sicker, and less secure while paying higher and higher taxes for fewer and fewer benefits. Japan appeared to be a dying country.
LIGHTS OUT
In the spring of 2014, the militant Sunni Muslim group known as the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIS, ISISL, or ISIL) broke out of its base in northeast Syria and quickly overran northwestern Iraq up to the very gates of Baghdad, while also threatening northern Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and parts of Turkey. At the same time, the United States and Iran appeared to be making rapid progress toward an agreement that would allow Iran to continue developing its nuclear-energy capability while still being barred from acquiring sufficient capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The combination of these two developments resulted in an unexpected shift in Middle East alliances. Because of its seminal role in the creation of the Shia Muslim state of Iraq after deposing the dictator Saddam Hussein, the United States felt a strong obligation to prevent the collapse of the new state. It also wished to maintain good relations with Tehran in order to conclude the nuclear deal. But longtime US allies Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan all shared an existential fear of Iran and its surrogate Hezbollah forces in Syria, Lebanon, and northern Saudi Arabia. They deeply believed that Iran was bent on the overthrow and destruction of each of their governments. Consequently, in late 2016, Jordan and Saudi Arabia opened their airspace to Israeli bombers, which launched massive attacks on suspected nuclear facilities all over Iran. Tehran struck back by unleashing Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel from Lebanon, sinking vessels, and planting mines that closed the Strait of Hormuz to all outbound oil shipments. They also encouraged sabotage by Shia Muslims who, despite being a small minority of Saudi Arabia’s mainly Sunni population, held the majority of the kingdom’s vast oil fields and refineries along the western edge of the Persian Gulf. Overnight, the price of oil soared to US$300 per barrel, threatening to push Japan into a massive trade deficit and to completely stall the Japanese economy.
Because 80 percent of the oil and half of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) bound for Japan passed through the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of this passage threw Japan into a desperate situation. The government requested help from Russia, but Moscow replied that it had already committed to supplying China and had no additional capacity. Efforts to obtain increased supplies from Indonesia and Malaysia were also unsuccessful, as these countries wanted to ensure that they and their ASEAN colleagues would have a sufficient supply. In desperation, Tokyo turned to the United States in hopes of obtaining emergency imports of shale-gas-based LNG and shale oil. But despite having become energy independent as a result of the development of shale deposits, the United States did not yet have sufficient infrastructure to export substantial quantities of LNG.
To partially offset the loss of oil and LNG-fueled energy, the Japanese government began to accelerate the restart of its nuclear power reactors. These had nearly all been shut down in the wake of the 2011 tsunami-induced partial meltdown of the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) nuclear reactors at Fukushima. This action, which was necessary in order to carry out safety inspections, had automatically cut Japan’s electric power production by more than 25 percent. Despite growing public opposition to nuclear power, by mid-2014 the government had completed most of its safety inspections and had begun the process of reactivating fifty-four closed reactors.
In early September of 2014, a panel of nuclear regulators had ruled that the Sendai power plant in southern Japan faced no risk from the several dormant volcanoes in its vicinity. On September 27, 2014, however, nearby Mount Ontake unexpectedly erupted, leading University of Tokyo professor and volcanologist Toshitsugu Fujii to warn that no one could accurately predict volcano eruptions, and that Japan was in danger of experiencing further volcanic disturbances that would endanger a number of nuclear power stations. Sure enough, in late 2016, Mount Sakurajima unexpectedly released a hot, fast-moving flow of gas and sediments that quickly knocked out both reactors at Sendai. This created overwhelming grassroots pressure to shut down any reactors even remotely under the threat of volcanic eruptions. Thus, Japan returned to a state of severely restricted nuclear power supply.
THE END OF THE PAX AMERICANA IN ASIA
The years 2012–2016 brought a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the entire Asia-Pacific region. China’s economy had become arguably the world’s largest. Previously, China had been content to pursue economic growth while largely ignoring geo-political issues and ambitions. But all that started to change with its 2012 occupation of the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal near the Philippine coast. Thereafter, China began to extend its growing power into the seas around it by asserting the “nine-dash line” of control (the sketched line segments on an old map now used by China to determine its area of rightful control), which included nearly all the islands and shoals of the South China Sea. In reaction to the 2012 purchase of the Senkaku Islands by the government of Japan, China asserted its own claim to the islands and began to challenge Japan’s administration of them by sending fishing boats and other vessels into the islands’ waters, as well as by practicing air-force fighter maneuvers in the area. In early 2014, China suddenly established a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that included the Senkakus, as well as reefs and islands claimed by South Korea. Later in the same year, it began oil-drilling operations in waters also claimed by Vietnam. These actions were accompanied by a rapid buildup of Chinese military forces, particularly shore-based anti-ship missile batteries aimed at eventually denying the US Pacific Command and allied forces committed to defending and maintaining stability in the region access to the waters within China’s “first island chain” (Japan, Okinawa, the Ryukyus, the Senkakus, Taiwan, the Paracels, the Spratleys, and the Strait of Malacca).
All eyes had been on the United States to see how the long-time hegemon and guarantor of stability might respond, and a palpable unease could be felt in the region when Washington did not react strongly. In response to the Chinese occupation of the Scarborough Shoal in 2011, the White House had sent the secretary of state to Beijing and Manila to urge negotiations, but had taken no concrete steps to prevent or reverse the Chinese occupation. In what initially appeared to be a success for US diplomacy, China had agreed to talks with Manila. But as the talks dragged on and produced no result, China continued its occupation, and Washington continued to watch. In the case of Japan’s long-disputed—and then, in 2012, openly challenged—sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, the United States had always held a nuanced position. It had several times stated that it recognized Japan’s present administration of the islands and that it therefore was obliged to defend them as part of Japanese territory under the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In other words, the Senkakus were considered to be under the US nuclear umbrella. At the same time, however, Washington said that it had no opinion on whether China or Japan had rightful sovereignty over the islands, and that such final sovereignty should be determined by negotiation between those two countries. When China announced its new ADIZ, the US Air Force sent two B-2 bombers through the zone without giving prior notice to Chinese authorities, thereby indicating that Washington did not recognize the legitimacy of the zone. However, Washington also advised US airlines operating in the region to abide by the new Chinese ADIZ.
To be sure, Washington had announced it was “pivoting to Asia” in 2012, but in view of these developments, many in the region wondered what the “pivot” really meant. This concern was only heightened when word leaked out of the Pentagon in late 2013 that, in order to avoid a confrontation with China that might pose a direct threat to the United States, as well as to cut costs and avoid excessive US federal budget deficits, the US was considering a possible withdrawal of US forces to China’s “second island chain” (Tokyo Bay, the Bonins, the Marianas, Guam, Palau, and the Sunda Strait). No one in the region was sure whether America really intended to maintain its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region or not.
Then, in late 2016, warning shots from Japanese Self-Defense Force pilots aimed at Chinese fighters overflying the Senkaku Islands accidentally resulted in the downing of one of the Chinese planes. China responded by occupying Uotsuri Island, the largest of the Senkakus. Washington condemned the action and sent ships from the Seventh Fleet to patrol the vicinity, but took no action to dislodge the occupying Chinese. Instead, it urged Japan to negotiate with Beijing for a deal
