of security imperatives. Material incentives carry more weight than security imperatives in trading states’ grand strategy (Rosecrance 1986; Rudolph 2003). Societal actors that stand to lose from tighter policies may boost the salience of material concerns in the state’s calculus. For example, trade lobbies and multinational corporations have admonished the U.S. government for tough policies that stymie and slow down trade (Yu 2010). Trade groups in particular raise the concern that visa restrictions risk rechanneling business to economic competitors of the United States, such as Brazil, China, and India. Even when the visa is granted, it might have a cooling-down effect and divert foreign business abroad, thus weakening a country’s competitive edge over its economic rivals. Domestic coalitions with internationalist preferences may forge cross-national bonds, facilitating economic interdependence and prosperity (Solingen 1998). These ties in turn significantly shape foreign policy attitudes, both among political elites and at the public level (Fordham and Kleinberg 2009). Economic exchange inculcates mutual trust, which in turn should temper fears associated with economic partners’ citizens. Hence, we expect economic interests to downplay the impact of transnational terrorism: the positive impact of transnational terrorism on policy stringency declines with the strength of economic ties.
Measuring the Concepts
The hypotheses pertain to visa policies in general. This chapter focuses on visa restrictions; the subsequent chapter proceeds to visa rejection rates and documentation requirements. The dependent variable (DV) employed in the analyses that follow is coded 1 if the destination state has a visa requirement in place for the citizens of the origin state and 0 otherwise. The data cover 189 member states of the United Nations and 18 nonmember political territories.5 This yields information on bilateral visa restrictions for 36,300 directed dyads. Directed-dyad design allows each state to appear once as destination (recipient) and once as origin (sending) state. That is, the data differentiate between a visa in force by state A against state B and vice versa. The directed-dyad design is appropriate for this study because visa reciprocity is not guaranteed. To illustrate, 32 percent of states do not reciprocate visa waivers; reciprocity is more common among Western democracies and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states. Put another way, 68 percent of states do reciprocate policies, but this figure also includes reciprocating by imposing visa restrictions (close to 25 percent).
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
