attacked us in our position near Corunna and got a most complete beating for his pains. We have however lost our Commander Sir John Moore who was killed and Sir David Baird lost his arm but is as yet doing as well as could be expected. The troops with the exception of my brigade embarked the night after the action, and the ensuing day I was left as the rear guard to cover and protect the embarkation of the army, and the enemy having driven among our transports during the day, I was given up at least as to be a prisoner, however, I completed the service and embarked my own Brigade and the wounded, and got on board at two o’clock this morning, and the enemy will be astonished. I can say no more than that I hope shortly to see my dearest Anne and I now long for your being in London …37
Beresford could, and clearly did, feel positive about his own contribution to the circumstances allowing for that evacuation.
Beresford and Moore had served together prior to the campaign in Spain ending with the retreat to La Coruña. At Toulon and in Corsica they had soldiered side by side and there is no evidence of other than cordial relations between the two men. That did not stop Beresford criticising Moore’s decision to retreat to La Coruña, calling it a most inglorious and unnecessary flight which had cost five times the numbers than would have been the case if they had stopped to oppose the enemy. He was not alone in his criticism of the retreat, with the now-deceased Moore being castigated both in England and Spain.38 Certainly, huge numbers were lost on the retreat but Moore’s achievement in enabling a large part of Britain’s Peninsular army to be brought home was considerable.39
6 FIRST STEPS IN THE REBUILDING AND REFORM OF AN ARMY: THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL, 1809
Sometimes military reform becomes an engine for change for an entire society, intended or otherwise. Given the global reach of British and French military practices and the compulsive energy and hypermilitarization of Imperial Germany, it is not surprising that the great reformers are Europeans: William Carr Beresford in Portugal, Charles George Gordon in China, Ivor Herbert in Canada, H.H. Kitchener in Egypt, Orde Wingate in Jewish Palestine, John Bagot Glubb in Jordan, Joseph-Simon Gallieni in Indochina, Hubert Louis Lyautey in Morocco, Colmar von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders in Turkey, Emil Korner in Chile, Hans Kundt in Bolivia and Max Bauer and Hans von Seeckt in China.1
After the evacuation of the British army at La Coruña, Beresford’s stay in England on his return from Spain was to prove a short one. He did not even have the opportunity to return to Ireland to visit his relatives, and indeed it was to be a further five years before he was reunited with his family. Soon after returning from Spain he was offered the command of the British forces in Jamaica, with the expectation of Governorship of that island. He declined on the basis that he wished to see active service.2 Within days of turning down this opportunity, on 9 February 1809 he was ordered to Portugal in response to a request from the Regency Council for a British officer to reform and rebuild that country’s army. While he noted that he would not have refused this opportunity to be involved in active service, he also made clear that he had been told that his appointment to command the Portuguese army was not open to refusal.3
Notwithstanding the victories at Roliça and Vimeiro, the position of Portugal was fraught with danger by the close of 1808. The optimism which surrounded the British advance into Spain that autumn had perished in the retreat to La Coruña and Vigo. Once again, in early 1809 Portugal was faced with a French invasion.
In the aftermath of the Convention of Cintra and the deportation of the French army, on 18 September 1808 General Dalrymple had re-established the Regency Council subject to the removal of its French supporters. It faced huge difficulties, not least because of the need to obtain instructions from the Prince Regent in Rio de Janeiro before making major decisions. This restriction was born of a determination by the royal family and its advisers in Brazil not to allow the growth of an alternative power base, a policy which was to make difficult Portuguese participation in the war, and which on occasion was to provide a convenient stratagem for those opposed to British suggestions. It is important to realise that on arrival in Brazil in January1808, Prince João effectively set up a full royal government and state apparatus there.4 It included a Council of State, four ministries, a Supreme Court of Justice, Royal Treasury, Royal Mint, Royal libraries, a military academy, a law school and more. This government-in-exile not only established the conditions for the development of Brazilian independence, but for thirteen years led to a role reversal whereby Portugal was in many respects ruled from Brazil.
This situation created difficulties which were manifested in different ways, such as when Prince João, in confirming the reinstatement of the Regency by order of 2 January 1809, made it clear that all matters other than those requiring immediate decision should be referred to the appropriate ministry in Rio de Janeiro. This requirement included all reforms as well as promotions in the army and even the universities. In effect, the Regency Council were governors rather than a body standing in lieu of the Queen (or in reality the Prince Regent) with all the difficulties in making decisions required to govern on behalf of a ruler some 5,000 kilometres away in an age when communication was by sail and subject to the vagaries of the prevailing weather system.5
Furthermore, the Regency experienced considerable difficulty in establishing its own authority in Portugal. It was split by rival factions and undermined by, amongst others, the Bishop of Porto whose reluctance to recognise its authority reflected a desire to promote himself and the Junta of Porto as a leadership uncontaminated by collaboration with the French. The serious riots which had occurred in Porto in early October, riots in which many of the soldiers stationed there were involved, were brought under control but there remained an inflamed mood with the threat of further outbreaks. Anarchy was matched by apathy, with many thinking the war with France was now at an end and that the French would soon be driven from the Iberian Peninsula. French success in the winter of 1808–9 meant that apathy amongst some was quickly replaced by terror, and the febrile atmosphere in Lisbon was not helped by persistent rumours of an intention by Britain to withdraw its remaining troops from Portugal, rumours which were not without foundation for that possibility was recognised by Sir John Cradock, the new commander of the British forces in Portugal, on his arrival in Lisbon in mid December. British government policy was itself uncertain.
Remarkably, at the end of January – the very moment the government was considering further involvement in Portugal – it simultaneously recognised the possibility of withdrawal. Following La Coruña and the bringing home of Moore’s army in what must have been a particular low point for British ministers, Castlereagh wrote to Cradock on 28 January 1809 urging him to maintain himself as long as possible in Portugal in order to give the Spanish an opportunity to regroup and to force the enemy to engage in long marches. If Cradock had to withdraw he was to go to Cádiz, if the Spanish wanted the British army there, but if the response was negative he should proceed to Gibraltar.6 Cradock for his part was clearly worried about his ability to maintain a presence in Portugal, and following receipt of the news of the departure of the British army from La Coruña he closed a number of provisioning depots in northern Portugal – at Almeida and Lamego – and sought to concentrate his army of about 10,000 men in and around Lisbon; though the 40th Regiment was garrisoned strategically at Elvas and Brigadier General Charles Stewart, with a force of 2,700, occupied Santarém. British popularity in Portugal was less than universal, with its troops in Lisbon not immune from attack by Portuguese.7
In addition, the departure of a number of the pro-French party in Portugal, whether through going to France with the Portuguese Legion under d’Alorna or from taking sail with Junot, did not mean there was not a pro-French faction still in Portugal. A British observer, the Reverend James Wilmot Ormsby, detected in October 1808 that there was still a strong French party in Lisbon, though in most of the country people detested the French. He noted the joy of the Portuguese at the extermination of the French but added, ‘it does not follow that because they hate them they should love us. Had they behaved with moderation the French might have been hailed as deliverers.’8 The result of this state of affairs was that little rebuilding
