Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations. Chiara Ruffa
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I also engage in competitive theory testing. The book’s research design takes into account as many potential intervening factors and competing theories as possible. The case selection controls for many factors by choosing examples with similar characteristics in terms of material resources, mandate, ROE, type of threat level, doctrine, and training. In addition, I discuss and empirically test three complementary factors (doctrines, SOPs, and training) and five relevant alternatives to my cultural argument, which fall into two categories: mission-specific explanations (headquarters’ directives and leadership) and domestic-political explanations (governmental mandates, previous operations, and organizational interests). Empirical expectations and causal claims are discussed at the end of Chapter 1.
Case Selection and Strategy of Data Collection
My focus on variations in operational styles in peace and stability operations has a theory-building purpose. I have selected my cases in order to control for as many material and mission-related factors as possible so I can isolate the potential causal role of military culture and theorize about the relationships between domestic political configurations, military culture, and the observable behavior of soldiers in the field. Therefore, this book is the result of a long and complex “series of iterations.”15 To increase the external validity of the findings,16 it analyzes two very different kinds of operations—the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) and the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). UNIFIL II is a traditional peacekeeping operation: soldiers are tasked to supervise a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, and are mandated to use force only for self-defense. ISAF, by contrast, is a stability and security operation: its mandate requires soldiers to enforce minimal security conditions (using force if necessary) and provide security for reconstruction projects.17
I assess my explanatory variable—military culture—through field observations, questionnaires, and qualitative in-depth interviews, which I supplement through historical analysis and secondary literature.18 I analyze the dependent variable, force employment, via interviews, observations, and military reports. For each case, the book relies on in-depth ethnographic material about two specific military units, and on interviews and analysis of primary sources for all other units across rotations in two armies, to detect potential variations across different units of the same army. I focus on the French 1st Fusilier Regiment from Epinal and the Italian 132nd Ariete Regiment deployed in UNIFIL II in 2007 and all the other French and Italian rotating units until 2013; and the French 8th Marine Parachute Infantry Battalion and the Italian 9th Alpini Battalion in ISAF deployed in 2008 and all successive units until 2013. The analysis thus combines cross-case and within-case comparative approaches.19
The French and Italian armies deployed roughly the same number of troops in the AOs studied, and were deployed in areas with comparable threat levels and with identical ROE (as I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4).20 To illustrate, in Lebanon, the French deployed 2,000 troops and the Italians 1,800; in Afghanistan they deployed 2,500 and 2,510 troops, respectively. Troop deployment numbers remained roughly consistent across rotations within my time frame. Nonetheless, despite all these similarities, the French and Italian units in each operation behaved differently and excelled at different tasks across the two missions.
I spent nine months collecting data in the two countries, embedded within each army and as an observer in the area. I was in Lebanon from September to December 2007 and in Afghanistan from July to November 2008. I also conducted seven follow-up fieldwork missions in Paris and Rome. I have maintained contact with each of the four units and visited their military bases, where I conducted follow-up interviews, and also circulated post-deployment questionnaires with the units that were subsequently deployed.
I interviewed thirty soldiers per unit and ensured that the sample was balanced between officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers, and also regarding activities undertaken, which included logistics, force protection, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), and operational activities. The thirty-five-to ninety-minute interviews explored soldiers’ everyday lives and activities, perceptions, and understanding of the context via open-ended questions. To ensure robust data, I recorded only those behavioral patterns that could be observed from interviews with at least three soldiers of different ranks and triangulated with my own observations, as well as those obtained through secondary interviews with humanitarian and UN staff and the local population about the French and Italian units deployed in their AO.
Interviews focused on soldiers’ understanding of the situation, interpretation of the ROE, and their daily lives in order to highlight variations in force employment. I conducted more than 80 interviews in each case, with a well-balanced sample of soldiers deployed in each unit, as well as with civilian officials and military officers at the headquarters both in the field and at home. This data was complemented by approximately fifty context interviews with nongovernmental organization (NGO) practitioners and UN officials in each case. Where possible, interviews were conducted with parties involved in the conflict: Hezbollah and Amal members in Lebanon, and Afghan intellectuals who are critical of the NATO presence in Afghanistan.21
Questionnaires were distributed following the logic of randomized stratification: I stratified by rank and then randomized within each rank (adhering to quotas of officers and soldiers, thus overrepresenting the officers). The questionnaires—30 of which were distributed to the units under study, while the others were received by other contingents in Lebanon, and thirty of which were distributed to the units under study in Afghanistan—gave respondents multiple pre-specified choices and room to elaborate on their answers. Though the rather small sample size has limits for generalizability, the careful sample selection, qualitative approach, and robust triangulation to ensure that the results were consistent across several sources enhances the validity of the findings.
Questionnaires were used to gain insights into different components of military culture, namely the organization’s self-perception, perception of change within the army, and interpretations of basic notions such as victory and peace. Semi-structured questionnaires, which presented a limited set of options but left space for free answers where necessary, were used to crosscheck this information and collect personal accounts of the soldiers’ world views. The questionnaires were anonymous to encourage genuine responses about the beliefs and perceptions of the organization, and were distributed predominantly to soldiers who had not been interviewed.
I employed direct observation as a complementary methodological tool. As demonstrated in many studies, direct observation is one of the best ways to collect information on behavior, that is, force employment and military culture.22 Accordingly, it is widely used by scholars studying culture: “Investigators typically participate in the daily life of the organization over a period of several months to a year.”23 The goal of observation is to check and validate the findings emerging from interviews and questionnaires. In some cases where it was not otherwise possible to collect data about actors’ perceptions, I have used data obtained by observation as principal data. Observations were conducted between 2007 and 2009, by living for several weeks with each unit on base in Lebanon and Afghanistan, and accompanying patrols and CIMIC activities.
Data obtained through interviews, questionnaires, and observation was supplemented by analysis of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include army doctrines for the military organizations deployed, military training handbooks, white papers, military doctrines of the relevant regional organizations, mission mandates, and diaries and memoirs of soldiers in operations. The literature dealing with