Marshal William Carr Beresford. Marcus de la Poer Beresford

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quest for Venezuelan independence from Spain. The emergence of Spain as Britain’s ally changed the political dynamic. In late June, Sir Arthur Wellesley received orders to proceed to Cork and to sail with the force for the Peninsula, without any particular destination being named. There was talk of a landing in the Asturias or Galicia, but also Cádiz as well as Portugal.12 Wellesley was directed to proceed to La Coruña to ascertain the situation there, as it was understood that while the Spanish wished for arms they were not keen on British forces landing on Spanish territory. Wellesley was told that another force of 10,000 would follow about three weeks behind his own, and that the objective was ‘the entire and absolute evacuation of the Peninsula by the troops of France’.13

      Wellesley sailed from Cork (Cobh) with his force of just under 10,000 men on 12 July.14 Stopping briefly at La Coruña, he ascertained the local junta did not wish for British troops to be landed to assist in Galicia. Wellesley therefore proceeded to Porto, arriving there on 24 July, and on the following day met the Bishop who headed the Supreme Junta. Bernardim Freire informed Wellesley that he had about 5,000 men under his command available, though some of them were in Coimbra; additionally about 12,000 peasants were armed ‘in different modes’.15 A small portion of the Portuguese forces, with some Spanish assistance, was blockading French occupied Almeida while others were trying to guard Trás-os-Montes against a background of the Spanish having suffered defeat at Rio Seco on 14 July.16 The Bishop promised to supply the British commander with 150 horses for his dragoons together with 500 mules for transport purposes to be delivered at Coimbra.

      Wellesley himself then sailed to the British squadron off the Tagus, where he met with Admiral Sir Charles Cotton undertaking a blockade of Lisbon, which included the confinement and isolation of a Russian fleet anchored in the Tagus.17 Cotton advised disembarkation at Mondego or Peniche, both north of Lisbon; Peniche being a somewhat curious choice as it contained a strong French garrison. From General Brent Spencer in Andalucia, Wellesley received intelligence which suggested there were perhaps 20,000 French troops in Portugal rather than the local estimate of 16,000–18,000. The latter figure is not necessarily incompatible as it may reflect the number of troops available to Junot given that there were 600–800 in each of Elvas, Almeida, São Julião and Peniche fortresses. Wellesley ordered Spencer and his force to join him in Portugal and returned to the estuary of the river Mondego, where a landing – though physically challenging through the Atlantic surf – was made eminently feasible tactically due to the seizure of Figueira da Foz, the port at the river mouth, by the students from Coimbra University on 26 June.

      Arriving off Mondego, he heard of the Spanish victory at Bailén on 20 July.18 He began disembarkation of the British army at Mondego on 1 August, but not before he apparently received some important news on the previous day. On 15 July, Castlereagh had written to him telling him the troops from the Baltic under Sir John Moore would follow as soon as they were re-victualled, together with another 5,000 under Generals Anstruther and Ackland as more French than were previously thought were stationed in Portugal. A total force of 30,000 was promised for the Peninsula. These included the 3rd Regiment (‘The Buffs’) which were being dispatched from Madeira under Major General William Carr Beresford to join Wellesley. A second letter, dated 15 July, was also received on the 31 July. It may not have been so welcome for it notified him of the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Hew Dalrymple to command with Lieutenant General Harry Burrard as second in command. Wellesley was slipping down the command chain.19

      Wellesley lost little time in moving south from Mondego towards Lisbon. He met Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade and General Manuel Pinto Bacelar with their Portuguese forces at Montemor-o-Velho on 7 August and by 12 August the combined forces were at Leiria.20 A disagreement on tactics followed, with Wellesley wishing to take a coastal route to Lisbon (with a view to staying in touch with his provisioning fleet) and Bernardim Freire anxious to secure central and eastern Portugal by following a route through Santarém.21 Wellesley also claimed that the Portuguese General had demanded the British feed the Portuguese force, which they were unable to do. As a result, only some 1,600 Portuguese troops under Colonel Nicholas Trant, out of a total of some 6,000, joined Wellesley.22 Bernardim Freire’s decision is sometimes criticised, but he marched the balance of his force to Santarém where he managed to delay Loison’s corps for three days, preventing it from uniting with that under General Henri Delaborde at Roliça at a time when the reinforcements under Ackland and Anstruther had yet to join with Wellesley. On 17 August, Wellesley fought an initial engagement against a French force under Delaborde at Roliça before meeting the main French army under Junot at Vimeiro on 21 August and inflicting a comprehensive defeat on the French General.23 However, there was to be no pursuit of the defeated French.

      General Burrard had arrived in Maceira roads aboard HMS Brazen on 20 August.24 Wellesley went on board this sloop that evening to report and hand over command. The British army was then before Vimeiro and Wellington proposed to advance the next day. Burrard, perhaps feeling he needed further information, suggested delaying any advance. Matters were taken out of Wellesley’s hands on the morning of 21 August when the French chose to attack the British force. After the battle, the victorious Wellesley wished to pursue the defeated French but Burrard, who had by then joined the army, prohibited such a move even though the French were in considerable disorder.25 Burrard clearly felt the French still had their reserve intact and a substantial superiority in cavalry and accordingly caution was required in his mind. He wished to wait for Sir John Moore with reinforcements.26 As a result the French were able to retire on Torres Vedras.

      Dalrymple, stationed at Gibraltar, had received his instructions from Castlereagh on 7 August.27 He was directed to seek to expel the French from Lisbon and cut off their retreat to Spain if possible. Sailing from Gibraltar on 13 August, he reached the mouth of the Tagus on 19 August and there conferred with Admiral Cotton. He left the 42nd Regiment, which had travelled with him from Gibraltar, with Cotton in case the opportunity arose to land at Lisbon; while Dalrymple proceeded to Maceira where he landed on 22 August, establishing there his initial headquarters. Assuming command, he met Wellesley who once again urged an advance. Dalrymple made it clear he was not in a position to form an opinion on the merits of such a proposal, having just landed, but he did authorise Wellesley to prepare to march the army.28

      Within hours of Dalrymple landing at Maceira, General François Étienne Kellerman (who had commanded the reserve at Vimeiro) arrived under a flag of truce to propose an armistice.29 This suspension of arms was stated to be for the specific purpose of negotiating a convention for the evacuation of the French army from Portugal. Furthermore the armistice provided:

      it is agreed provisionally that the French army shall not, in any case, be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals who compose it shall be transported to France with their arms and baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing shall be exempted.30

      The balance of the armistice provided for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon so that the Russian fleet trapped there could sail at will, guarantees of security for those who had supported France in Portugal, the transport of French artillery and the horses of the cavalry to France, and a forty-eight hour notice of termination of the suspension of arms.31

      While the clause quoted above was to become central to the disagreements that followed, each of the provisions referred to gave rise to debate, both during the formation of the terms for the suspension of arms and the subsequent convention.32 Importantly, Kellerman assured the British that the words used regarding baggage and private property meant their strict grammatical meaning and did not cover merchandise of any sort. Wellesley for his part advocated unavailingly that the suspension of arms should be for only forty-eight hours rather than determinable on forty-eight hours notice.

      The days following the signing of the suspension of arms were spent negotiating the terms of the convention, on the one hand, and the preparation for the renewal of conflict, on the other. However the ink was barely dry on the suspension of arms terms before Bernardim Freire expressed his dissatisfaction. The Portuguese commander visited Dalrymple at his new headquarters at Ramalhal on 23 August. He was given a copy of the terms of armistice

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