alongside the Germans, while others disbanded, went home, or joined the resistance. Many soldiers perceived the armistice as a traumatizing and confusing event, including those who were not fighting at the front.
It was a terrible defeat for the military—particularly for the army: the perception was that the organization had failed to fulfill its mission. As the official Italian Army history explains, “obliged to the armistice, the Army was terribly defeated on September 8.”9 Rossi argues that Italy was a “disbanded nation” (allo sbando), and a civil war ensued between partisans fighting the liberation war against the German troops that had occupied Northern Italy, and former fascist leaders.10 These events created an irreparable disconnect between the military, civilian decision makers, and the rest of society.11 In this context, the military, in line with its tradition, became strongly associated with the monarchy, and the resistance movement was linked to the republic. According to some, “the military had let down its own people.”12 Other, more nuanced, interpretations argue that “the Italian armed forces started to lose their credibility … when they stopped being perceived as the incarnation of the nation and took up one side, only one component among the many fighting in the Italian civil war.”13 For four main reasons, this was one of the most dramatic points in Italian history, not only because of the suffering imposed on the civilian population, but also due to the general sense of disorientation it created and the pluralistic, democratic, and “creative” new equilibrium that emerged.
First, the founding myth of the new republic was based on a solid convergence between the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party, and their shared value of pacifism. Article 11 of the 1948 Constitution of the newly established Republic clearly states that “Italy rejects war as a means of settling international disputes.”14 In such context, the military had to be contained: “The political elite involved in the reconstruction agreed that in the future, Italy could not and should not give military power a central role in its foreign policy.”15 At the same time, the armed forces were given the important role of the guarantor of stability.
Second, the Italian armed forces entered a profound moral crisis, which is considered to be unique in Europe.16 Overall, partly because of the military’s inability to adapt to the changing role asked of the armed forces, partly because of the difficulties of purifying the armed forces of its fascist infiltration and of integrating resistant organizations into military ranks, there was the widespread public perception of a link between the armed forces, the monarchy, and the regime, which set the foundation for the events following 1943.17 Marco Mondini argues that even the Wehrmacht was perceived to be cleaner and less colluded than the Italian armed forces. In this climate of general distrust, the Italian army was unable to renounce to its traditional role as “priest of the nation” and prestige attached to it: “It was like a priest that had lost its sacred aura: tired and without conviction, it was repeating old rituals, unable to engage, to trigger emotion and mainly to unite as it used to do.”18
Third, the dramatic transition in the immediate post–World War II era provoked “the most profound reshaping of the relations between state, society and the armed forces in the history of unified Italy.”19 The events following the fall of the fascist dictatorship created a peculiar political spectrum in Italy that became deeply polarized, triggering unusual relationships between the right and the left; the military came to be strongly associated with the extreme right.20 For instance, referring to the 1943–1945 period as the liberation war carries a profound antimilitaristic legacy to this day. Similarly, the role of the resistors and former fascists during the 1943–1945 period still provokes heated debates. The 1946 referendum, in which Italians opted for a republican system of government, reiterated the military’s inability to be perceived as an apolitical body.21
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
