advice, from April 1923 to January 1924, Cosgrave’s cabinet considered that if a constructive customs policy was initiated, this could encourage northern businessmen to view Dublin rather than London as their natural ally and, in the process, facilitate the goal of a united Ireland. O’Shiel himself believed that Ireland’s case regarding the economic and, in turn, political injustices of partition should be presented to the League of Nations itself.14 Bruno Waller, the president of the still-extant Irish League of Nations Society, argued strongly against adopting such a stance, however, and instead advised Cosgrave’s cabinet to focus simply on getting the Anglo-Irish agreement, or ‘treaty’, registered with the League of Nations as an internationally recognised legal agreement.15
The American government had some interest in establishing diplomatic and trade relations with the Irish Free State quickly. It would not do so, however, because of a combination of political disturbances in Ireland and America’s felt need to defer to Britain’s hesitancy in allowing a Free State government to operate freely.16 While an Irish American contributor to Foreign Affairs recommended George Russell’s Irish Statesman journal to Americans as the best guide how to ‘properly envision the revolutionised Ireland of today’,17 Irish civil disturbances during 1922–3 led to the suspension of municipal government in Ireland for several years. Therefore, neither Russell’s nor anyone else’s ideas of economic development were likely to be implemented any time soon.18 Russell himself would later write for Foreign Affairs that Ireland was the only country in Europe ‘where there is neither fear nor envy, but only gratitude’ for America’s growing influence in international affairs. He also argued that the claim in Foreign Affairs by unionist propagandist Stephen Gwynn that there were two, mutually hostile, Irelands (north and south) was incorrect, and that the eclipse of partition, by means of a new federal political arrangement,19 was likely in the near future.20 This belief of Russell’s (a native of Ulster) that the partition of Ireland could not last reflected the fact that the existence of Northern Ireland had no legal, political and cultural antecedents in history before Westminster’s unilateral passing of its Government of Ireland Act in December 1920. The official title of the United Kingdom itself would not change to include Northern Ireland until 1927.21 Its existence could not be ignored, however, while it was also clear to critics and supporters of partition alike that ‘the “Ulster” problem’ was ‘the crux of the whole situation’ in determining whether or not the fledgling Irish Free State could possess sufficient financial solvency to survive.22
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
