Beresford a Brigadier General. The land forces were escorted by a fleet commanded by Sir Home Popham on HMS Diadem. This fleet fitted out and sailed from Falmouth on 5 August, and having assembled and taken on troops and further provisions departed on 31 August from Cork.6
The fleet called first at Madeira in the last week of September 1805. There the destination of the expedition was confirmed, ending weeks of speculation, as instructions had been declared secret to all but the commanders. The ships prepared to sail from Madeira on 1 October. A few days later, those ships destined for the West Indies separated from the remainder of Popham’s fleet. After leaving Madeira, Popham raised his pennant as Commodore and appointed Captain Hugh Downman of the Diomede to command the Diadem, in a move that was to cause many disputes later when it came to claiming prize money. The fleet traversed the Atlantic, crossing the Equator on 3 November and arriving at São Salvador (now Bahia) on the Brazilian coast on 9 November after suffering some damage in a heavy storm. Two large vessels, the King George and the Britannia, were lost on Las Rochas with fatalities including Brigadier General Yorke, who had command of the artillery. Repairs and the sourcing of provisions and horses for the cavalry meant that the fleet did not depart São Salvador until late December.7 It was not until 4 January 1806 that the fleet reached Table Bay, where it was sighted by the Dutch colonists.
Notwithstanding the rough seas, Beresford and a small landing party were sent ashore that day to ascertain a suitable disembarkation venue.8 The next day, 5 January, there was an unsuccessful attempt to land Beresford’s brigade at Leopard’s Bay in high surf. Baird then detached Beresford with the 38th Regiment and some cavalry with orders to land at Saldanha Bay. This wonderful harbour is some 60 miles north of Capetown.9 Orders were to secure the area (including seizing the postmaster) with a view to obtaining provisions for the army, and to prepare the site for a landing by the entire force if that should prove necessary. Beresford’s force was carried by the Diomede (50-guns) and some smaller vessels, and disembarked without opposition on 6 January. As it turned out, landing at Saldanha Bay meant that Beresford missed the ensuing battle that determined the fate of southern Africa.
A change of wind direction abated the surf enough to allow Baird to land his main force at Leopard’s Bay (now Melkbosstrand), some 16 miles north of Capetown, with only minor opposition on 6 January.10 Two days later Baird comprehensively defeated the Dutch under Lieutenant General Jan Willem Janssens at the battle of Blaauwberg, and on 9 January the commander of Capetown surrendered on terms which were ratified later that month.11 In Capetown, the British learnt the welcome news of the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar over the combined Franco-Spanish fleets on 21 October of the previous year.
Beresford caught up with Baird in Capetown. Baird then sent him after Janssens, who had withdrawn into the interior in the Hottentots Holland Kloof area with his defeated force. He caught up and made contact with the Dutchman, having assumed a position in Stellenbosch on 14 January, and secured the environs. When Baird arrived the following day, Janssens surrendered after further discussions. In his dispatch home, Baird praised Beresford’s ‘spirit of conciliation and perseverance’.12
Up to this point the British expedition had followed its instructions and achieved its objectives with little loss. Baird’s and Popham’s orders provided (in the absence of a negotiated surrender) for the capture of the Cape with the granting to the inhabitants the continued enjoyment of their private property, usages and religion as nearly as might be possible consistent with the terms granted in the previous war when it had been occupied by Britain. Baird was then to send on to India the troops designated for that service. In the event of it being decided that an attempt to capture the Cape was not viable (there was concern the French might have fortified it by means of troops and provisions on vessels that had escaped from Rochfort), the instructions were for that part of the force not designated for India to return to St Helena to await further instructions, and in the event these were not forthcoming within fifteen days, to return to Cork, calling at Faial in the Azores in case instructions had reached that island.13 There was no element of discretion that would allow for the expedition that Baird and Popham subsequently determined upon.
The renewal of the conflict with Spain offered the opportunity to weaken Spain as a military power and to open up trading opportunities, particularly in South America. The latter objective was particularly important in mercantile circles threatened by the loss of British and Irish trade with continental Europe.
One of the most vociferous advocates of British intervention in South America was Sir Home Popham. He had been trying to interest the British government in South America for some years. However, the attack on the Rio de la Plata in 1806 which now took place was pure opportunism and had not been sanctioned in advance by the British cabinet.14 While in Capetown, Popham apparently heard from a number of sources that the Peruvian treasure (in fact primarily silver from the mines around Potosi in modern-day Bolivia, then part of the Viceroyalty of Peru) was on its way to Buenos Aires for transhipment to Spain.15 With communications to London taking perhaps three months in each direction, there was no time to seek instructions. Popham approached Baird, and after some initial resistance persuaded the military commander to authorise Popham to take part of his fleet and some 1,400 troops from Capetown to support the enterprise. The voyage provided for a stopover at St Helena, where it was hoped that the expedition might pick up additional troops and artillery.16
Baird determined to appoint Beresford to command the expeditionary force, stating to Lord Castlereagh that he had: ‘confided the command to an officer of rank and recognized ability, wise and zealous.’ He further authorised the appointment of Beresford as Lieutenant-Governor if he should get possession of ‘the Spanish establishment on the River Plate’.17
The core of Beresford’s force (some 864 men) was made up of the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment of Foot, commanded by another Irishman, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Pack. Beresford and Pack were firm friends, though it is not known whether this factor played any part in the selection of the 71st Regiment to accompany Beresford.18 Popham had wanted to take a different regiment, whose commanding officer was a close friend of his own.19 Additional firepower was to be supplied by Royal Marines, Royal Artillery members and a picket of the 20th Light Dragoons, as well as sailors from the fleet accompanying Beresford’s force.
Following the capture of Capetown, the 71st had been quartered at Wynnberg, about 7 miles outside the town. Once again secrecy was the order of the day and the speculation in Capetown concerned Macao or Manila as the destination of the expedition, given that the Ile de France was considered too strong a target. Popham’s predeliction for South America was such that it was not long before opinion fixed on a marauding expedition along the coast of Peru. When later they heard of Beresford’s success in capturing Buenos Aires, the reaction was one of incredulity that a city of this size could be taken by one regiment.20 On 12 April 1806, the 71st Regiment and the other members of the expedition embarked, and Popham’s fleet, which sailed on 20 April, arrived in Saint Helena nine days later. On the way there contact had been lost with The Ocean, one of the transports carrying some 200 men, but fortuitously this was waiting for the fleet when it arrived at the entrance to the Rio de la Plata. In Saint Helena, Beresford acquired some 250 additional soldiers including artillerymen and two 5½-inch howitzers. In all this little army numbered little more than 1,600 men.21
Arriving in the Rio de la Plata in early June, Popham and Beresford disagreed on their first objective. Beresford sought to strike against Montevideo rather than Buenos Aires, on the basis that Montevideo was reportedly well fortified and that it would be preferable to strike the stronger position first while the British force had the element of surprise and the men were fresh. He was overruled by Popham, allegedly on the basis that provisions, which were apparently in short supply, would be easier to obtain in Buenos Aires.22 However, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the suspected presence of ‘Peruvian’ silver in Buenos Aires in transit to Spain may have contributed to Popham’s preference for an attack on Buenos Aires rather than Montevideo.23 The troops then transferred from the men-of-war to frigates and transports as the former were too big to proceed up-river. The scene was set for a landing, though Beresford’s disclosure
