseach’s speech was ‘magnificent’ and he now ‘hoped it was not merely words but would be followed by further action if necessary’.55
Unable to meet Lynch or Hillery, the three Northern Ireland MPs purportedly stressed to Eamonn Gallagher of the Department of External Affairs the plight of Catholics in Derry and Belfast and noted that if ‘Irish troops were not sent into the North, they wanted guns.’56 Devlin was reportedly so angry at Lynch’s cold-shoulder that the police armed guard protecting the taoiseach’s house was increased.57 Although rebuffed by Lynch, Haughey and Blaney met Devlin and both expressed their determination to obtain guns for Northern nationalists.58 Blaney subsequently claimed that he knew the names of twenty-five politicians in Dáil Éireann who in August 1969 had given their own guns for use in Northern Ireland. He said that ‘truckloads of surplus small arms were at the time loaded in trucks ready to be moved to the North’.59
Shortly after the formation of the government Northern Ireland sub-committee, Haughey and the minister for defence, Jim Gibbons, attended a meeting with senior military officers at McKee Barracks in Dublin. Haughey sought specific answers regarding the supply of arms to Northern nationalists, including the Irish army’s military capabilities and what contingency plans were in place to ensure that weapons could be made available to designated recipients.60 Haughey’s intervention should not merely be viewed as ad hoc intrusion by an emotive politician, during this same period the Irish defence forces produced top-secret interim reports which also considered the pros and cons of supplying Northern nationalists with arms, ammunitions and equipment. Contingency plans were also drawn up in the event of a ‘doomsday scenario’, which envisaged that unconventional small-scale operations by the Irish army might be contemplated in certain areas of Northern Ireland.61
In the meantime, before any possible plans might be put in place to supply weapons, Haughey realised that a line of communication must be opened between the Irish government, under the auspices of the Northern Ireland sub-committee, and those Northern nationalists on the ground. On the suggestion of the director of the Irish Military Intelligence (IMI) Colonel Michael Hefferon, the name of a young officer on his staff, Captain James Kelly, was put forward as a possible intermediary.62 When the violence first erupted in Derry on 12 August, Captain Kelly was in the city having taken a few days leave to witness the annual Apprentice Boys’ parade. On the evening of 13 August, in the aftermath of the Apprentice Boys’ parade, Captain Kelly travelled to Belfast to visit his brother, Martin Kelly, then a priest in the Falls Road, Belfast. The following day, 14 August, Captain Kelly decided to return to Dublin to report immediately to Colonel Hefferon his first-hand experiences of the unfolding events on the streets of Northern Ireland.63
Significantly, in one report on the riots in Belfast, Captain Kelly suggested that the Irish government should give serious consideration to co-operating with the IRA. By then the IRA were being widely taunted with the slogan ‘I ran away’, because of the movement’s inability to defend Catholic areas of Northern Ireland. Following discussions with Gerry Fitt and John Kelly (a leading figure in the Citizens’ Defence Committees springing up throughout Belfast at this time), Captain Kelly advised that the Irish government provide monies to John Kelly in order to purchase guns and ammunitions.64 Captain Kelly was told by Kelly and others within the Citizens’ Defence Committees that what they wanted from Dublin was ‘technical assistance’ in the purchase of arms.65
Captain Kelly later testified to the Public Accounts Committee in 1971 that his recommendation to arm Northern nationalists was met by Haughey’s expressed approval.66 Over the following weeks and months the relationship between Captain Kelly and Haughey became integral to the entire affair. Captain Kelly effectively became Haughey’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground in Northern Ireland. The former regularly kept Haughey (and Blaney) up-to-date with unfolding events, chiefly in Belfast.67 Indeed, at his subsequent trial for the alleged attempt to import arms, Haughey publicly acknowledged that Captain Kelly had been a vital link between the Irish government, under the auspices of the Northern Ireland sub-committee, and Northern nationalists during this period.68
By September 1969, Northern nationalists in Belfast were beginning to fall under the command of the newly established Central Defence Committee (CDC), chaired by Jim Sullivan. As Justin O’Brien noted, this committee ‘organised life behind the barricades, negotiating with the RUC and British army, briefing the media, and organising internal security’.69 Significantly, the CDC believed that in its dealings with Captain Kelly it had garnered the official support of the Irish government, and that weapons would soon be delivered.70 This newly constituted committee was to form the nucleus of what was to become known as the PIRA. From Captain Kelly’s perspective, his ability to infiltrate the CDC in Belfast permitted the IMI a unique opportunity to help split the IRA between the traditional Marxist leadership in the South, led by the movement’s chief of staff Cathal Goulding, and a new generation of Northern republicans (hereafter referred to as the ‘Northern Command’).
The precise date of when the decision was taken on behalf of the Blaney/Haughey caucus and the IMI to supply the emerging Northern Command with weapons can be traced to a meeting held at Bailieborough, Co. Cavan on 4–5 October 1969. According to Captain Kelly, this meeting was a cover for the arming of the Northern republicans under the guise of the CDC. It was organised as a ‘stock-taking exercise’ in which representatives of the CDC could provide information to the IMI, which could then be passed on to Haughey.71
Within the space of a few hours news of the Bailieborough meeting quickly reached John Fleming, chief superintendent and head of the Gárda Síochána Special Branch. Aghast by the news, Fleming immediately travelled to Mount Carmel nursing home to visit Peter Berry, secretary of the Department of Justice. Berry was in hospital undergoing tests on the day of the Bailieborough meeting. Fleming informed Berry that republican elements of the defence committees at the Bailieborough meeting had requested financial assistance from the Irish government to procure weapons for defensive purposes.72 Berry was horrified to learn of this news, which he believed was a subversive plot that could undermine the Irish state.73 He attempted to telephone his minister Michael Moran,74 but to no avail (Moran, by this stage, had a ‘serious drink problem’75). He then tried to contact Lynch, but was unsuccessful.
Berry then contacted Haughey, unaware that it was the minister for finance who had provided the funds for the Bailieborough meeting. Haughey answered the phone and immediately agreed to visit Berry at Mount Carmel nursing home later that evening.76 On his arrival Berry informed the minister of the information he had received from the Gárda Síochána Special Branch. Throughout their conversation Haughey pleaded ignorance, making no attempt to make Berry aware of his knowledge of the Bailieborough meeting.77 Berry was dismayed to learn subsequently that only two days earlier, on 2 October, Haughey had met Captain Kelly and Col. Hefferon at his Kinsealy home,
