which established the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, created the new position of director to lead the office, and outlined the mission and jurisdiction of the office.
Even though the declaration of war was informal, the way the War on Drugs was waged—the funding, organization, planning, strategy, and missions—looked at times like the waging of war in Vietnam or Korea and other foreign conflicts. And Nixon used language to match. His words dripped with the language of war—as if the Pentagon had punched up these messages to Americans. In his remarks at a White House press briefing in June 1971, Nixon stated,
America’s public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive. I have asked the Congress to provide the legislative authority and the funds to fuel this kind of an offensive.… If we are going to have a successful offensive, we need more money.… Finally, in order for this program to be effective, it is necessary that it be conducted on a basis in which the American people all join in it.11
The phrase “drug abuse” could have been replaced with “Nazis” and the message easily confused with a World War II–era statement sent from the FDR White House. It combined a focus on an enemy, a request for money—the equivalent of an emergency war supplemental—and a rallying of Americans to a cause reminiscent of exhortations to purchase war bonds and cultivate victory gardens.
In his “Special Message to Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” Nixon claimed that the new Controlled Substances Act was insufficient to the broader task and made an emotional appeal to rally Congress to approve his war funds:
Narcotics addiction is a problem which afflicts both the body and the soul of America. It is a problem which baffles many Americans. In our history we have faced great difficulties again and again, wars and depressions and divisions among our people have tested our will as a people—and we have prevailed. We have fought together in war, we have worked together in hard times, and we have reached out to each other in division—to close the gaps between our people and keep America whole. The threat of narcotics among our people is one which properly frightens many Americans. It comes quietly into homes and destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and breaks the fiber of community which makes neighbors.… The final issue is not whether we will conquer drug abuse, but how soon. Part of this answer lies with the Congress now and the speed with which it moves to support the struggle against drug abuse.12
President Nixon identified the enemy, laid out a plan of attack, and asked for the support to accomplish the task, but he also built in a strategic effort to help guarantee his success. He immediately distinguished himself as a leader, ready to fight an insidious enemy, and shifted responsibility for fighting this enemy (and prospective blame in the case of failure) to Congress.
Ultimately, Richard Nixon’s efforts were resoundingly successful in a political sense. Less than a year after Nixon declared his War on Drugs, Congress approved his “war supplemental.” On March 16, 1972, the House and Senate approved the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972. The House vote was 366–0; the Senate’s, 92–0.13 The appropriations contained in this legislation gave Nixon the additional funding he needed to prosecute the war as he saw fit. And so the United States entered an unprecedented War on Drugs—one that historically was a series of smaller-scale battles. President Nixon ramped up the campaign and ultimately handed the war off to his successors, who as commanders-in-chief would strategize and prosecute this war in their own ways.
5
Prosecuting the War on Drugs
One of the early battles Nixon faced grew out of the Controlled Substances Act itself, Section 601, which established the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. Nixon, who appointed nine of the commission’s thirteen members, likely saw the commission as an opportunity to produce propaganda in support of the War on Drugs; the commission was tasked with producing a report on drug use.1 Many members of Congress praised the creation of the commission, while several other members raised questions about marijuana: its effects and its inclusion in the Controlled Substances Act, specifically under Schedule I. One opponent, Representative Gilbert Gude (R-Md.), stated the following on the House floor on September 24, 1970:
I am particularly pleased by the section establishing the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. I sponsored legislation to establish a Marijuana Commission which was approved by the Judiciary Committee. This section owes much to the thought and effort of the Gentleman from New York [Democratic Congressman Ed Koch]. I hope the Commission can clear up some of the confusion and conflicting reports that have made it so difficult to formulate a sound policy on marihuana.2
Whereas Gude raised concerns and questions about the commission, Nixon had clear opinions about marijuana and obvious expectations about the value of the work of the well-funded ($1 million) commission.3
President Nixon selected as chairman of the commission Raymond Shafer—a former Pennsylvania governor, a Republican, and an old friend. Commission members and staff began working in spring of 1971, and the final report, Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, was delivered to President Nixon and Congress in March 1972. Nixon expected it to provide him with ammo in the drug war, but he didn’t get what he wanted. Like the La Guardia Report before it, the Shafer Commission’s report infuriated those in government who were committed to marijuana prohibition, chief among them the president of the United States.
The report explicitly opposed the legalization of recreational marijuana, stating, “Society should not approve or encourage the recreational use of any drug, in public or private. Any semblance of encouragement enhances the possibility of abuse and removes, from a psychological standpoint, an effective support of individual restraint.”4 However, the report forcefully challenged the historical, scientific, legal, and sociological underpinnings of the prohibition of marijuana. It challenged earlier policy choices: Were they the result of sound analysis or of historical and cultural biases built on false assumptions? It questioned the legitimacy of reports connecting the use of marijuana with increases in criminal activity.
The report also explored the societal and financial costs of criminalizing the possession and use of marijuana. In the face of a prohibition-centered War on Drugs, the Shafer report was damning, stating, “The Commission is of the unanimous opinion that marihuana use is not such a grave problem that individuals who smoke marihuana, and possess it for that purpose, should be subject to criminal procedures.”
Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding was transmitted to Congress and the president just days after the passage of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act, which funded an expansion of the War on Drugs. Nixon unambiguously expressed his concerns over the report in advance of its publication. During an Oval Office meeting with Chairman Shafer on March 22, 1972, Nixon made his interests clear and sought to steer Shafer away from the type of report Nixon now expected:
You’re enough of a pro to know that for you to come out with something that would run counter to what the Congress feels and what the country feels and what we’re planning to do, would make your Commission just look bad as hell. And I think in, I think that, and on the other hand, you could probably render a great service, that doesn’t mean we’re going to tell you what it’s going to be, but we’re going into this too.5
Nixon was unable to prevail upon his friend, and the report ended up reflecting some of Nixon’s greatest fears. During a news conference a few days after the report’s release, the president was asked about his reaction to it. His public statement on the report was brief, dismissive, and clear:
I met with Mr. Shafer. I have read the report. It is a report which deserves consideration and it will receive it. However, as to one aspect of the report, I am in disagreement. I was before I read it, and reading it did not change my mind. I oppose the legalization of marihuana and that includes its sale, its
