with a professional arms dealer in Europe – Otto Schleuter in Hamburg, Germany. Blaney not only supplied Captain Kelly with the name of Schleuter, but also the use of the services of Albert Luykx, a Belgian-born businessman, who ran a restaurant in Sutton, Co. Dublin. The importing of the weapons was to be carried out by the IMI under the authority of Colonel Hefferon and with the knowledge of Gibbons. According to Justin O’Brien, the IMI was now working under the direct orders of the Northern Ireland sub-committee, or more appropriately under the command of Blaney and Haughey.93
In-mid February, Captain Kelly made arrangements to travel to the Continent to inspect an arms shipment, bringing with him £10,000 drawn from the George Dixon account in the Munster and Leinster Bank.94 The deal was to consist of ‘200 sub machine guns, 84 light machine guns, 50 general purpose machine guns, 50 rifles, 200 grenades, 70 flak jackets and 250,000 rounds of ammunitions and 200 pistols’.95 Captain Kelly met Schleuter in Antwerp where arrangements were made to ship the ‘cargo’ to Dublin. However, one stumbling block remained. In order for the cargo to be shipped authorisation from either the Department of Defence or Justice was required, due to restrictions on the importation of arms.96
To sidestep this legal stipulation Haughey became directly and personally involved in the affair. Under Irish law the Department of Finance, Haughey’s department, could exempt goods from custom inspection. In mid-March Captain Kelly approached Haughey, via the minister’s personal secretary, Anthony Fagan, with a request for an exception. According to Fagan’s subsequent testimony in court, Haughey’s reply to this request was to ‘see that it is done’.97 To the frustration of the conspirators, however, when the ship assigned to transport the arms consignment, The City of Dublin, docked in Dublin on 25 March, the guns were not on board. Rather, the consignment was impounded in Antwerp due to the lack of an ‘end user’s certificate’, the procedural formality which only the Department of Defence or Justice could supply.98
By this stage the entire episode had turned into something of a farce. Captain Kelly, however, had not given up hope of importing the arms consignment. In April, accompanied by Luykx, Captain Kelly travelled to Hamburg to meet Schleuter. The German arms dealer explained that all was not lost. It might be still possible to transfer the cargo by air. Captain Kelly then returned to Ireland and acting as ‘an assistant to Mr Haughey’s assistant’ attempted to bring the arms consignment to Dublin on a scheduled Aer Lingus flight. When it became apparent that international regulations did not permit the transportation of firearms, Captain Kelly approached John Squires, managing director of a charter subsidiary of Aer Lingus. Yet again, however, this attempt failed due to legal considerations.99
The Special Branch then got wind of what was going on. In response Fagan telephoned Haughey to warn his minister that if the consignment of arms arrived at Dublin Airport it would be seized by the Special Branch.100 Peter Berry was then made aware of the unfolding debacle; although he still remained unaware of the extent of Haughey’s involvement in the attempts to import arms.101 In a telephone conversation on the evening of Saturday, 18 April, Berry informed Haughey that the guns would be seized by the Special Branch if the attempted shipment arrived at Dublin Airport. According to Berry’s record of this conversation, Haughey said, ‘I think that is a bad decision.’ Haughey then asked, ‘What will happen to it when it arrives?’ Berry replied, ‘it will be grabbed’. On hearing Berry’s words Haughey noted that ‘I had better have it called off.’102 The following day, on 19 April, working through Fagan, Captain Kelly was informed that Haughey had decided to call an immediate halt to the operation.103
At this juncture, Lynch’s actions, indeed inactions, must be addressed His behaviour during this period raises more questions than answers. On 18 April, five days before Berry’s conversation with Haughey, the secretary of the Department of Justice met the taoiseach at Government Buildings to discuss recent events. This was the first occasion that both men had met one another since Lynch had visited Berry at Mount Carmel nursing home in October 1969. For the second time in less than six months (the first occasion being at their October encounter)104 Berry informed the taoiseach of attempts to import arms into Ireland and of the possible involvement of Haughey and Blaney in this affair.105 Lynch, as he had also done the previous October, decided not to act on this information.
It was because of Lynch’s unwillingness to confront either Haughey or Blaney that Berry took the unusual and unprecedented decision to contact Irish president, Éamon de Valera, to force the taoiseach’s hand.106 On 18 April, following his telephone conversation with Haughey, Berry informed de Valera during a telephone conversation that he had become aware of matters of national concern but did not elaborate on the nature of the information. De Valera immediately advised the secretary of the Department of Justice to once again ‘speak to the Taoiseach’.107 Two days later, on 20 April, Berry eventually met Lynch and supplied the taoiseach with a full report on Haughey’s recent activities.108 By this stage Lynch, who was ‘enraged’ by Berry’s decision to contact de Valera,109 knew it was only a matter of time before information regarding the attempts to import arms found its way into the public domain.
On 29 April, Lynch summoned Blaney to the Taoiseach’s Office. Lynch made it clear that he knew all about the covert plans to import weapons. He said that he was determined to stop it and demanded his unruly minister’s immediate resignation from government. Blaney vigorously protested his innocence and refused to resign. Later that day Lynch then visited Haughey at the Mater Hospital where Haughey was recuperating having purportedly injured himself either falling from his horse or having been badly beaten with an iron bar during an altercation in a public house on the morning of 22 April.110 Haughey also protested his innocence and because of his ill-health, Lynch felt that he could not continue his meeting with the frail minister, who was reportedly in a ‘very weak sedated state’.111
The question arises as to why Lynch waited until late April 1970 before he decided to confront either Blaney or Haughey regarding Berry’s accusations. If the secretary of the Department of Justice’s account is to be believed – there is no other available reliable evidence to contradict Berry’s account – Lynch had been aware of such activities since October 1969. It is Lynch’s inaction over this six-month period that has aroused numerous conspiracy theories among writers interested in this subject. Was Haughey actually working under the direct authority of the taoiseach? Did Haughey have the collective support of the Irish cabinet to arm Northern nationalists with guns and ammunitions? Or, in fact, did Lynch simply turn a blind eye on learning of the Blaney–Haughey plot?
Lynch’s role remains unclear and like Haughey’s involvement, one will never be able to garnish a definitive picture of the taoiseach’s actions and motivations during the Arms Crisis.112 Nonetheless, it seems implausible that Lynch officially sanctioned Haughey’s covert activities. It seems equally implausible, however, that the taoiseach remained completely ignorant of the unfolding crisis before April 1970. Rather, Lynch’s actions during this period can be best described as politically naive, even imprudent. Ostrich-like, Lynch stuck his head in the sand, hoping that Haughey and his co-conspirators would see the error of their ways or simply become bored and abandon their activities. This was a dangerous tactic on Lynch’s behalf. With Berry’s intervention, Lynch realised the time had arrived to weed out the Blaney–Haughey rump faction from his government.
On 1 May 1970, Lynch addressed a crucial meeting of the Irish government. He informed those in attendance that nobody could initiate Northern Ireland policy without his explicit endorsement. He then dropped a bombshell. Serious allegations of attempts to import arms, he said, had been made against both Blaney and Haughey. Both, he explained, vehemently denied the allegations. Pádraig Faulkner recalled that he was shocked by the allegations and noted that if they proved to be true the taoiseach would have no choice but to demand the resignation of the two accused.113 In his memoirs, Faulkner wrote, ‘I can still clearly recall Neil Blaney ... vigorously arguing a point on the subject [of agriculture]. It was as if the Taoiseach had said nothing of any significance.’114 George Colley was reportedly left dumbfounded, with his mouth wide open, demanding to learn more about the requested resignations.115 Hillery’s recollection of the meeting is most revealing.
