of 2012, when the Japanese government bought three of the islands from their private owner. Ironically, Tokyo did this to forestall any private plans for economic development of the islands that might antagonize China. Tokyo’s intent to the contrary notwithstanding, Beijing was antagonized, claiming the purchase was a violation of the agreement between Zhou and Tanaka, and responded aggressively by sending fishing boats, patrol craft, and observation planes into the waters and skies around the islands. At one point, Chinese naval guns even locked their firing radar on Japanese Self-Defense Force planes. All of this seemed to be aimed at calling into question Japan’s ability to administer the islands and at forcing Japan to agree to negotiations over their eventual fate.
Japan had no interest in negotiating as this might have constituted an admission of the possible validity of China’s claims. In the eyes of Tokyo, Japan’s ownership of the Senkakus could no more be disputed than China’s ownership of Taiwan.
In this regard, however, a crucial question was what the United States thought. By treaty, it was obliged to come to Japan’s defense if Japanese territory were attacked. But did the Senkakus count as Japanese territory? On one hand, Washington recognized that Japan was administering the islands, and said in press statements in 2013 that it would defend against any effort to change that administration by force. On the other hand, it repeatedly responded to press questions by saying that it had no opinion on the question of which country’s historical claims were most valid. So the United States would not commit itself completely to support Japan’s position, and that gave a hint of danger to Tokyo.
The imposition of the ADIZ by Beijing probed at this possible gap between Washington and Tokyo. The immediate US reaction was to announce that it would not recognize the zone. To prove the point, it immediately sent two B-52 bombers through the zone without prior notice or flight plans. While that was encouraging for Japan, Washington also directed all US airlines to act in accordance with the Chinese demands. This was less encouraging, as Japan had told its airlines to ignore the Chinese zone requirements. In early December, 2013, Vice President Joe Biden visited first Japan and then China. His mission was to reassure Japan of America’s strong commitment to its defense, while also not saying anything that might further disrupt US-China relations. In Beijing, he urged Chinese president Xi Jinping to administer the ADIZ passively, but did not suggest that China cancel the zone. To close observers, the message seemed clear. Washington was reluctant to risk offending China in defense of what Japan considered its right of sovereignty over the Senkakus. This became more worrying for Tokyo in May of 2013, when some Chinese generals stated that Japan also had no right of sovereignty over Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands.
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