Ibn Taimīyah’s vision of economic affairs is very clear. All economic activities are permissible except those prohibited by the Sharī‘ah. Within the limits set by the Sharī‘ah-prohibitions, men know better what is good for them and they are free to make transactions, enter into contracts and conduct their worldly affairs in a just and fair manner, observing the standards of fairness set by ‘urf and ‘ādah, i.e. conventions and custom. The Sharī‘ah intervenes only to ensure justice in human relations and to direct individual action to what is good for all. It seeks to eliminate ẓulm, i.e. injustice and oppression from social relations. With this purpose in view it has prohibited ribā and qimār. The essence of the former is unilateral gain, i.e. ‘taking an increment without a quid pro quo’ (Fatāwā, Vol. 20, p. 341). The essence of the latter is ‘acquisition of another person’s property while it is uncertain whether that person would get the recompense (to his property) or not’ (Fatāwā, Vol. 19, p. 283). Justice in transactions requires mutual reciprocity of benefits. This is ensured only when all contracts are based on the willing agreement of the contracting parties. To be meaningful, this willingness should be based on adequate knowledge of what is involved in the contract. There should be no coercion, no deception, no taking advantage of dire circumstances or ignorance of a contracting party, etc. When the contracting parties adhere to these rules, the resulting market prices are just and fair, provided there is no withholding of supplies with a view to raising prices. Normally there would be no intervention in the market – prices, profits, wages, etc. being left to be determined by the forces of supply and demand. But an intervention is called for when some of the above conditions are violated. When the public authority does intervene, it should be guided by expert advice and should seek to approximate to the price of similar goods or services determined in fair circumstances (see Chapter III, sections B and C of this book).
As to the mode of men coming together in the conduct of their Economic affairs, Ibn Taimīyah, while recognizing freedom of contract, regards co-operation to be the right spirit which should infuse social relations. He would, therefore, not tolerate the type of competition that violates the spirit of co-operation. Note, for example, the following:
(Ibn Taimīyah) was asked about a man who offers, for a house, a rent higher than the (one paid by its present) occupant; does he incur a sin by doing so? Must he be punished for doing so?
He replied, it is reported in the two correct compilations (of ḥadīth, i.e. Bukhārī and Muslim) that the Prophet (peace be upon him), said: ‘A Muslim is not permitted to bid against the bid of his brother; also he should not propose (to a woman) against the proposal of his brother.’ (It follows from this ḥadīth that) if the owner is inclined to renting to a particular person, it is not permissible for another person to offer a higher rent. Then, how (can it be permissible to do so) when that particular person is already living in that house. Hence, whosoever does so deserves punishment, and Allah knows better (Fatāwā, Vol. 30, pp. 160–1).
Following the same logic, Ibn Taimīyah regards sharing in its various forms (muḍārabah, share cropping, etc.) to be more just than the hire contract. ‘Because there is some risk in hiring too, the one who hires may or may not get the benefit (he expected). Whereas in musāqāt and muzāra‘ah (i.e. share cropping) both of them share the profits or the losses (as the case may be), so it does not involve a risk for one of the two parties only, as is the case in hire (contract)’ (Fatāwā, Vol. 20, p. 356).
Looking at social life as a co-operative venture to seek the pleasure of Allah through living in accordance with His Sharī‘ah, Ibn Taimīyah emphasizes the essential status of worldly possessions as means, not ends in themselves. This is also true of all worldly activities, they are means to a higher moral purpose. This being so, one needs always to be conscious of his obligations towards others. These obligations are flexible, one’s own capacity and the others’ needs being the two determinants of the obligation. Like all Islamic thinkers Ibn Taimīyah recognized inequality in worldly possessions but thought it did not imply social inequality which was to be banished from the Islamic society which was based on universal brotherhood in submission to Allah. To him this followed directly from the central Islamic doctrine of tawḥīd and its necessary corollary, justice. He writes:
Justice is related to tawḥīd as tawḥīd is the foundation of justice. The will to superiority relates to corruption as it is the foundation of injustice …
The person who seeks superiority over another person of his kind is an oppressor with respect to him, a transgressor. As the two of you belong to the same (human) kind, you are no more entitled to being superior to him than he is entitled to being superior to you. Justice and equilibrium require that men be brothers (to one another) as Allah has described the believers to be (brothers to one another) (Fatāwā, Vol. 18, p. 165).
Ibn Taimīyah was not a believer in an invisible hand taking care of the society. There were needs to be fulfilled and goals to be achieved. The relevant vocations and industries were regarded as socially obligatory duties (furūḍ kifāyah), which in normal circumstances got done by being prompted by motives ingrained in the nature of man. But the social authority could oblige performance, should circumstances so require. As the author argues in Chapter VII, section D of this book, Ibn Taimīyah envisaged a big economic role for the Islamic state, aiming at eradication of poverty, ensuring fair practices in the market, securing monetary stability, and planning for economic development.
According to Ibn Taimīyah, it is crucial, for the state to be able to play this role, that those appointed to public office observe the Sharī‘ah. Only the God-fearing and the competent should be entrusted with public office, as required in the Qur’ānic verse: ‘Allah bids you to deliver all that you have been entrusted with unto those who are entitled thereto, and whenever you judge between people, to judge with justice’ (4: 58). Opening with this ‘verse relating to the rulers’ his advice to the ruler of his day, which is his treatise entitled ‘Sharī‘ah Policies Relating to the Ruler and the Ruled’ (al-Siyāsah al-Shar‘īyah fī aḥwāl al-Rā‘ī wa’l Ra‘īyah), he goes to great lengths to emphasize that the ‘trust’ (amānah) mentioned in the above verse related to the dispensation of power and wealth. A just society would be one in which political power and material wealth are properly distributed.
The state plays a very active role in Ibn Taimīyah’s economy, being the custodian of public interest and the chief instrument for ensuring justice through enforcement of Sharī‘ah. It manages money but is itself barred from making a profit out of it (Fatāwā, Vol. 29, p. 469). It administers public property in the public interest, supervises the management of all waqf properties, and sees to it that private ownership rights are not exercised to the detriment of public interest. Through the institution of the muḥtasib, it makes all Economic agents fulfil their obligations towards one another, adhere to commonly-recognized norms of behaviour and scrupulously observe the relevant rules of Sharī‘ah. In this context, he comes down very heavily on those employing various kinds of tricks or legal ruses to circumvent the rules relating to barter or to currency exchange. These tricks are worse than outright ribā in his opinion. As a general rule, he regards not the form but the real purpose of and intent behind an act to be decisive regarding its validity. The strictures of Ibn Taimīyah against tricks leading to ribā and other unfair practices reflect the currency of many corrupt practices in the market during his days.
A similar situation prevailed in the realm of public finances. A number of extra-Sharī‘ah levies were being collected from the people and public expenditure, in many cases, was unjustifiable on grounds of public interest. Some of his contemporaries and predecessors had reacted to this situation by declaring all extra-Sharī‘ah
