of this unilateral variation of the terms, which he condemned, and stated he would adhere to the original agreement. Subsequently, he indicated to Beresford that the people of the town were in a state of insurrection as a result of which he wished the British to embark at night from a place out of sight of the crowds. Even that plan was abandoned and clearly under pressure de Liniers denied any knowledge of an agreement in the terms originally reduced to writing.56
Popham supported Beresford’s protests. He engaged in a vigorous correspondence with the Governor of Montevideo, Ruiz Huidobro, and subsequently Viceroy Sobremente, protesting strenuously at the non-fulfilment of the terms of the capitulation agreed between Beresford and de Liniers. These protests were to no avail as the Spanish authorities determined that de Liniers had no authority to agree the terms, and that in reality the terms had not been signed until after the surrender of the British forces in Buenos Aires.57 Popham castigated the Governor of Montevideo for arguing that the agreement had been intended merely as a private document and not a public treaty, pointing out that it had been agreed in the presence of Casamayor antecedent to the surrender, and if this had not been the case Beresford would not have surrendered the castle. In a burst of righteous indignation, Popham claimed the Spanish conduct was disgraceful and contrary to the law of nations and he contrasted this behaviour with that of Beresford on the capture of Buenos Aires earlier.58
The treatment of the defeated force was a mixed one. A number of men were abused and even murdered, but alongside such incidents acts of considerable kindness took place.59 In particular, the Bethlemite fathers administered medical treatment to the injured, and this was recognised by the 71st Regiment when it was later repatriated.60 Colonel Pack kept up a correspondence with Don Luis, one of the Bethlemite Friars, for some years afterwards. He expressed his gratitude for the attention paid to the wounded and sent him the gift of a coffee service in English china in 1809.61 Initial developments were far from satisfactory, for instead of release and repatriation the British soldiers were committed to various jails and other strongholds in and around Buenos Aires. Beresford (and other officers) were released on parole and he lodged with the family of Felix Casamayor in the city.62 Casamayor was the official who had transcribed and witnessed the original terms of the treaty whereby Beresford surrendered.
Following the arrival of further British forces in the estuary of the Rio de la Plata from the Cape at the end of September, as part of the response designed to reinforce Beresford, there was a change of policy and the senior officers were rounded up in mid October and sent under guard to the Cabildo of Luján, the very town from which Beresford’s force had seized the ‘treasure’. Other officers were sent to San Antonio de Areco, Capilla del Señor and various estancias. Parallel with the decision to send the officers to Luján and other locations, the Cabildo dispersed the British troops to a number of inland towns, including Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, San Luis and Córdoba.63 The decision to place them at a distance from Buenos Aires was taken in anticipation that Britain would either attempt their rescue, or, as in fact happened, seek to use reinforcements to restore and extend British rule. Moving officers to the interior and the failure to repatriate the force was seen by the British officers as a breach of the terms of surrender by the colonial government and this was made clear. Later the British officers were able to use this breach as a justification for their own conduct.
In Luján, Beresford and the officers with him were initially at liberty to exercise. They hunted, fished and played cricket; and at first were allowed to correspond.64 Beresford was attended from time to time by Captain Saturnino Rodriguez de Peña, military secretary to de Liniers. De Peña was an opponent of Spanish dominion and he seems to have formed the opinion that Beresford supported the objectives of those who sought independence.65
The promised relief force of some 2,000 under Colonel Backhouse arrived in the Rio de la Plata from the Cape of Good Hope towards the end of September. Meeting up with Popham’s fleet, Backhouse learnt of Beresford’s defeat and capture. After an abortive attempt to capture Montevideo, a small force was landed and captured Maldonado, a then modest town on the left bank of the Rio de la Plata, together with a number of surrounding gun batteries. Maldonado then became the British shore base. Meanwhile British strategy, unaware until 25 January 1807 of Beresford’s surrender, was being directed not just to the maintenance of the conquest of Buenos Aires, but with a view to taking control of Chile. Further reinforcements arrived from England in December with Rear Admiral Sir Charles Stirling, who relieved Popham of his command. Popham returned to England to face trial for his unauthorised campaign.
The main British relief force under Brigadier General Sir Samuel Auchmuty arrived off Montevideo in early January 1807. On 3 February, Auchmuty captured Montevideo. The reaction of the chief magistrate of Buenos Aires was to order the seizure of Beresford’s papers. Judge Juan Bazo y Berry and another procurator fiscal, Dr Pedro Andrés García, with a military escort were sent to Luján for this purpose and despite Beresford’s protests his papers were taken from his ADC, Robert Arbuthnot.66 It was also decided to move Beresford and the other officers further away from the coast to Catamarca in the interior.67 Colonel Pack was clear in his report that García was reminded that the British officers did not regard themselves as on parole due to the Spanish breach of the terms of surrender.68
These developments galvanised de Peña, who was in charge of bringing supplies and money to the detained officers. In possession of a free pass from de Liniers for that purpose, he and a colleague rode to Luján, arriving on 16 February to find that Beresford and the other officers had left under armed escort that very day for Catamarca.69 De Peña and his colleague, in an act of daring, pursued and caught up with the escort party near the Estancia Grande of the Bethlemite Fathers at Arrecifes claiming to have orders to bring Beresford to Buenos Aires. De Peña apparently informed Beresford that he would be taken to Montevideo and that de Peña and his colleagues were undertaking this rescue for the good of the country. However, a difficulty arose in that Beresford refused to leave without Pack, so both were taken back to Buenos Aires by de Peña. There they were hidden by de Peña and his two colleagues, messrs Padilla and Francisco Gonzalez, for three days in the home of Gonzalez before being smuggled offshore in a small boat on 21 February.70 On 22 February 1807 they were transferred to HMS Charwell in the estuary of the Rio de la Plata and they made good their escape to Montevideo.71
Auchmuty’s forces had captured Montevideo three weeks prior to Beresford’s arrival there. When Beresford arrived, Auchmuty was preparing to attempt the recapture of Buenos Aires. He proposed that Beresford should take command of the forces designated for the attempt, in accordance with his own orders to place his force under Beresford’s command. Beresford refused this offer on the grounds that he wished to go to England to acquaint the government fully concerning the situation in the country (i.e. the Rio de la Plata). In this respect he may have wished to express views regarding the potential for Argentinian independence and possible British support for such a move, given the suggestion he had expressed sympathy for such a move to de Peña.72 He also suggested that given the disgrace which had occurred he doubted whether he could really assume command; though it is not clear whether this remark was a reference to military defeat or the rows about the terms of surrender.
A Court of Inquiry held in Montevideo determined that neither Beresford nor Pack had broken their parole, but perhaps Beresford still felt honour-bound not to resume the fight personally.73 Pack corroborated Beresford’s evidence regarding the conditions under which they had surrendered and stated that he was present on 13 August when de Liniers dispatched a Spanish officer to Popham to request transports be furnished to execute the terms of the treaty. Insofar as they were able to controvert the evidence of the surrender document, the Spanish advanced an argument that Beresford had raised the Spanish flag over the fort at Buenos Aires prior to the signing the document and had thrown down his sword, both considered as evidence of unconditional surrender. However, it was pointed out that the Spanish flag had been raised at the specific request of de Liniers’ ADC in order to stop the exchanges of fire which were continuing, and in fact Captain Patrick rather than Beresford had thrown down his sword in disgust.74 Beresford conceded he had given his parole not to escape but maintained he was not bound by his word given the failure of the Spanish to return him and
