rather than the party’s interests that are being considered, transparency demands that important matters be decided in public.
A public discussion of the issues would ensure that the points of view of the various stakeholders are heard and considered. Such is certainly not the case in a typical CPC caucus meeting, which in fact barely qualifies as a meeting. The process is completely controlled by the party leadership and more closely resembles a briefing than a meeting. There are no motions; there are no votes. There is no Roberts Rules of Order.
Caucus members do receive updates, and they hear from the prime minister how great they all are and how Canadians trust only them to manage the country, especially the economy. To remove any doubt, caucus members are provided talking points, canned stump speeches, and sample letters to the editors of local newspapers, all designed to reinforce the government’s messaging and the caucus member’s role in distributing those communications to his or her constituents.
Members are briefed about the government’s plans and proposed legislative initiatives. However, these plans and initiatives are often news to the caucus members as, frequently, no notes will have been distributed in advance to provide background. That deficiency significantly compromises the caucus members’ ability to ask researched or meaningful questions.
More problematic, no votes are ever taken inside the government caucus room. A minister will brief the caucus concerning a legislative initiative she intends to introduce. She will take questions and will attempt to provide clarification and satisfy concerns caucus members may have. But the government bill will not formally (or informally) be approved by the caucus. Caucus members will subsequently be whipped, or instructed, to support a bill or motion that they have had the opportunity to discuss but have never had the opportunity to approve.
An Opposition motion or bill will similarly be presented to the caucus. The government will state its position; there will be a discussion of it and the opportunity to ask questions. But no vote will ever take place. Caucus members will be expected to follow the government’s position regarding the proposal but will never have the opportunity to ratify that government position.
This is very different from situation that existed in the provincial Progressive Conservative caucus of Ralph Klein, which I had the pleasure of serving in from 2001–2004. Premier Klein ran what at least approximated a democratic caucus. No legislative proposal could make it to the floor of the Alberta Legislature without first having been vetted, then supported by an actual vote at a standing policy committee of the caucus and finally by a show-of-hands vote at a full caucus meeting.
The party whip would ask for a show of hands on all matters before the caucus. If the result was not obvious, hands would remain up until a formal count could be taken. If a minister’s recommendation was defeated, the minister could tweak the proposal or remedy the defect and bring it back for approval, but nothing made it onto the floor of the legislature without caucus approval.
I was able to use that democratic vetting process in 2003 to delay radical changes to Alberta’s automobile insurance regime for over a year. In a well-publicized display of democracy in action, Finance Minister Pat Nelson had to modify her legislative proposals, which capped injury claims, several times. It was not until she changed the legislation to include public consultation and a mandatory legislative review in the future that the bill received the requisite caucus support and could proceed to First Reading in the Alberta Legislature.
There is no comparable vetting or approval process in the caucus of the Conservative Party of Canada. In a partial, but woefully inadequate, attempt to remedy this defect, the government established Caucus Advisory Committees (CACs) several years ago. The CACs are comprised of the caucus members who are assigned to various committees; other caucus members may attend, but the schedules are not published.
The aptly named advisory committees are briefed on imminent legislation initiatives and can ask questions and provide input. Informal votes are sometimes taken, but these are completely non-binding on the minister — a fact that perfectly illustrates the focus-group relevance of the CPC caucus including the CACs. For example, the Justice CAC unanimously approved salary disclosure, in PMB C-461 (also known as the CBC and Public Disclosure Act), at $188,000. However, the committee’s approval of this bill did not prevent the executive from instructing the evisceration of the CBC and Public Disclosure Act at the Access and Ethics Committee. As with all other aspects of their role as members of that caucus, MPs are expected to willingly and unequivocally follow the will of the party leadership.
As a result, the government caucus plays no meaningful or substantive role in holding the government to account.
4. The Senate
On Tuesday, March 05, 2013, the House of Commons was debating an NDP Opposition day motion seeking to abolish the “chamber of sober second thought” (the Senate). They cited recent well-publicized allegations against specific senators as a rationale for mothballing the $92 million upper house. I listened intently to their argument, but was not remotely persuaded, save to the extent that recent developments reinforce the need to reform the Senate.
Firstly, every institution has members who have fallen beneath the standard expected of them. All professions — physicians, lawyers, businessmen, and clergy — have had members fall from grace; yet we do not abolish their important institutions. Members of Parliament and members of provincial legislatures, past and present, have been, and are, embroiled in ethical and even legal quagmires. In the end, senator misconduct is not a good argument in favour of Senate abolishment. The institution is bigger and more important than the individuals who comprise it.
Secondly, the Senate serves a useful, although frequently misunderstood, purpose. The Senate does in fact provide a deliberate and thoughtful second look at legislation that was inadequately vetted by the House of Commons. A recent example was PMB C-290, dealing with single-event sports betting. The bill seemed straightforward: it would allow casinos to take wagers on single games — currently they will only accept bets on multiple games, to prevent against game fixing, something that has become a problem in European football matches.
The House rushed the bill through, as it had bi-partisan support. At the Senate hearings, however, it was discovered that all the major professional sports associations were vehemently opposed to the legislation. Paul Beeston, president of the Toronto Blue Jays, went so far as to opine that expansion of minor league professional baseball in Canada would be compromised if the bill became law. The Senate correctly put the brakes on potentially damaging legislation until more information could be obtained and important questions answered.
Although unicameral legislatures do exist in modern democratic states, they are certainly the exception, not the norm. The democracies of Scandinavia, New Zealand, and Singapore all have single houses. But the United States and most Commonwealth countries have bicameral legislatures, designed specifically to provide checks and balances, allowing reconsideration of inadequately vetted legislation in a manner similar to the incident cited above where brakes were put on the gambling legislation.
Ironically, the Senate sometimes comes under attack for doing its job. In fact, the Senate usually comes under criticism when it actually amends legislation approved by the democratically elected House. Critics argue that an appointed body has no legitimacy in overriding an elected body. However, as we saw with the case of the single-sport betting bill, hastily approved by the House of Commons but opposed by all professional sports associations concerned by match fixing, the Senate attempted to improve the legislation and fulfilled its constitutional obligation by applying the brakes to the bill and ordering protracted study and hearings.
Constitutional experts cite the potential for gridlock between chambers and the slowing down of government reforms as negative bicameral side effects. The cynic in me suspects that is the real reason the NDP supports Senate abolition. If they ever form government, they might
