terms of the Convention, the cabinet was aware of the terms of the armistice because the Bishop of Porto had furnished these to the Portuguese Minister in London, who in turn had drawn them to the attention of George Canning to whom he made a formal protest.88 Canning and others found it difficult to believe the veracity of these statements and the government did not publicise the true nature of the agreement until the terms were printed in the Gazette on 16 September. As one British soldier put it, the news occasioned a ‘political electric shock’.89
The Whig opposition had been lukewarm in its support of the war with France. There was, however, a very keenly held view that the terms of the Convention were not only foolish but inimical to the interests of Portugal and Spain. Wordsworth, who had previously exhibited republican sympathies, tried along with others to hold a meeting in Cumbria with a view to submitting an address to the King on the subject, and it was probably only when this stratagem failed that he turned to writing his tract.90
For the Whigs, ‘Cintra’ was a heaven-sent opportunity to attack the Tories and the government found themselves in some difficulty. As unpalateable as it seemed, the convention could not in reality be abandoned, though Canning wrote to Bathurst, Percival and others, including the King, railing against it. In that correspondence he argued that Britain should repudiate those parts of the convention repugnant to the Portuguese and not within the competence of a military commander.91 There were comparisons drawn with the loss of Minorca in 1756, following which Admiral John Byng had been court martialled and shot, and the debacle at Buenos Aires leading to Whitelocke’s court martial in 1808.92
The government moved quickly, Castlereagh recalling Dalrymple on 17 September to England to explain his conduct. In his letter Castlereagh made the point that His Majesty was disappointed with certain Articles of the Convention which were deeply upsetting to England’s allies and stating that no ally should be exposed to an injury so offensive under the countenance of a British army.93 The uproar was such that Richard Wellesley advised his brother to return home, which Arthur did, taking leave of the army on the basis that his duties in Ireland required him there.94 Wellesley’s own trumpeting of his success at Vimeiro, which he called a ‘complete victory’ with only half his army over ‘the whole of the French force in Portugal’, was now coming home to roost.95 The government realised that it was in danger of being blamed for the terms of the Convention and that if it did not investigate the matter further, the public would hold it responsible. While recognising the fait accompli, it was decided to establish a Board of Inquiry. On 1 November, the King ordered the establishment of an Inquiry into the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, the causes and circumstances which led to them, and into ‘the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of the said Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and any other officer or officers who may have held the command of our troops in Portugal’.96 General Sir David Dundas was appointed President and six other experienced soldiers and statesmen nominated to the Board.97
The Inquiry sat from 14 November to 27 December 1808 at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea. It took evidence from Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley, the three principal officers present in Portugal at the time the Armistice and Convention were negotiated and signed; as well as from a number of more junior staff officers. A voluminous amount of documentation was submitted to the Inquiry and this was listed in its Report placed before the House of Commons in January 1809.98
In essence, Dalrymple gave as his evidence that his instructions and objective had been to get the French out of Portugal and cut off their retreat to Spain, so as to enable the British army to assist Spain. Bearing in mind that Junot still had an intact army and held strong positions, combined with the difficulties of holding his provisioning fleet on station, he felt this was best achieved by the Convention. He not unreasonably pointed out that he had consulted his Lieutenant Generals, including Burrard and Wellesley, and that none of them had objected to the terms as eventually settled (there had been considerable negotiation).99 Where he differed from Wellesley was in his assertion that Wellesley had been involved in the negotiation of the Armistice. Dalrymple also felt that Burrard had played no great part in the negotiation of the Armistice.
Burrard gave evidence to the effect that he felt the army was exhausted after the battle of Vimeiro. It suffered from a lack of provisions and its cavalry was heavily outnumbered by the French and any advance as it approached Lisbon would be entering countryside more favourable to cavalry. He had therefore ordered a halt, anticipating in due course the arrival of Sir John Moore with a substantial force.
Wellesley had moved to distance himself from the terms of the Convention while still in Portugal. On his arrival in London he made it very clear that he had not approved the terms of the Armistice.100 He maintained that while he had favoured an advance following the victory at Vimeiro, Burrard’s decision to halt was not unreasonable. Further, while Wellesley had favoured such an advance with a view to cutting off the French from Lisbon, he pointed out that was in no way incompatible with his support for an armistice and convention when the circumstances had changed on 22 August, for by then the French were no longer in confusion. Wellesley made it clear he had not negotiated the armistice, but had merely signed it at Dalrymple’s request, given that he held a rank of equivalence with the French signatory, General Kellerman. Furthermore, Wellesley stated that he had objected to various terms of the armistice including that pertaining to the Russian fleet in the Tagus (which Cotton rejected in any event) and the agreement to give forty-eight-hours’ notice to end the suspension of hostilities. Wellesley confirmed he had in fact suggested the suspension of hostilities should be only for forty-eight-hours.
All three of these Generals expressed the opinion that if the Convention had not been entered into, the French might have passed the Tagus and gone to either Almeida or Elvas and therefore frustrated the British desire to help Spain. Furthermore, they might have held up the British by defending Lisbon and other strongholds which would have required protracted siege warfare with the same result. Indeed it was widely reported that Junot had threatened to destroy Lisbon rather than let it fall into British hands intact.101
The attention of the Board was drawn to earlier Conventions, including those whereby the French had been allowed to evacuate Genoa (1800), Malta (1800), Egypt (1801) and indeed the arrangement whereby terms for the repatriation of Dupont’s army had been agreed following the French defeat at the hands of the Spaniards at the Battle of Bailén (1808); though these were not subsequently honoured.102 Dalrymple solicited the assistance of two generals in his own defence, with Anstruther and Lord William Bentinck furnishing supportive letters.103 Though neither Beresford nor Proby were called as witnesses (they remained in the Peninsula), the correspondence with the Commissioners employed to carry the provisions of the Convention into effect was listed with a view to bolstering the cases of the generals as the subject of scrutiny, as they were able to demonstrate their determination to prevent the French taking home items of value not encompassed by the articles.104
The Board of Inquiry Report accepted that Burrard’s conduct in not advancing after the battle of Vimeiro had been justified, particularly when two commanders succeeded each other within the space of twenty-four-hours. Further, the Convention had immediately liberated Portugal and relieved a large section of the Spanish frontier from the danger of attack, enabling the Spanish to make a more effective defence of Spain without an enemy at its back. It noted much firmness had been taken in restricting the French interpretation of the Convention, with the French being forced to disgorge their plunder. The Convention was similar to those entered into in Egypt, where the garrisons of Alexandria and Cairo could not have held out for long and had no prospect of succour. The Convention had not been objected to by five experienced Lieutenant Generals and in the opinion of the Board ‘no further military proceeding is necessary’. The Report concluded with the statement that while the Board might have differences respecting the fitness of the Convention it was unanimous in recognising the unquestionable zeal and firmness of Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley.
The Commander in Chief, the Duke of York, was not impressed with one aspect of the Report. Three days later, on Christmas Day, he ordered the Board to express their opinion on whether the conditions of the Armistice and Convention were
