of justice estimated that Colombia continued to export 80 percent of the world’s cocaine. “Colombia, primer exportador de cocaína,” LP (PA), 2 April 1996, 3A.
187. “Fragmenting Narcotics Industry,” 13.
188. FBI agent Huff stated of the Cali cartel kingpin: “Valencia was relentless in his exploration of other smuggling routes and methods . . . particularly . . . in a direct route from Colombia to the United States, as this would eliminate the high cost and periodic treachery associated with dealing with Mexican smugglers and traffickers. Valencia was weary of his Mexican associates’ lack of discipline and reliability in delivering cocaine pursuant to their agreement with him.” Huff affidavit, 49.
189. “Mexican Drug Traffickers Eclipse,” 1A.
190. Among U.S. federal cases the murder spawned were United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259; and United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599.
191. Grayson, Mexico’s Struggle, esp. 68–85, and Garzón, Mafia and Co., 98. See generally Grayson, Mexico.
192. See Jordan, Drug Politics, 151, and “Tons of Cocaine Reaching Mexico in Old Jets,” NYT (US), 10 January 1995, A1, A8.
193. For the 1993 Guadalajara airport shoot-out between Tijuana and Sinaloa traffickers that killed Catholic cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, who was meeting the Vatican’s ambassador arriving from Mexico City, see Rotella, Twilight on the Line, 150–60.
194. For the evolution of the Gulf cartel, see Garzón, Mafia and Co., 82–89. For its ties to top Mexican judicial and federal police officials, see Jordan, Drug Politics, 85–86.
195. “Top Mexican Cartel Chief Sentenced to Prison,” Wall Street Journal (United States) (hereafter cited as WSJ [US]), 27–28 February 2010, A12.
196. Note that some originally used the term La Familia to denote the close ties in the early 1980s between the Guadalajara and Sonora cartels. See Toro, Mexico’s “War,” 79–80, 80n78.
197. Grayson, Familia Drug Cartel, esp. iii, 3, 42–43, 58–60.
198. “Según la DEA: La mitad de los principales cárteles de drogas del mundo son mexicanos,” LP (HO), 23 April 2001, 39A; “El poderío de los cuatro cuarteles,” LP (PA), 26 May 2007, 5A; “DEA privilegiará lucha contra narcos mexicanos,” LP (PA), 26 May 2004, 2A.
199. “Surgen sesenta grupos de narcotraficantes,” SV (GU), 15 July 2001, 13.
200. The Federation refers to cooperation among Pacific-coast Mexican organizations, including the Sinaloa cartel, after a 2002 meeting in Cuernavaca. Garzón, Mafia and Co., 100.
201. “Mexican Drug Cartels Move North,” WP (US), 20 September 2007, A14; “U.S. Strikes Blow Against Mexican Cartel,” WSJ (US), 23 October 2009, A3; “U.S. Arrests Hundreds in Mexican Cartel Sweep,” WSJ (US), 11 June 2010, 1.
202. In 1997 retired DEA agent Donald Ferrarone testified to Congress that “every indicator now and over the last 20 years reveals the government of Mexico consistently works together with the major drug-trafficking families, seeing to it that the drugs . . . are offloaded securely, protected, shipped cross-country under convoy, stored and safely transported to our border.” Jordan, Drug Politics, 142. For a corroborating statement by a Medellín trafficker to an undercover U.S. agent, see Mazur, Infiltrator, 65. In 1998 a 230-page confidential assessment by Swiss officials investigating money laundering reportedly alleged that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s brother Raúl had taken “control of practically all drug shipments transiting Mexico” during the Salinas administration. Jordan, Drug Politics, 259n42. Raúl Salinas was later convicted of ordering the assassination of his brother-in-law, president of the PRI; however, in 2009 the investigation of his alleged drug trafficking was closed. See Astorga, “Mexico,” 94, and Garzón, Mafia and Co., 84n118.
203. See generally Gross, Drug Smuggling, and Escobar, Accountant’s Story, 64.
204. See “Drugs: Central American Region a Cocaine Warehouse,” Interpress Service, 21 April 1999.
205. Lee, “Perversely Harmful Effects,” 191.
206. “Marijuana of the Eighties,” 1.
207. In 1994 the DEA discovered on a $1 million IBM computer, confiscated from José Santacruz Londoño, extensive telephone records, including those of the U.S. Embassy and its DEA office, and all of Colombia’s motor-vehicle records. This enabled Cali traffickers to gain clues as to the identity of informants. Chepesiuk, Drug Lords, 239–40.
208. U.S. Senate, Law Enforcement: Report, 139.
209. “Cartels Have Best Technology,” 12A.
210. Strange, Retreat of the State, 7.
211. Drug czar General Paul Gorman told the U.S. Senate that Medellín traffickers, in certain respects, were better equipped than the U.S. Air Force. U.S. Senate, Law Enforcement: Report, 33. Barry Seal demonstrated Medellín communications equipment to the President’s Commission on Organized Crime, stating, “I don’t believe there’s any paramilitary group better equipped than my former associates.” “Marijuana of the Eighties,” 2. See also “Equipo satelital controlaba trasiego de droga por mar,” LN (CR), 9 August 2007, 18A; “Cartels Have Best Technology,” 12A; and “Stemming the Drug Flow,” 17.
212. See Huff affidavit, 111; U.S. Senate, Laundering in Panama, 34–35; and “Gozan de impunidad sin costo,” LP (PA), 23 January 1999, 6A. In arresting a Salvadoran trafficker in 1998, Guatemalan authorities found an encryption device and equipment to monitor police conversations. “Desmantelan red telefónica que servía a narcotraficantes,” LP (HO), 13 July 1998, 71A.
213. “Target: Cali Cartel,” 1.
214. See “Patrols Push Drugs into Deeper Waters,” TT (CR), 20 February 2004,
