Marshal William Carr Beresford. Marcus de la Poer Beresford

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have been agreed upon. As a result, the Board agreed that each member should indicate whether he approved of the Armistice, and separately whether he approved of the Convention. The results of those deliberations on 27 December showed a 6:1 majority in favour of the Armistice but only a 4:3 majority in favour of the Convention. The minority felt that the appearance of John Moore with reinforcements, together with the arrival of the 3rd and 42nd regiments following the Armistice, meant that Dalrymple could have taken a stronger position in the discussions leading to the Convention and would in all probability have obtained a more advantageous result had he done so. Only Moira felt there should have been no armistice as it effectively established the terms of the Convention.105

      It is well known that Dalrymple and Burrard were never again given active commands. The King went further. While he adopted the unanimous opinion of the Board that no further military proceeding was necessary, he made a formal declaration of his disapprobation of the Armistice and Convention which was communicated to Dalrymple. It is most interesting that in doing so he highlighted his disapproval of the Articles in which stipulations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations. It was declared improper and dangerous to include in military conventions articles of such description. While the King’s disapprobation does not list the articles complained of, it is easy to see that these must be those that had caused so much grief in Portugal. The inclusion of Spain may relate to the promise to secure the restoration of French subjects, whether military or civilian, detained in Spain. Dalrymple was being criticised for his acceptance of political articles in a military convention.106

      Napoleon initially reserved his opinion on Junot and the Convention, writing to General Clarke on 2 October saying that on landing Junot should be told Napoleon did not know if he should approve the Convention but that there had been no harm to French honour in that the troops did not lay down their arms and no standards had been lost.107 He seems to have felt that Junot should have entrenched himself and waited for reinforcements and is reported to have been considering a court martial, but the establishment of an Inquiry by the English avoided the need for him to punish an old friend.108 Indeed, on his return to France Junot was given command of the 3rd Corps to prosecute the siege of Zaragoza.109

      The holding of the Inquiry bears the hallmarks of political expediency. No inquiry had been called for under circumstances where deals had been done in recent years to allow the French home on surrender, and indeed such arrangements were the norm for other countries as well.110 Indeed, Whitelocke’s army had been allowed home from Buenos Aires111 so why was the case of Portugal so different? The Report exculpated all three Generals in respect of their military conduct but clearly Portugal was felt to be a valuable ally whose feelings needed to be assuaged.112 Furthermore, the fact that some of the French returnees were back in Spain by the beginning of December and the more immediate realisation they would be available to fight again caused considerable upset. Criticism of Dalrymple and Burrard as military commanders may be justified and it may be that a better result could have been obtained by making use of Moore’s army, but is it sustainable to argue that all the parties to the conflict benefitted considerably by the Convention?113

      While it was hard to get the message accepted, Britain had removed the French from Portugal without suffering serious losses and on a short time scale. The early capture of Lisbon enabled the provisioning of an army to go into Spain under Sir John Moore, and the deliverance of Portugal made the march on Spain feasible. All the other strongholds in Portugal were secured without fighting and Portugal became the British base for future operations. Furthermore, the British now had a safe harbour for their navy. On the negative side there was a perception that Britain could have struck a tougher bargain with Junot, perhaps ensuring the troops did not return to the Peninsula. There was also the more cosmetic criticism of the recognition of Napoleon’s Imperial title for the first time, as well as the recognition of Junot as the Duke of Abrantes. The British Generals in overall command had failed to take the Portuguese into account, a situation which was recognised within government. Moreover, the psychological effect of winning victories in the Peninsula at a time when British forces were faring dismally elsewhere must have been a great morale booster for the British army and the government. Condemnation of the convention was not universal, and often depended on political allegiance. On balance it is argued Britain emerged a winner.

      The English government was perhaps fortunate that the hullabaloo concerning Cintra died down remarkably quickly because of a fresh scandal which erupted in late January 1809, shortly after the publication of the report of the Board of Inquiry.114 The new scandal concerned alleged corruption in the army arising from the sale of commissions under the influence of the Commander in Chief’s mistress, Mary Ann Clarke. While the Duke of York was acquitted of the charges against him, he had to stand down for a considerable time as Commander in Chief.

      Portugal had rid itself of the French army of occupation. While plundered to a degree, the Convention had saved Lisbon.115 Henceforth, it obtained protection from a British army which paid its way. The fact that Moore was able to take an army into Spain and draw the French towards northern Spain and La Coruña probably prevented a fresh and more substantial invasion of Portugal by the French at this time. Of course, the involvement with Britain drew it into a lengthy war and huge suffering in terms of property and people, but in return it received a well trained army and financial assistance in its defence through British subsidies. It was not the Convention of Cintra, but the removal of the Court to Brazil in 1807 and the ensuing six years of warfare, combined with the opening up of direct trade by other nations with Brazil, that caused seismic changes to the politics and economics of Portugal. While Britain’s failure to consult with the Portuguese over the proposals leading to the Convention of Cintra proved a real irritant, it is arguable Portugal emerged a winner.

      Spain is not often thought of in terms of the Convention. However, it resulted in the repatriation of the imprisoned division of its army under Carafa. The march of the British army under Sir John Moore into central Spain and its subsequent withdrawal to La Coruña may have contributed to the saving of Andalucia in that Napoleon turned troops northwards which might otherwise have been used to crush resistance in the south. Finally, Spain no longer had an enemy behind it in Portugal, which enabled Spanish forces to concentrate elsewhere. A win also for Spain.

      France lost Portugal, but in doing so recovered almost intact an army which was soon redeployed.116 With some justification, the Convention was portrayed as a diplomatic triumph, as while the British feared a long engagement in Portugal the reality was that with the additional forces at the disposal of Dalrymple, a French withdrawal would have been a strategically demanding affair and might have resulted in unconditional surrender. If not a win, then a measured loss. France was still in the driving seat on mainland Europe, including the Peninsula.

      The removal of the French army from Portugal enabled British propaganda to present the Convention of Cintra in a favourable light, but there were losers under its terms. A number of Portuguese lost possessions, and national treasures were looted from museums, libraries, churches and palaces. The full extent of those losses is difficult to quantify, not least because as Junot observed to Napoleon 50 million Francs worth of goods had been removed from Portugal to Great Britain when Portugal had initially come under French threat.117 In addition, the Portuguese had already suffered a brutal taxation imposed by Junot. This situation should be set against the gain of a liberated country and the recovery of a considerable amount of goods and valuables. Without defending the theft of items, it is difficult to estimate the extent of plunder when it is recalled that substantial royal and independent valuables had been shipped to Brazil in 1807.118 Further, it was a surprising oversight that Dalrymple did not seek to incorporate in the Convention provision for the return to Portugal of Portuguese prisoners detained in France.

      Dalrymple and Burrard certainly emerged as losers, not being given further commands. Poor Burrard lost three sons fighting in the Peninsula and is said to have died of grief in 1813. However, fortune did not entirely desert Dalrymple. Though his son’s military career suffered in that while he purchased promotion he was not given any future command, the General, with the support of Castlereagh, was created a baronet in 1815, perhaps

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