was achieved in Portugal in the autumn of 1808 and early spring of 1809. Ultimately the Regency would be reformed in the summer of 1809, but before the end of the previous year it had at least recognised that it was incapable of reforming the Portuguese army and sought the assistance of Great Britain to do so.
If Portugal was in a state of chaos in 1808, it is equally clear that its army was not fit for purpose. No discussion of the rebuilding and reform of the Portuguese army would be complete without looking at its historical evolution prior to the Peninsular War and the career of the man who more than any other provided the Portuguese impetus for change, Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.9 Beresford was to prove to be the instrument of reform and the creation of an efficient fighting force was made possible by the provision of financial and material support from Great Britain; but the undertaking and progression of this task owed much to the foresight and determination of Forjaz, one of the Secretaries to the Regency Council. The much maligned General Burrard had identified that nothing would be done in Portugal without a minister ‘equal to the task of instructing, urging and conciliating the government and people’ and Forjaz proved to be that man of vision and determination.10
Forjaz joined the re-established Regency Council as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, War and Marine and remained one of those most influential and supportive of the Anglo-Portuguese war effort throughout the Peninsular War.11 A lack of military organisation and modernisation in the Portuguese army had been identified as far back as the 1790s, and the need for reform had been advocated by Forjaz and some of his compatriots since that time. Following the conclusion of the ‘War of the Oranges’ in June 1801, the appointment of Karl Alexander von der Goltz as Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army led to recommendations for reform aimed at producing a trained and disciplined force, but internal resistance led to Goltz’s departure a year later.12 His short period in Portugal was not without result, for it led to the appointment of a military Commission to examine how the army could be improved, and Forjaz served as Secretary to the Commission. The Commission did not agree a final report and its resolutions were not acted on by the government. Forjaz, however, worked closely with successive Ministers for War and made suggestions for appointments to be made on merit and the reform of logistical support, which had they been acted upon might have reduced the serious problems encountered by the Portuguese army in the Peninsular War. It is likely that the policy of appeasement adopted towards Napoleon by António de Araújo, the Francophile Minister for War from 1804, was an important factor in the failure to address the issues required for the proper defence of the realm.13
Forjaz had been dismissed from the army by Junot, and having withdrawn from public life rather than support the French regime he had been one of the first to become involved in the re-establishment of a Portuguese army under the Supreme Junta of Porto in the summer of 1808. Serving under General Bernardim Freire de Andrade (his cousin), Forjaz sought to introduce many of the reforms he had long advocated for the Portuguese army.14 Relatively little had been achieved in the run up to the defeat of the French in August 1808, and indeed thereafter progress was very slow prior to Beresford’s arrival and appointment as Commander in Chief in the spring of 1809. The combination of Forjaz’s vision and application and Beresford’s commitment to the creation of a well disciplined fighting force, where promotion was based on merit rather than merely birth, meant that over the next few years these two men effectively combined to produce one of the finest armies in Europe.
In the autumn of 1808, the prospect of Portugal possessing an army to be reckoned with in the Napoleonic wars must have seemed remote. In despair the Regency Council reported to Rio in mid October that the country was effectively a demilitarised zone; a rather startling and pessimistic assertion given there were then over 30,000 British soldiers in the country in addition to the Portuguese forces.15 Junot had denuded Portugal of some of its best soldiers by creating the Portuguese Legion under the Marquis d’Alorna.16 The regiments raised by the Supreme Junta of Porto and others in 1808–9 were for the most part badly armed, poorly trained and in some cases lacking in leadership. There was a shortage of money to pay the troops, discipline was weak and there was a chronic lack of supplies. In addition to the troops raised in Portugal in 1808, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion had been formed in England, and this force commanded by Sir Robert Wilson had landed in Porto in the autumn of that year. Made up principally of Portuguese who had escaped from Portugal it consisted of two battalions of infantry and an artillery unit, and the Loyal Lusitanian Legion was to perform useful service until ultimately subsumed into the Portuguese army in 1811.17
The steps taken by the Regency involved a declaration of 30 September recalling all officers retired by Junot to the colours. This step could only have been moderately successful given that many officers had either gone to Brazil with the Court, joined the Loyal Lusitanian Legion or the Portuguese Legion. At the same time a radical move was made in creating six battalions of caçadores (light troops). This decision was not entirely innovative; one such regiment had been created previously under the Marquis d’Alorna as part of the reforms suggested by the members of the military commission, but this had been part of the force dispatched to France designated to become the Portuguese Legion in the service of Napoleon. In October and November, further decrees were issued designed to reorganise the army on previously existing lines, recalling men to their regiments and including a pardon for deserters.18 Forjaz instigated the formation of volunteer regiments in Lisbon in late 1808.
The restored format for the army thus envisaged twenty-four infantry regiments of the line (37,200), six battalions of caçadores (3,768) twelve cavalry regiments (7,128) and four artillery regiments (4,800), giving a regular army of some 52,000 men. In addition, there was theoretically a militia force of comparable size and a levée en masse, known as the ordenança, which could be called out in time of crisis. However, the reality was very different. Early in September a report prepared by Baron Frederick von Decken for the British Government suggested there were in fact 13,272 infantry, 3,384 caçadores, 1,812 cavalry and 19,000 militia.19 Portuguese returns for 26 November 1808 suggested that this figure had risen to 22,361 infantry, 3,422 cavalry, 4,031 artillery and 20,800 militia by that date, but Portuguese historians query the veracity of these and later figures when set against the much more strictly tabulated figures for 1810 and 1811.20
Portuguese forces raised in 1808 were lacking in equipment, provisions and discipline.21 A return for 5 January 1809 lists 21,094 infantry but some without arms or uniforms. A theoretical cavalry force of 3,691 could not be put in the field due to a lack of horses, while there was an artillery force of 2,419. The remaining British force under Sir John Cradock amounted to just over 10,000 men, with a rather alarming number of a mere 5,221 effectives. These were centred on Lisbon from whence it was anticipated initially they would sail for England in the event of a major French advance, though later a retreat to Cádiz or Gibraltar was contemplated.22
Furthermore, it is clear from the correspondence of Sir John Cradock with the British Envoy to Lisbon, Sir John Villiers, that the former had been told by Forjaz that the quality of those recalled to the Portuguese army did not greatly impress him and further there were less than 10,000 serviceable arms for the Portuguese forces in mid December.23 At the beginning of the month, Major General MacKenzie, who had just arrived in Lisbon, observed to Castlereagh: ‘I am sorry to say that very little assistance can be relied on from the government of this country. The reestablishment of their military force goes on, but very slowly and without energy.’ Forjaz had told him that there was an extreme lack of arms for both the regular forces and the militia.24 A month later, in early January 1809, Villiers wrote to Canning stating, ‘this part of the Peninsula will fall whenever it is attacked, unless measures for its defence are immediately taken’, going on to add that at present it may be considered as defenceless.25
By February 1809 there were two Portuguese armed forces of any size operational in Portugal together with garrisons in fortresses such as Almeida and Elvas. The larger of the two forces, under the command of Lieutenant General António José de Miranda Henriques, was headquartered at Tomar with the objective of protecting Lisbon. This corps nominally amounted to just under 15,000 regulars and 2,000 cavalry with artillery support. The second force was operative north of the Douro in the provinces of Minho and Trás-os-Montes. This
