that he openly wept. ‘Now’, said de Valera, ‘it is quite clear that these charges are groundless.’ Brugha arose without a word and left the room. Stack rushed after him: ‘Come in, shake hands’. But Brugha angrily turned from him; ‘You’ll find him out yet,’ he spat.81 [sic]
Now, whether Brugha’s query was a cause or an effect of the collapse of the assassination project is a matter of conjecture. But, certain it is that Brugha’s insistent yet futile questioning upset more than Collins at GHQ. For example, Mulcahy resented very much being called as a witness to Brugha’s investigation on the grounds of so many high-ranking people being obliged to congregate in the one place.82 It is, therefore, theoretically possible that Brugha’s lack of tact on the Glasgow accounts caused GHQ to cooperate no further with him on what was, even with the best of preparation, a problematical assassination venture, official GHQ policy or not. And, in such a confrontational situation, Brugha might have tried to proceed alone rather than be completely outdone, which is to imply that he might have tried to recruit MacEoin as leader of the venture.
Nonetheless, by early 1921, it is clear that, because of those commingled controversies, Mulcahy gave up trying to be neutral between Brugha and Collins. From then on, he came out strongly against Brugha’s actions. The countermanding order to MacEoin was certainly sufficient in itself to destroy the solitary bridge of mutual understanding which had existed between them. This was the belief (originally endorsed by the Cabinet in 1919) that control and moderation in the military sphere would create the best environment for a possible political settlement. But Brugha’s terrorist option of last resort, which, if activated, would definitely have brought the wrath of the British military and political establishments down upon the IRA, would have upset Mulcahy much more than Collins’ relatively lower-key form of extremism did.
In the meantime, at any rate, Mulcahy began raising issues about the new police force which Stack, as Minister for Home Affairs, was trying to introduce. Mulcahy and GHQ were apprehensive about the IRA becoming involved – ‘the Army should not be unduly impoverished of good men’.83 Collins became dissatisfied with progress. In disparaging fashion, he placed the entire blame at Stack’s feet, thereby instantly destroying their amicable relationship.84 (Stack’s administrative inadequacies, similar to Brugha’s, were noticeable: ‘Seeing the agonising effect Stack’s sense of responsibility was producing on him, I was very glad that I was not in his shoes.’85)
In later life, Mulcahy voiced suspicion that de Valera might have been implicated in Brugha’s pushy attitude towards GHQ: ‘Questions arise as to why Mellows came home from America … He never settles in to any kind of harmonious work on the GHQ side and was an added influence to Cathal Brugha maintaining and developing his agitation about Collins.’86 Brugha was certainly in personal touch with de Valera87 and de Valera did have a disagreement with Collins about what he alleged were peculiarities in Collins’ method of calculating the National Loan.88 However, de Valera did not really become embroiled until he returned home from the States on 23 December 1920,89 at which juncture Mulcahy put it to him that Brugha’s attitude to Collins on the matter of the Glasgow accounts, were it to continue, could split GHQ. In response, de Valera seemingly attributed Brugha’s behaviour to nothing more than jealousy of Collins.90
Mulcahy had a strong argument. On top of the possibility that the decision making process might miscarry, there was the undeniable fact that, from early 1921, other than the exceptional success of the Tom Barry inspired Crossbarry counter-offensive against Percival’s Essex Regiment of 19 March,91 the Crown forces were steadily gaining an edge throughout the country, with despatches reporting success in harrying the IRA from post to pillar.92 There were a number of reasons for that. The IRA’s stock of ammunition was low due to its international sources of supply drying up.93 The British began to deploy their own men in bicycled flying columns in order to give them easy bypass along disrupted roads and the opportunity to raid suspect houses more effectively than when they travelled in Crossley tenders94 and, furthermore, some of the IRA rank and file began to lose faith in the struggle and began to concentrate on easy targets by, for example, burning down ill-disposed houses.95
It was therefore only a matter of time before guerrilla-like strikes, in the manner of Kilmichael, were conducted by the Crown forces on the IRA. Peter Hart lists four such offensives in Cork, when, during the early months of 1921, units were either captured or wiped out, as in Clonmult, Dripsey, Clogheen and White’s Cross.96 In particular, ruthless stealth tactics were utilised to great effect in the Clonmult ambush of 20 February 1921, when almost the entire East Cork flying column was eliminated on the word of an informer.97 Worse still, the local IRA completely lost the run of itself, initially in trying to trace the informer, but subsequently in an orgy of revenge, quickly reciprocated in kind by the British.98
Conditions were just as bad in the capital. On 15 January 1921, for example, the British started a system of dragnet encirclements. The IRA immediately responded by travelling about the streets in small desperado gangs prepared to open fire on any lorry suspected of carrying British soldiers.99 In May, Collins’ headquarters in Mary Street was raided and documents seized. By June, curfew restrictions, first introduced on 23 February 1920, had become most effective due to an extension of the hours of curfew, but principally due to the very real threat that anyone found to be out of doors, even someone carrying a pass, would be immediately fired upon. And, on 16 June, the Crown forces were reinforced in the barracks of Marlborough Hall, Phoenix Park, Ballsbridge and Portobello.100
Yet, despite the particular relevance of Mulcahy’s warning and the general military context in which it was given, de Valera himself began to behave in almost the exact same exaggerated way as Brugha had been doing. Straight away he proposed that Stack, instead of Collins, become his successor (obviously a demotion for Collins) in the event of his own capture or death; that Collins should take the place he had vacated in the States; that there be an easing off of the guerrilla campaign so that British propagandists would be less able to portray the IRA as murderers; and that, in its stead, every few months, set-piece battles would be provoked involving a few hundred men on either side.101
The set-piece battle idea was first discussed early in the new year of 1921 at a specially convened meeting held at 41 Herbert Park, The O’Rahilly’s old home. Everyone in any way associated with the above intra-elite squabbles attended, which is to say de Valera, Brugha, Stack, Mellows, Collins, Mulcahy, O’Duffy, O’Connell, O’Sullivan, MacMahon, Béaslaí and Russell. De Valera, upon his arrival, immediately ‘made it clear that something in the nature of a big action in Dublin was necessary in order to bring public opinion abroad to bear on the question of Ireland’s case’.102 He suggested the storming of the Black and Tan stronghold at Beggars Bush, a proposal which was not enthusiastically received. By way of a compromise, then, an idea, which was originally mentioned by McKee, was accepted, i.e. the burning down of the Custom House within which were stored the papers of the British local government and tax system for Ireland.103
The date agreed upon for the attack was 25 May. By that time, behind the scenes on the other side of the Irish Sea, the war was increasingly causing turbulence within Lloyd George’s government, though it is unlikely that de Valera was aware of that. In actual fact, a heave under Bonar Law was pending, something which Lloyd George was determined to see down, in part by means of an all-out drive to finalise the Irish question. Lloyd George’s change of tack can be dated from de Valera’s return home, because, from as early as January 1921, Sir John Anderson, the Under-Secretary, who regarded de Valera as an important moderate, ordered the less enthusiastic Nevil Macready, General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Ireland that, from then on, he, de Valera, must not be arrested or attacked, so as to make him available for discussions, should the greater need arise.104 Consequently, when de Valera, having been arrested on 20 June, was released within twenty-four hours, it was obvious that he was being accorded diplomatic immunity for negotiation purposes. Sure enough, on 24 June, two days after King George V read out a conciliatory speech at the inaugural session of the Northern Ireland parliament – ‘May … the Irish people, North and South, under one Parliament or two … work together in common love for Ireland’105 – a formal invitation
