their home governments. From a slightly different perspective, the rogue-state framework that gained currency post-9/11 labels specific countries as pariahs because of their purported support of terrorism (Caprioli and Trumbore 2005). The international community may cast blame upon terror-rich states for turning a blind eye to their nationals’ involvement in worldwide terror.2
The contagion of terrorist violence across borders magnifies the global effect on policies. Transnational terrorist events may spill over into neighboring states even if the grievances are homegrown (Braithwaite and Li 2007). Alternatively, terrorist groups strategically target softer targets (Enders and Sandler 2006). Hence, proximate states’ more stringent policies may redirect terrorist violence toward states with more permissive conditions for violence. Thus events in other states inspire heightened perceived probability of future violence. Even if the state in question is not targeted in attacks, violence in other countries increases the perceived security risks of human mobility. In sum, we expect states to tighten visa policies in response to attacks elsewhere.
Hypothesis 2: Targeted Effect
States whose citizens or territory have been harmed in incidents of terrorism will enact restrictive visa policies against origin states whose nationals were associated with these incidents.
The global effect is selective in the sense that states tailor policies to specific countries, imposing restrictions on terror-rich origin states. That is, it does not imply a wholesale response whereby attacks abroad drive destination states to enact more stringent policies against all sending states. However, it is somewhat less discriminate in that it means stricter policies against origin states, regardless of whether the destination state has been directly harmed by these attacks. We can imagine a more selective type of policy whereby states respond to attacks by origin-country nationals only if their national security interests were involved in these attacks. Incidents that harm the state’s citizens, or take place on the territory of the state, directly threaten its national security. I refer to this as the targeted effect of terrorism.
Targeted events also more directly activate the fear-management aspect of border controls. Friedman (2011) argues that responding to terrorism is mostly about managing perceived vulnerability to attacks. Targeted assaults generate a sense of vulnerability, propelling states to calibrate policies according to the possible harm rather than to precise risk. However, Andreas (2009) contends that policy stringency is, to an extent, an outgrowth of public demand. Regardless of the objective efficacy of policies, restricting territorial access to outsiders also fulfills domestic demand. Policymakers also utilize draconian measures to symbolically assert their commitment and ability to insulate the citizenry from external threats.
The symbolic aspect is muted when it comes to visa controls because the public is not always cognizant of visa restrictions. The government may make much ado about imposing visas on terror-exporting states, but even then the visa requirement is physically not salient. That said, insofar as attacks on the country’s soil or involving its citizens elevate threat perception, they inspire the public to demand that the government take action.
Furthermore, targeted attacks compound the securitization of human mobility, which pivots on countries reframing migration as a threat to physical integrity (Lavenex 2001). Terrorist events on the state’s own soil directly allow securitization of short-term mobility. Targeted attacks muster public backing of harder policies by creating widespread fears of being victimized. In addition, they agitate the public into demanding tighter policies. In effect, the public push allows governments to put aside the objective efficacy of policies. Additionally, terrorist events tend to cluster together spatially and temporally (Braithwaite and Li 2007; Gelpi and Avdan 2015). Put simply, unlike lightning, terrorist events do strike the same locale twice. Hence, it is logical to expect states that have suffered violence at the hands of origin-country citizens to selectively curb human mobility from these states.
Hypothesis 3: Economic Interdependence
Economically interdependent states will be less likely to pursue restrictive visa policies with respect to their economic partners’ citizens.
At the heart of the theoretical framework is the argument that economic ties make for more liberal policies. They do so through direct and indirect effects; that is, by affecting migration policies and by conditioning the impact of terrorism. Insofar as stiffer visa policies degrade economic exchange, we’d expect opportunity costs to matter in states’ decision making. That is, anticipating revenue from economic exchange to shrink, states will be less willing to implement stringent policies. Reduced travel is a detriment to economic exchange to the extent that trade and foreign direct investment rest on face-to-face contact. The same characteristics of visa controls that augment security can inhibit travel. Visa restrictions raise the costs of travel as a result of the wait time, paperwork, fees, and uncertainty involved in the application process. Not surprisingly, visa requirements may discourage prospective travelers. In addition, tougher visa policies significantly dampen tourism. Neumayer (2010) demonstrates that, on average, visa controls decrease travel between pairs of states by 52–63 percent.
We may contend that tourism-dependent destination countries are more likely than other states to hesitate to impose restrictions.3 However, this misses the strong positive correlation between travel and commerce. As O’Bryne notes, “Freedom of travel is freedom to trade” (2001, 409). Visa requirements function akin to non-tariff barriers to trade because while goods and capital can circulate, the producers of goods and owners of capital cannot. We can further unpack the wisdom behind these words if we consider that even in the electronic age, the physical presence of investors encourages the establishment and preservation of business interlinkages. Neumayer (2011) reports the reductive impact of visa restrictions on the flow of goods and capital. He argues that primarily by hampering personal contact across borders, visa restrictions significantly lower bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). He finds that visa restrictions result in a drop of 21–32 percent in bilateral trade and a moderately higher drop of 33–38 percent in bilateral FDI.
Neumayer’s (2011) findings point to the direct negative correlation between restrictive visa policies and economic transactions. Stricter visa policies can erode the dyad’s economic relationship through an alternative mechanism: to the degree that draconian policies are viewed by the commercial partner as an antagonistic signal, we might expect a backlash. After all, restrictions on mobility are antithetical to liberal tenets and collide with shared norms between trade partners (Flynn 2003). Consequently, restrictions might anger economic partners. To illustrate, in response to the Euro pean Union’s controversial proposal to impose visa restrictions on the citizens of the United States and Canada, critics were quick to voice concern over the breakdown of transatlantic relations (Kanter 2016). Additionally, the commercial partner may retaliate by enacting tougher legislation, further stifling economic revenue. Neumayer’s (2010) empirical analysis validates this intuition, showing that reciprocal visa restrictions reduce capital flows between states by 6–12 percent more than unilateral visa requirements.
Reprisals can also manifest as weaker economic ties, either because investors become reticent to continue doing business in the partner state or because the state revokes economic privileges. Key domestic actors in the origin state may also feel slighted by stiff policies. By inhibiting face-to-face communication and contact, restrictive policies will undercut mutual affinity. Turkey’s response to severe visa requirements by Schengen states is a case in point (Kirișçi 2007).4 Pro-trade lobbies and business in Turkey have time and again castigated the European Union for tough visa legislation that contravenes the spirit (and, to some extent, the legal framework) of the European Customs Union. These concerns prompt commercial lobbies at home to champion liberal visa policies toward economic partners. In sum, states will consider the opportunity costs of reduction in trade and capital investment when devising visa policies. Policymakers will also be attuned to vested interests favoring liberal policies.
Hypothesis 4: Conditioning Effect
