threat perceptions turn inward and host states become preoccupied with cultural rather than economic insecurity.
Rudolph and Peters show that globalizing has varied effects on states’ migration policies. But neither work tells us much about how non-state threats—and informal violence wielded by these actors—influence migration-control policies. My argument points to a different reason why economic incentives may have limited impact on open-migration policies. Economic models stipulate that states engage in cost-benefit analysis when deciding how open borders should be. Fears affect policy through an appeal to emotion rather than strict cost-benefit analysis. This suggests that states deviate from strict cost-benefit analysis when policies then reflect these fears (Friedman 2011; Mueller 2005). Coupled with weak lobbies, emotional decision making should further winnow support for open migration.
Theoretical Anchor
My book speaks to debates about the role of borders and territoriality in states’ pursuit of sovereignty. Territoriality and borders occupy a venerable and important role in IR scholarship; this lends a solid theoretical foundation when generating empirical implications about borders. Nonetheless, when IR scholars have studied borders, they have done so by looking at the role of borders in conflict (Huth 1996) or cooperation (Simmons 2005). Conflict scholars examine why states clash over the location of borders. Cooperation scholars explore how borders can function as effective institutions facilitating cross-border trade. Neither perspective tells us much about how states manage their borders. Common to both perspectives is that territorial demarcation is a given. Agnew refers to the unquestioning acceptance of demarcation as the “territorial trap,” noting that mainstream IR “assumes implicitly that a state is a fixed territorial entity operating much the same over time and irrespective of its place within the global geopolitical order” (1994, 54). The territorial trap handicaps our understanding of how states manage borders in the face of non-state threats. An important consequence of globalized informal violence is the emerging role of borders as perimeters of defense against intrusion by non-state threats. While scholars underscore that non-state actors can exact considerable damage (Keohane 2002; Salehyan 2008b), scant attention has been paid to whether these concerns do in fact alter how states manage their borders. By looking at transnational terrorism, I shift attention to how states manage their borders in the face of such threats. This book also asks scholars to reconsider territoriality in international relations.
The territorial trap is underpinned by realism’s contention that sovereignty is predicated on territorial exclusion. As an early voice in classical realism, Morgenthau defined sovereignty as “supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce law” (Morgenthau 1978, 4). Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century geopolitical thinking mirrors realist thinking and stresses that geography plays a pivotal role in state security (Starr 2006). Within its borders, the state monopolizes the legitimate use of force. Borders delimit the bounds of states’ policing and lawmaking authority. In a similar spirit, the modern state has appropriated the legitimate means of movement (Torpey 2000a; Torpey 2000b). Dating back to the turn of the twentieth century, the passport is a relatively new invention. In previous centuries, individuals could traverse boundaries unencumbered by the need for documentation. The passport and the visa regime allow the modern state to monitor movement across its borders (Salter 2003). The realist perspective contrasts sharply with liberalism on the role of borders. Liberals view borders primarily as institutions that regulate and facilitate cross-border exchange (Simmons 2005). Whereas realists emphasize territorial sovereignty, liberals stress managing and monitoring flows across borders, or what Krasner (1999) has dubbed interdependence sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty requires the exclusion of external actors; in contrast, interdependence sovereignty turns on “the ability of public authorities to control transborder movements” (Krasner 1999, 9).
The book’s analysis also sheds light on a second debate between globalists and security scholars. To summarize the debate, the material benefits of transnational exchange in an increasingly globalized economy have led many observers to anticipate the erosion of state territorial control and ultimately the obsolescence of state borders. The security externalities of globalization, however, point to the opposite expectation: harder borders. To date, no one has attempted to reconcile these propositions. This debate remains unresolved also because it ultimately rests on an empirical question of how globalization affects border politics. The book addresses this controversy by expanding economic interdependence theory beyond its conventional boundaries, which are limited to questions of conflict and cooperation. An extensive scholarship addresses how economic incentives can restrain states from using militarized force (Oneal and Russett 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). We know much less about how economic ties influence how states seek security when faced with nontraditional threats.
Border and migration control is an ideal testing ground for studying how economic and security incentives influence policies because this is one policy domain where both types of incentives intersect (Rudolph 2005). In contrast, for example, other policy domains may be about maximizing primarily one objective. Trade policy concerns economic security. Counterterrorism is about physical security. Migration and border control are about both in that states simultaneously pursue economic and security objectives in their grand strategies.
Globalization scholars assert that commerce inspires policy liberalization because economic interests override security incentives in state grand strategy (Rosecrance 1986). Some might go even further to say that globalization imposes a golden straitjacket on states, rendering unilateral policies infeasible (Friedman 1999). This perspective is limited, however, because it does not account for economic ties between pairs of states but rather expects trading states to have open borders. This limitation underwrites the enduring clash between the expectations of globalization and security scholars. Economic interdependence theory suggests that economic ties between states constrain policies. The constraining effect grows with the relative strength and salience of such ties. I propose a similar argument and maintain that asymmetric interdependence in particular creates a push for softer policies toward trade partners. To illustrate, Canada and Mexico are disproportionately dependent on commerce with the United States; bilateral trade comprises a higher proportion of overall trade and of gross domestic product (GDP) for both states than it does for the United States. This asymmetric dependence compelled Canada and Mexico to oppose a border clampdown in the wake of 9/11. Commerce also creates stakeholders that advocate for open borders. Transnational firms and commercial interests were vocal in opposing the thickening of borders within NAFTA.
These debates anchor the broader implications of the book’s three interrelated findings. First, I show that states harden borders against origin countries whose nationals have conducted attacks against their own interests in the past. This is a targeted rather than universal policy response; in other words, states targeted in terrorist attacks do not exhibit a blanket response but tighten up policies against only a subset of countries. Second, trade and capital ties render states less eager to harden borders against the citizens of commercial partners, regardless of previous attacks. Third, the identity of victims matters in conditioning states’ policy choices. States factor in attacks against other similar countries and treat these events as striking closer to their own interests. This effect is evident in the European Union whereby attacks on the European continent compel states to tighten up their borderand migration-control policies, regardless of whether their own citizens were hurt in such attacks. These findings yield support for both sides of the debate. I argue that borders continue to matter, but they take on the role of a shield against transnational threats rather than traditional, military threats. The argument refines realist insights on borders as a hard shell against the militaries of other states. My argument also upholds the liberal perspective, however, by showing that economic ties soften policies and reduce the likelihood of fortified borders.
I show how the insights from economic interdependence encompass state behavior beyond the decision to engage in militarized disputes. The book demonstrates that parallel to their effects on conflict behavior, material incentives shape how states cope with transnational terrorism. The insights in this book would thus appeal to scholars interested in how security and economics intersect.
