11 July.
Therefore, the Custom House raid – a venture which Collins and Mulcahy had serious misgivings about, even though they went on as if they were merely amused by de Valera’s military suggestions106 – probably helped expedite the process towards a political settlement, as de Valera had hoped it would. (In justification of Collins’ and Mulcahy’s doubts, the cost in quality manpower was very high – one hundred and twenty of the best men of the Dublin brigades were actively involved, eighty of whom were captured and five of whom were killed.107)
Nonetheless, there is no escaping the fact that de Valera was motivated by more than considerations of international politics, when he became involved in military strategy. A tenable argument would be that, in the style of his performance in the States, he did not countenance playing second fiddle to anyone,108 most especially someone whose power base was in the army. Or, to put it in another way, he was fully aware that Collins had become the dynamo of the national front in his absence and that, therefore, backed up by his colleagues in IRA GHQ, Mulcahy in particular, he could prove to be an awkward ally during the Treaty negotiations, these being obviously an occasion of momentous national importance, as well as being an opportunity for gaining, or at least not losing, personal prestige and power in the process.109
CHAPTER 6
Pragmatic
Truce, Treaty and Debate,
July–December 1921
Hardly was the Truce declared on 11 July when Brugha and Mulcahy began squabbling once again. The particular reason was a relatively trivial one. During the war, an ex-British army officer by the name of W.G. Robbie owned a typewriter sales company and he had in his possession eleven American manufactured Yost typewriters. These typewriters were once the property of the British army. The IRA unceremoniously removed them from his premises. Robbie was convinced that his secretary had informed Sinn Féin on him, so he got rid of her. The IRA then forced him to leave the country. However, with the coming of peace, he applied for permission to be allowed home.1
Next day, 12 July, Mulcahy contacted Collins and asked him to deal with the case, ‘a very bad one’.2 Tom Cullen, one of Collins’ men, duly became involved. Brugha was informed of this on 27 July.3 He immediately made an angry complaint to O’Sullivan, as AG, about Collins, who, two days later, had been in contact with Tom Cullen on the matter:4 ‘The handling of this case from start to finish … displays an amateurishness that I thought we had long ago outgrown.’ Also, he hoped that Mulcahy would take action against Collins: ‘I intend to see about putting our Department of Information [Intelligence] on such a footing that things of this kind cannot occur in future.’5
At any rate, by September, as far as Mulcahy was concerned, the case had been adequately dealt with by Collins and was therefore closed. Even so, he expressed annoyance with Brugha’s criticisms: ‘I consider the tone of your letter of 30th July is very unfortunate.’6 But, of course, this remark merely served to provoke yet another angry reaction from Brugha:
The latter’s [Collins’] memo of July 29th. was not the result of your note of the 12th. but of mine of July 28th. – 16 days later … What good purpose was served by your writing 5 weeks after the event is probably best known to yourself. To me it seems a further development of that presumption on your part that prompted you to ignore for some months past the duly appointed Deputy Chief of Staff [Stack]. However, before you are very much older, my friend, I shall show you that I have … little intention of taking dictation from you as to how I should reprove inefficiency or negligence on the part of yourself or the D/I [Collins], as I have of allowing you to appoint a Deputy Chief of Staff of your own choosing.7
Mulcahy immediately handed the problem over to de Valera, thereby implicating him in a controversy which had the potential to develop into a profound split at the very top of the state-building elite: ‘I cannot usefully discuss any matter with the Minister for Defence, and in view of the spirit in which the endorsement of the 7th September is written, I cannot accede to his request to preside at or be present at any meeting of the staff.’8 It would appear, therefore, that he had asked for an apology from Brugha, but, having got a begrudging one only, he opted to withdraw his labour in protest, thereby giving Brugha the perfect opportunity to suspend him sine die, which, on 12 September, he warned him he would do if he did not comply by noon the next day. Mulcahy didn’t comply, whereupon Brugha proceeded as promised: ‘You will hand over to the Deputy Chief of Staff all monies, papers, books, and any other property of the Department in your possession.’9 But de Valera must have intervened as requested because Mulcahy turned up at Sheila Humphrey’s house on the Ailesbury Road, where Brugha and Stack were already gathered. Stack left immediately and, in de Valera’s presence, Brugha wept tears of frustration as he explained to Mulcahy that he himself could do no wrong, by which he probably meant that he always acted with the best of intentions, which was about as good an apology as Mulcahy was ever likely to receive from the man.10
Mulcahy later claimed that his trouble with Brugha was a form of collateral damage emanating from Brugha’s preoccupation with Collins: ‘I was a bad contact for the transmission of these attacks, and in that way Cathal became somewhat antagonistic to myself.’11 That was never the full story because Brugha would still have been suspicious of a military-based IRB, with or without Collins. Besides, once de Valera made up his mind to take on Collins, the unsettled political context widened considerably, as the following chain of events illustrates.
On 22 June, de Valera proposed that Brugha, Mulcahy and Collins draft a military statement outlining their fidelity to the Cabinet, ‘As an attempt is being made by the British Propagandists and others to misrepresent the position of the Army of the Republic.’12 Moreover, on 9 July, Mulcahy was not appointed to the delegation which met with Macready, arguably Mulcahy’s military counterpart, in order to settle the terms of the Truce13 and, from 11 July, de Valera and Brugha opened face-to-face communication with the IRA. Mulcahy immediately became suspicious that Brugha, in particular, was paying too much attention to the IRA’s complaints about the way the war had been managed.14
Then, lo and behold, probably in late July, Stack came into prominence. Ever since March 1918 there had been an understanding that the position of DCS was his for the taking and, after his escape from Strangeways Prison, Manchester, on 25 October 1919,15 he actually did attend GHQ meetings in that capacity, though he submitted his resignation during the autumn of 1920 in order to commit himself more fully to the running of Home Affairs, for which he was also responsible.16
It is perhaps understandable, therefore, that there was some antagonism when Stack decided to exercise the DCS option once again. Mulcahy, in particular, was not happy, even though, according to himself, it was he who made the DCS offer in the first place in March 1918.17 However, by 1 August 1921, he had changed his mind and opted to defy both Brugha and Stack by appointing Eoin O’Duffy instead.18 In addition, as Brugha already alleged (in the previous block quote),19 he might have decided to give Stack the cold shoulder. But significantly, on 15 September, the Cabinet minutes recorded the following:
Personnel to be asked to re-enlist. M.D. to get out necessary instructions. Volunteer Executive to be notified. 2. C.S. to preside at Staff Meetings. If the M.D. wishes to meet the Staff on a particular question, he may preside at such meeting. 3. Austin S. to attend at Staff meetings. 4. Names of Officers of H.Q. Staff & Divl. Commdts. To be submitted by C/S through M/D for ratificn. by Cabinet.20
Next, on 4 November, the minutes said: ‘The Min. for Defence to take steps immediately to give effect to a former decision for recommissioning of the Army. To begin with, commissions to be offered to all members of the old headquarter[s] staff and the divisional commanders.’21
Therefore, given the adroitness of those decisions, it is virtually certain that de Valera had at last decided to publicly lend his weight to Brugha’s enduring struggle to gain homage from Collins and Mulcahy. Indeed, similar to Brugha’s
