term, for not only did he take part in the Copenhagen expedition of 1807, but he did so as First Captain in the fleet commanded by Lord Gambier.
For his part, Beresford was clearly not felt to be culpable. He had neither devised nor authorised the expedition, and the letter of recall to Baird makes it clear that a larger force would have been utilised had the British wished to attack the Spanish in the Rio de la Plata; the implication being that he had done well with the force at his disposal. His conduct of his small force was admired by those present and recognised by the government.85 Beresford’s own feelings that he had perhaps let the side down by surrendering rather than fighting to the end were not shared by others. Pack neither blamed him for the subsequent disputes surrounding the terms of surrender, nor for the act of surrender observing:
A more gallant and honourable officer than General Beresford there cannot be, and I am fully persuaded he has acted from the purest motives of humanity, and I cannot help thinking it was to us a dreadful sacrifice. If the place ought to have been defended, I am afraid it will be thought we lost too few in the attempt; if not, too many.86
Beresford’s experience in the Rio de la Plata colony was to stand him in good stead in the years to come in the Iberian Peninsula. He had demonstrated administrative abilities, an adherence to discipline and personal courage in leading his troops. Within six months of his return to England he was appointed to command an expedition to take control of the Portuguese island of Madeira. It was only following the abdication of Napoleon in 1814 that he was able to attend the Guildhall in the City of London on 11 June in that year and receive in person the Freedom of the City together with the freedom box and sword voted to him in 1806. In accepting this honour, Beresford described it as the proudest moment of his life.
While it was undoubtedly a high point of an already distinguished career, it was to prove one step in a life which subsequently saw him rise to become Marshal-General of Portugal and a cabinet minister in Wellington’s government of 1828. His reputation was enhanced rather than tarnished by his South American experiences, though arguably had he thought through Popham’s proposal he would not have agreed with it, as conquest of the Rio de la Plata had little chance of success with such a small force. Did he let an opportunity for glory cloud proper judgment? If he had not wished to support the decision of Baird to endorse Popham’s proposal for the invasion of the Rio de la Plata, he would have had to resign from the expeditionary force at the Cape and return to England and might have been criticised in some quarters for such conduct; though this is what Sir Robert Wilson did when chastised by Home Popham for expressing doubts regarding the project.87
Even in Argentina Beresford was not without his admirers. The capture and 47-day occupation of Buenos Aires is frequently acknowledged by Argentine historians as part of the process which enabled Argentina to secure its own independence, beginning four years later.
3 MADEIRA, 1807–1808
Portugal had long held a strategic importance for Great Britain and others. To this had been added a commercial relationship of considerable importance. The Portuguese had developed an empire based on maritime trade and Portugal proved to be invaluable to Britain in the latter’s politico-economic struggle with first Spain and later France. In 1807, Portugal was governed by a Regent, Prince João, due to the fact that his mother Queen Maria had been deemed of unsound mind.1 Britain and France, as well as other participants, had been at war again since 1803 with Portugal desperately seeking to maintain its neutrality.
The importance of Portugal to France lay in its continued resistance to the implementation of the imposed continental system, whereby Napoleon sought to block Great Britain from access to continental markets.2 Furthermore, France had not given up its ambition to invade Great Britain. After Trafalgar, the French engaged in a naval rebuilding programme but at the same time perceived the potential benefit of securing the only two remaining navies other than the Royal Navy in western Europe, both representing neutral powers.3 The French failed to secure the Danish fleet when the British pre-empted Marshal Bernadotte’s invasion by itself acquiring twenty-nine ships of the line and frigates following the bombardment of Copenhagen in late August and early September 1807. Napoleon was also prepared to invade Portugal, should that country fail to comply with French demands.
In the summer of 1807, France gave Portugal an ultimatum to seize British property, to close its ports to British shipping and to declare war on Great Britain. Portugal tried to appease Napoleon while keeping Great Britain onside but ultimately this proved impossible.4 Deeming the Portuguese response inadequate, Napoleon determined to send a French army under Marshal Junot to invade the country. Prior to this invasion, the British envoy to Lisbon, Lord Strangford, had negotiated in August an arrangement whereby the Governor of Madeira would surrender when British forces appeared off the island; subject to the Portuguese government being informed first of the intention to send an expedition to Madeira. Separately, in October 1807 the British Foreign Secretary George Canning, and the Portuguese envoy to London, Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho, drew up a secret agreement providing for the occupation of Portuguese possessions only on notice and for a British fleet to escort the Portuguese court to Brazil should that prove necessary.5 In Britain, however, there remained both unease and uncertainty as to Portuguese intentions both prior to and subsequent to these agreements. This was not just because of the apparent desire of the Portuguese to appease Napoleon, but also because of the existence of a pro-French faction in the Portuguese government.
When Portugal succumbed entirely to France’s demands on 20 November, expelling Britons, seizing property and closing Portuguese ports to British vessels, it seemed as if the British fleet off the Tagus under Rear Admiral Sidney Smith might be called upon to undertake offensive operations against Portugal rather than come to the defence of that kingdom.6 His orders provided for the destruction of the Portuguese fleet and the bombardment of Lisbon if necessary, and on 16 November Smith called on Prince João to remind him of what had happened to the Danes at Copenhagen. On 24 November, following receipt the previous day of the news that Junot and the French army had crossed the Portuguese frontier and was at Abrantes, the decision was taken by João and his advisers to move to Brazil; an outcome that determined the Portuguese Empire would remain an ally of Great Britain.
The Portuguese royal family, the court and much of the administrative apparatus left Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro in a massive fleet of some fifty ships carrying reputedly 15,000 people a couple of days prior to Junot’s arrival in the Portuguese capital.7 In addition to ships of the Portuguese navy, it was protected by a Royal Navy convoy under Admiral Sidney Smith with nine ships of the line.8 In concept this was no last-minute flight but the adoption of a well-thought-out strategy followed by the Portuguese court when all attempts to remain neutral failed to secure that status.9 Repair work on the Portuguese fleet had commenced in August. When the moment came for embarkation on 27 November, notwithstanding a system of permits and allowances, many could not obtain passage and on Junot’s arrival on 29 November much of value was simply sitting abandoned on the Lisbon docks.10 The French General watched helplessly as the fleet sailed down the Tagus estuary and out of sight on its long seven-week voyage to São Salvador (Bahia) and Rio de Janeiro.
By virtue of the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, Napoleon initially agreed to carve up Portugal with Spanish assistance. The treaty envisioned three separate states: In the north a new kingdom centred on Porto and to be known as the Kingdom of Northern Lusitania was proposed to compensate the Spanish Bourbon King of Etruria for the loss of his kingdom to France. In the centre, a French dependency to include Trás-os-Montes, Beira and Portuguese Estremadura would be centred on Lisbon, and in the South a promised principality for the Prime Minister of Spain, Manuel Godoy, the ‘Prince of the Peace’, was to be made up of the Alentejo and the Algarve.
The treaty enabled Junot’s army to march through Spain with Spanish approval. Even so, because of the duress placed on Junot to move with speed to capture both the Portuguese royal family and its navy, the French force straggled piecemeal into
