The Future of Economics. M. Umer Chapra
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Positive economics and normative goals are, hence, mutually inconsistent and may not be capable of coexisting harmoniously in the same analytical framework, or what Lakatos calls, “scientific research programme”.42 What conventional economics should have done is to base its microeconomics on the same religious worldview from which its macroeconomic goals have been derived so that there is harmony between the worldviews of its two major branches of study. This would have helped discussions on individual and firm behaviour that is consistent with these goals and could have enabled a strategy to bring this about.
Instead of doing this, conventional economics adopted the easier but unrealistic course of shying away from making value judgements and giving advice. A number of economists, among them Senior and the younger Mill, ruled out the giving of advice about practical problems as a function of economics, because this would require not only value judgements but also the non-economic elements of other Social Sciences.43 Giving advice based on inherently subjective and religious norms was declared outside the scope of a scientific discipline. Hence, Robbins warned the profession against recommending a particular course of action.44 The aversion to giving advice, along with the assumption that goals would automatically be realized, has unwittingly confined the method of economics to just explanation and prediction, devoid of prescription.
Positivists and operationalists like Paul Samuelson emphasize that the role of economics is to describe and explain the economic phenomena by means of testable or refutable hypotheses.45 In Samuelson’s own words: “a description (equational or otherwise) that works to describe well a wide range of observable reality is all the ‘explanation’ we can get (or need desire) here on earth ... An explanation, as used legitimately in science, is a better kind of description and not something that ultimately goes beyond description.”46 He does not show what it is that “works to describe well”. Could it be anything other than its relationship with the normative goals and their realization as long as these goals continue to be adopted by economics?
Instrumentalists like Milton Friedman emphasize that the primary purpose of economics is to predict. This raises the question of whether it is possible to make dependable predictions when so many of its epistemological assumptions are so grossly unrealistic. Friedman came to the defence of these assumptions with his controversial answer that it is not only unnecessary for assumptions to be realistic, it is also a positive advantage if they are not: “to be important ... a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions.” He further argues that “the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.”47
But the problem that the instrumentalists face is that unless all relevant social, economic and political variables are taken into account, predictions may turn out to be untrue most of the time. Is this acceptable? Economists, however, have a way out of this dilemma whenever their prediction is falsified. All predictions are subject to the ceteris paribus clause, and they can always claim, without any compunction, that the ceteris paribus conditions were not satisfied. The undeniable fact is that the world economy has been subject to such great instability over the last two decades that it has become almost impossible to make reliable predictions and the predictive record of economics has been uninspiring.48 If prediction is considered to be the primary function of economics, and predictions have in general turned out to be inaccurate, then what has economics achieved? Just professional sophistication! Does this not imply that economics should take into account at least the major non-economic factors that adversely affect its predictions or frustrate the realization of its humanitarian goals?
Even if analysis and prediction are accepted as the primary goals of economic method, they need to have proper direction if they are to be effective. The goal of actualizing the socially-agreed humanitarian goals could help provide such a direction and save economics from moving aimlessly in any conceivable direction. The political decision-maker, whose responsibility it is to take decisions, is not interested in knowing just ‘what is’, as described and analyzed by the economist. He is more interested in fulfilling his commitments to the electorate whom he periodically has to face for votes. These commitments are related to the humanitarian goals which concern the realm of ‘what ought to be’. Since resources are limited, he would like to get advice on the appropriate strategy for realizing the promised goals. He may not be able to work this out himself from the ‘is’ as described, analyzed, and predicted by the economist. If economics does not come to his help, its attractiveness as a discipline for solving socio-economic and political problems declines. Is it, therefore, possible for economists to live in human society and yet refrain from giving such advice?
The most desirable task of economics may, therefore, be to focus on the realization of humanitarian goals and the policy measures needed for this purpose. This would enable it to concentrate on the task of establishing the relationship between its humanitarian goals and the different configurations of resource allocations and distributions with a view to demonstrating the configuration which is most conducive to goal realization. This would contribute, after being tested against empirical evidence, to the development of theory, particularly microeconomic theory, and in turn help evolve an effective strategy for the necessary socio-economic change to solve the problems faced by human society.
BREAKDOWN OF FAMILY AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY
While excessive emphasis on the serving of self-interest did lead to the accelerated growth of Western economies, it did not help realize the social vision of actualizing all the normative goals. It also yielded a sour fruit in the form of what Fukuyama calls “the great disruption” in his recent book, The End of Order (1997). This refers to the breakdown of the family. While social interest was safeguarded in the economy to some extent by competition as well as the welfare state, there was nothing to safeguard the integrity of the family when the serving of self-interest became the dominant social philosophy. Family is an institution which works more effectively when all members are loyal to each other and willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the sake of others. The upbringing of children, in particular, requires a great deal of sacrifice on the part of parents. This sacrifice may be a loss in hedonist terms, but in reality it serves the self-interest of all by promoting greater love and affection, cooperation, harmony, and mental peace.
The market mentality of serving self-interest has, however, been injected into the family as well, and the result is that parents are not able to get along with each other. If the cement of mutual sacrifice and loving care is not there, why should they stay together or be loyal to each other. There is a rise in sexual promiscuity, divorce and single-parent families, leading to the emotional, spiritual and material suffering of children. Moreover, even while parents are together, the children may not get the kind of care that they need if the parents are not willing to sacrifice some of their pleasures and material interests for the sake of their children’s proper upbringing.
If the future generation does not get the kind of care and upbringing that an achieving civilization requires, there is bound to be a decline in the quality of human beings and a breakdown in