Point of View 2-Book Bundle. Douglas L. Bland
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу Point of View 2-Book Bundle - Douglas L. Bland страница 14
On these points, the analyst stated clearly his determination: “It is within federal jurisdiction. It does not offend the Constitution, and there’s no similar motion currently on the Order Paper.” In other words, the motion was, in the view of the non-partisan analyst, entirely votable.
After a couple of clarifying questions for the analyst, the Conservative member of the committee moved that “Bill C-408 should not be deemed vot[a]ble because it does not meet these two criteria.” This motion was carried unanimously without any further discussion. So, with swift adjudication, Motion 408 was dead, prevented from being debated and voted on in the House of Commons.
What is disturbing about this, firstly, is the haste and carelessness with which the motion was dispatched. The mover of the motion three times referred to it as a bill, when, in actuality, M-408 was a motion. This is more than mere nitpicking; the analyst clearly pointed out in his analysis that the standard of review is different for bills than for motions. Because motions are not binding and do not invoke statutory rules, the test is relaxed slightly.[4] So, any misunderstanding of what the committee was considering was most relevant.
But what was more disturbing than the committee’s haste was their apparent disregard for the rights of the private MP. Private members may bring matters of importance up for debate in the form of motions or bills. In a parliamentary calendar largely comprised of government business, subject to rules and a lottery that determines precedence, this is the most significant tool a private member maintains.
Undoubtedly, the issue of pregnancy termination is a subject that makes some MPs uneasy and most party leaders nervous, but that is entirely irrelevant. If members are opposed to a motion, they can vote against it. If leaders are strongly opposed to it, they can use moral suasion, or, more likely, whip their caucuses to vote against a motion. But to essentially censor a motion right at the gate, against the advice of an independent analyst, is heavy-handed and, I would suggest, contrary to the expectations of constituents, who rightly believe that their MPs have a voice and can represent them in Ottawa.
Predictably, a subsequent appeal to the entire PROC Committee was conducted in camera (i.e., privately) and purportedly summarily dismissed. By moving the vote in camera, the government ensured that the public would not know what, if anything, the committee considered before dismissing the appeal. This is a disturbing trend: moving the operation of committees in camera, preventing scrutiny of how Parliament operates. It requires majority support to move a matter in camera; the members of the majority government caucus can, when convenient, vote to move a motion away from the prying eyes of the public and the media.
As well as moving inconvenient committee discussions in camera in order to avoid the glare of publicity, the government has also taken to attempting to control — to the point of preventing it — committee work that it takes exception to. At a Justice Committee meeting in the winter of 2013, the NDP justice critic put forward a perfectly reasonable motion, requiring that the committee conduct a study regarding a whistle-blower’s allegation that the minister of justice was not vetting government legislation for Charter compliance before tabling the legislation, as required by statute.
This was, in my view, a serious allegation, especially given the growing number of the government’s tough-on-crime bills that had been struck down by the courts for being in violation of some Charter-protected right. I was not satisfied by the assurance given me by the parliamentary secretary to the minister of justice that all proposed legislation was indeed being properly vetted. She described some vague process that was being followed, which did not seem particularly similar to the very specific process prescribed and allegedly not followed according to the whistle-blower’s assertion.
However, the government, apparently not believing it was answerable to the committee, and certainly not to the NDP justice critic, instructed its majority on the committee to vote the motion down. Given the serious nature of the allegations, and since I was not feeling particularly compliant that day, I suggested that Ms. Boivin table her motion for forty hours (until the next meeting) to allow me to do my own research and allow the parliamentary secretary the opportunity to provide a more credible assurance that the government was, in fact, living up to its statutory Charter-vetting obligations.
I have never in my professional life caused such chaos or such a ruckus! Multiple staffers were literally running in and out of the committee room. Blackberries were buzzing constantly, as the executive staffers tried to figure out what the hell was going on. Did a backbencher just vote to hold over a motion potentially embarrassing to the justice minister rather than vote it down as instructed? This may have been precedent setting: a Conservative backbencher looking for assurance that the minister of justice was complying with the law!
The entire process concluded with an invitation to attend the principal’s office (that is the office of the chief government whip). I was, not so subtly, reminded of the expectations of me as a member of the team. Shortly thereafter, I was transferred off of the Justice Committee, albeit largely for reasons unrelated to my above attempt to hold the government to account and in compliance with the law.
3. The Caucus
I suppose that if there was a criticism of my performance as a member of the Conservative government caucus it was that I was not a team player. If my critics equate being a team player with being a government cheerleader, I concede the point.
Now, within caucus, there are obviously differing understandings of this role both in concept and in application. There are those who believe members, owing their election to the party and the party leader, are essentially an extension of the Prime Minister’s Office Communications Branch. Proponents of this model believe it is the purpose of MPs to read prepared lines in the House and then return to the ridings on break weeks to continue the selling of the government’s messaging. Any straying from approved communication lines is viewed as going rogue.
When I served as a Conservative MP, I took a more nuanced view of my role as a backbench caucus member. As a member of the government caucus, I was loyal to the party and to the leader, under whose banner I was elected. Accordingly, I felt obliged to support the government’s legislative agenda and I believe my voting record reflected consistency in that regard. However, supporting the government does not, in my view, necessitate blindly and mindlessly supporting everything the government says or does.
In my view, the constructive criticism of government initiatives is not the equivalent of mutiny, or even disloyalty. Quite the opposite actually; sycophants and yes-men are certainly less valuable to a government’s performance than constructive critics who demonstrate their loyalty by challenging the government to continually perform even better. Whereas a yes-man will continue to cheer blindly even as it becomes obvious that a policy is going off the rails, the constructive critic, not shy of speaking truth to power, will advise his caucus colleagues of the proposed policy’s shortcomings in order that improvements can be made — changes that will ensure that the final policy is sound. In so doing, he demonstrates his loyalty to his party and his government.
Traditional caucus loyalists believe that all differences between caucus members ought to be resolved in caucus behind closed doors; once a position is determined, the party leaves the caucus room united and singing from a single song sheet. It all seems perfectly reasonable; however, as appealing as in camera discussions might be for those concerned only with the party’s interests, they do absolutely nothing to promote the public interest. When a decision is under consideration behind closed doors, it is inevitable that political ramifications will also be under consideration. How will this initiative be viewed by the base? How will the voters react in the strategic swing ridings? How will the party’s fundraising be affected?
These partisan considerations might be extremely important to party operatives, but they are of absolutely no relevance to the taxpaying constituents that a Member of Parliament is supposed to be representing. In order to ensure