domination in order to exploit its wealth of ivory and slaves. Firearms enabled the slave traders to impose their rule. The classic means by which slaves were acquired in historical times in Sudan was the razzia (Arabic, raid), most associated with Turco-Egyptian slave hunting (during the Turkiyya, 1821–81) and with the Mahdi’s anti-Turk Islamic revolution (the Mahdiyya, 1881–98).15 The Rezeigat and Misseria (Baggara) tribal militia attacks on the villages of northern Bahr el-Ghazal have become the principal means for the acquisition of slaves, and the violence involved is reminiscent of the earlier razzia. The current system was organized and sustained by a strategic interest shared between the government of Sudan and the Baggara—the government wants fighters to confront the SPLA and the Baggara want grazing lands and free laborers.
The planning and organization of the slave-raiding expeditions are evidence that the practice is not a mere “tribal feud over grazing areas and water sources,” as the government of Sudan has claimed. The degree and time of planning depends on whether the force that is being put together is the Murahileen, that is, the tribal militias of the Baggara, or the Popular Defense Forces, the Mujahideen that guard the military trains. In the case of the tribal militia, before the raid is actually carried out, the slave-catching communities of the Baggara spend several weeks putting together the raiding force. Preparations begin with a message from the local authorities to the chiefs in some of the slaving communities that there will be free arms and some money offered to those who volunteer for the militia. They are also promised that they will keep whatever loot they will bring back from Dinkaland. The preparations also involve native administrators such as the nazir, the umda, and the sheikh,16 the army, and the government officials who work in the slave-taking communities such as the police, the judges, and security officers. The Baggara also make an important electoral support base for the Umma Party of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the party has therefore been involved in organizing the slave raids as well, at least during al-Mahdi’s premiership in the 1980s.
The native administrators then make clan-based lists of all the people who are interested in the adventure. The lists enable them to collect taxes from the raiders’ booty and to distribute the loot fairly. They also allow the government to keep track of the arms given away, for the government is at times unsure about the consequences of proliferating assault weapons to an undisciplined militia force. Recent interviews with South Sudanese returning from the North and with former slaves who were freed or who escaped have provided information on the planning of slave raids.
One informant was Ali, who was interviewed in Nyamlel (Aweil West) in the summer of 1999. He is half Dinka and half Baggara and has lived with the Dinka all his life. When a joint government army and militia force attacked and occupied Nyamlel for two weeks in 1998, Ali was captured and taken to the North along with 380 others. Because of his light complexion and other Baggara features, he was not enslaved. Instead he was released and told never to return to Dinkaland. Ali stayed in ed-Da’ein only to look for ways to sneak back to Bahr el-Ghazal. He eventually managed to travel to el-Fasher and got on a train that took him to el-Meiram. He then walked back to Nyamlel. His account, and information from SPLA local officials and other former slaves, explain the planning of a slave expedition as follows: “The Baggara usually form a slave-raid ‘committee.’ Each willing subtribal group brings its representative to participate in the committee. The representative mobilizes men and youth to join the raiding force. The committee determines the date of the raid. And the participants gather in a previously designated location that has water resources. The militia leaders, in collaboration with the umdas and sheikhs, would prepare food supplies for the raid. Then they would go to the hukuuma (the government) for weapons and ammunition. The government has to be informed about the departure of a raiding force to northern Bahr el-Ghazal so that reinforcements could be sent just in case the SPLA attacks them.”
This structured system is strong evidence that the government has made slavery an important institution once again, just as it was more than a century ago in the same area involving the same peoples. The preparations involve plans for the journey south, the attack on Dinka villages, the destruction of homes, the burning of food stores, the looting of cattle, the killing of men who resist, and the abduction of children and women. Also of important consideration during the preparation phase is the journey back to the North, how to deal with a possible SPLA ambush, the division of the loot at some point along the way, the dispersion of the militia to their villages, and the scattering of the slaves. The distribution and scattering of slaves has to be done as quickly as possible so as to avoid accumulation of slaves in one place where they might be found and the practice exposed. Upon the return of the attackers, the slaving communities normally celebrate the successful and safe return of the militias. Bulls are slaughtered to mark the occasion. People sing, beat drums, and make joyous cries. A game of horse riding-skills is played.
In the case of the Popular Defense Forces, slave raiding is a corollary of a jihadic war against the SPLA. As mentioned earlier, their main task was to guard the train between Babanusa and Wau. It took weeks, sometimes months, to get the train ready in terms of supplies and men to take the trip to Wau. The forces were conscripted and given rudimentary training in operating the AK-47 assault rifles. They were inducted into the mentality of martyrdom in the name of Islam. A word was then sent to Baggara umdas in el-Meiram, Babanusa, and Muglad that the government was recruiting Muslim youth to escort the train south. The government paid a varying amount of money to the participating youth in addition to arms, which they kept after the train had reached its final destination. Once a Baggara subgroup or clan received the arms, these arms became the property of the group. The chiefs can collect the weapons at the end of the mission or keep the list of recipients to be called upon the next time the government makes another request. Because they went through Dinka territory, sometimes in collaboration with the Murahileen and the regular army, the paramilitary forces raided Dinka villages along the railway line. Slaves captured in the process of the train movement became the property of individual Mujahideen as payment for their venture. Although material reward was minimal for this group, compared to the Murahileen proper, they seemed to believe that the demolition of the SPLA, the suppression of southern calls for freedom, and possible extension of Islam was the ostensible reward climax of their endeavor.
In sum, the line between the slave-raiding armies of the different subtribal groups in Darfur and Kordofan, the PDF, and the Sudanese army was blurry, as far as slavery was concerned. Often the army undertook a joint operation with these militias to attack SPLA positions or villages suspected of sympathizing with the SPLA. One such operation was the 1998 occupation of Nyamlel mentioned above. It involved not only the collaboration of tribal militias and the Sudanese army, but also the top administration of ed-Da’ein Province. The commissioner of the province, the commander of the armed forces, the nazir and other local administrators were all involved in the organization of the raid, the thirteen-day occupation of the town, and the town’s destruction. This occupation, which resulted in the taking of hundreds of slaves, was filmed and broadcast on an army program on Sudan national television. Although Nyamlel is not an SPLA military base, the broadcast portrayed the occupation force as a glorious army capturing a town from the rebels.
The following is an account of the occupation of Nyamlel in May 1998. It is a summary of many statements from the survivors of the raid as well as from escaped slaves. The Nyamlel occupation was a part of an offensive by the ruling National Islamic Front. The attackers were on foot, horseback and in armored vehicles. There were about twelve cars in all. They took cattle, goats, young women, and children. Houses were burned and people were thrown into the flames. Anyang Ngong, a young woman in her twenties, was among the captives. She was from a small village between Nyamlel and Marial Baai. She explained the whole ordeal in the following words:
They beat me and tore off my clothes. They tied the hands of small boys to the horses, and took us to Nyamlel. There, we had to stay at the old rest house.17 We were guarded by security men belonging to the Popular Defense Forces [PDF]. The commander in charge of the force was named Jenet Hassan. Almost all the strong people in my village were captured and taken to Nyamlel. But there were so many people from other villages. It was difficult to know how many were there. The town, Nyamlel, was crammed
