the internationalization of military procedures, particularly in Western countries.96 A change in military doctrine can reflect military cultural change, while continuity in doctrine may indicate cultural continuity. Alternatively, an innovative doctrine may not mirror a cultural change in the military, but instead reflect an adaptation to international norms. According to Kier, military doctrines are only rarely designed in response to the international security environment and its development; this influence depends on how the military organization perceives the constraints set by civilians and how they cope with them.97 In this way, changes in doctrine can occur notwithstanding the continuity in military culture.98 In this book, I study how military cultures differ from one another, and observe that they are largely independent from military doctrines.
Army training is another important dimension that differs from military culture. The secondary literature shows that training is partly shaped by culture, yet is distinct from it. Sion, for instance, shows that even well-trained members of the military are not trained for the role they have to perform, as training templates still very much depend on military culture.99 The way training is conducted is shaped partly by culture and partly by other factors, such as the availability of resources and the internationalization of Western armies. The French and Italian units received some specific training together before deploying, and they often trained together with other NATO countries. By tracing the basic characteristics of the training that each unit received, I show how similar this training was, which I control for by observing how the training differs from the practice.
For bureaucratic politics theory, I select a version of organizational interests theory related to military organizations, which argues that military organizations develop preferred ways of behaving in order to control and coordinate the contributions of large numbers of sub-units. I test two particular variants of this theory: that military organizations pursue their agenda either by increasing (a) their prestige and legitimacy or (b) their relative power, for instance by seeking an upgrade in military equipment or an increase in resources. According to this competing explanation, different armies behave differently because they pursue different interests in order to increase their prestige, legitimacy, or power. With respect to SOP theory, I test to see whether the units have different procedures and standardized ways of operating that could explain the behavioral variations. According to this alternative explanation, different armies behave differently because they have different procedures and standardized ways of doing things. Finally, military leadership theory holds that military leaders can “stretch constraints and this process requires determination and skill as well as opportunity.”100 According to this explanation, different armies behave differently because they have leaders with different approaches who order different kinds of behavior.
The next chapter focuses on the French and Italian military cultures and how they emerged.
CHAPTER 2
French and Italian Military Cultures
This chapter describes the domestic political conditions under which distinct military cultures emerged in France and Italy in the decades following World War II. It presents the main traits of these army cultures and explores the characteristics of the units studied in Lebanon and Afghanistan. This provides the historical-institutionalist background for the following chapters on the recent operational histories of French and Italian troops in Lebanon and Afghanistan, that describe how their military cultures shaped the perceptions of the deployed units and how they influenced what soldiers did on the ground.
Exploring the Roots of the Current Italian Military Culture
The current Italian army military culture emerged from a slow process of transformation that was completed in the early 1990s. This process originated in the controversial and widely debated postwar period of 1947–1949. This phase was a critical juncture—a period of radical break with the past that led to a completely new domestic political configuration, particularly concerning the relationship between the armed forces, civilian decision makers, and society. This new political configuration was based on strong societal beliefs rejecting war and militarism, and on the marginalization of the armed forces from civilian decision-making processes. These two components led to the emergence, in the early 1990s, of a specific army military culture based on the idea—true or instrumental—that Italian soldiers were “good humanitarians.” This core value was the result of a reinterpretation of the idea of Italian soldiers as good people (brava gente) and the quest for legitimacy in the post–World War II period. This section describes the historical process that led to the critical juncture in 1947–1949, the resulting political configuration, and how it eventually shaped a unique army culture that functionally served the organization. I then reflect on how this army culture is manifested in the specific unit traits of the battalions deployed in Lebanon and Afghanistan.
The Critical Juncture in Italy: A Disbanded Army in a Disbanded Nation?
This section elucidates the complex set of conditions that led to the post–World War II critical juncture in Italy. For reasons that still remain partly unknown, Italian troops came to consider themselves (and to be considered as) ineffective soldiers but good people during World War I and the colonial campaigns. The “good soldier” belief spread quickly and became an important identification marker. The Italian armed forces also enjoyed broad popularity and legitimacy, and were perceived as the apolitical defenders of the nation.1
In the interwar period, Italy shared many of the challenges of other European countries, namely growing economic hardship, unemployment, and the rise of nationalism, which in Italy became strongly coupled with the bitter issue of irredentismo—a movement to reclaim territories that were lost (allegedly unjustly) during World War I. During that war, Italy changed sides in 1915 and fought against the Central Powers, to which it had been allied at the beginning, and thus ranked among the winning powers at the end of the war. But the general understanding was that it had not gained enough and that the victory was “mutilated, debased and demonized.”2 Taking advantage of a general climate of frustration, in 1924 Mussolini staged a coup d’etat and enforced an autocratic dictatorship, which maintained—but marginalized—the monarchy.
Historian Marco Mondini recently illustrated the military’s non-negligible role in mobilizing against the so-called “anti-nationalist” leftist parties after World War I and supporting the coup, which contrasts with the perceived traditional apolitical orientation—at the time—of the Italian military.3 At the time, the military was a popular, highly influential institution that was very close to the king. The fascist dictatorship gave greater public visibility to the armed forces, as it celebrated the values of militarism and military skills and capabilities.4 Yet the collusion between the military and the dictatorship, although very natural, should not be exaggerated; it was far from an “idyllic marriage.”5 Mussolini tried to divide and control the military, thus “inflicting some huge attacks against the jealous independence of the military world,” in line with what Hitler did with the Wehrmacht.6 Even before the decision to intervene in World War II, several high-level generals expressed their concerns to Mussolini about fighting in a war for which they had not prepared enough.
During World War II, when Italy was allied with Nazi Germany, the army was deployed in Northern and Eastern Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. The army managed to win some battles but was defeated in most of them.7 These defeats, combined with growing public discontent and dissent within the Fascist Party, resulted in the fall of the Mussolini regime in July 1943—which marked the beginning of the fragmentation between the armed forces, civilian decision makers, and society. The period until the end of the war profoundly changed the army’s sense of its own mission, as well as society’s trust in it.
After Mussolini was ousted, the Italian armed
