in sterile and divisive controversies on a number of metaphysical questions like Divine attributes, Resurrection and Life after Death, angels, Revelation and Prophethood, the eternity of the world, the creation of the Qur’ān, Divine knowledge of particulars, and the ability of human beings to see God in the Hereafter. These extreme rationalists adopted hard line positions which were in clear conflict with the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and even the moderate rationalists had difficulty accepting their views.
With respect to the concept of ʿadl, the debate was more practical and relevant to the human condition even though it also raised a great deal of controversy. Some of the conclusions that the moderate rationalists derived were as follows:
• God subjects Himself to the same moral principles which He applies to human beings. He does only that which is just and morally right. It is inconceivable that He would do something that is unjust or morally wrong.
• Goodness or evil are innate in the nature of things themselves and not necessarily because God arbitrarily declares them to be so. It is, therefore, possible for human beings to recognize what is right or wrong through their own reasoning even though they need the help of Revelation to guide them and to confirm their conclusions.
• Since God is just, there is absolutely no room for the concept of predestination. Human beings are the authors of their own deeds, good or evil, and, therefore, rewarding or punishing them would be a reflection of God’s justice.
To a modern rationalist thinker there may be much appeal in a number of these views. Such appeal existed even in those days, and the initial objective, method and concepts of the moderate rationalists did not generate tension even among those members of the Muslim orthodoxy who did not accept the need for rational explanations for religious beliefs and practices. The differences of opinion that existed could have been resolved to a great extent over time in the light of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and through rational debate. The question is, why did this not take place?
Reasons for the Downfall of the Rationalists
It was the extremists on both the conservative and rationalist sides who generated a great deal of heat and changed the texture of the whole debate, creating an atmosphere of confrontation. On the conservative side, extremists like the Hashwiyyahs insisted that faith is based entirely on the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and that there is absolutely no room for reason. In sharp contrast with this, extreme rationalists like Ibn al-Rāwandī and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī9 insisted that reason and Revelation were incompatible and that all matters, including right and wrong, should be judged by reason alone. They belittled all attempts at reconciling philosophy and religion. They insisted on formulating a theology solely on the basis of reason, independent of Revelation, and approached what became known later on in the West as Natural Theology.10 They tended to reject, just like the Western Enlightenment movement later on, all those metaphysical truths that could not be established by means of reason and experience. Acceptance of their views would have pushed Revelation into the background and made reason the sole determinant of faith instead of being a tool for its explanation and defence, as was the original aim of the Muʿtazilites.
Does this mean that there is no room for extreme views in human society? Not necessarily. Extreme views have sometimes made substantial contributions to human development. However, social peace may in certain circumstances be served better if extremes are avoided at least in religious and social matters. Nevertheless, if such views do get put forward, then one would expect that people give them a patient and tolerant hearing. If extreme views are unable to establish their worthiness and gain general acceptance, they will die their own natural death. Why then is it that such extreme views created a problem in Muslim society? Was there a lack of tolerance?
There seems to be little evidence of this in the early Muslim society where tolerance generally prevailed and the debate between conservatives and rationalists progressed relatively freely and smoothly. Even a heretic like Ibn al-Rāwandī received a patient hearing and his arguments were logically refuted by several generations of eminent religious scholars.11 Given the spirit of the age, the prevailing intellectual controversies may perhaps have been resolved through free discussion, particularly because the differences of opinion between the moderates among the rationalists and the conservatives, who constituted a preponderant majority of the intellectuals, were not irreconcilable. What then was it that polarized the then Muslim society into two belligerent groups, when in the same society different fiqhī schools were mutually tolerant and generally coexisted peacefully in spite of substantial differences of opinion among them?
The answer may perhaps lie in the use of force by an illegitimate political authority which did not enjoy the trust of the people. The normal tendency in human societies is that if one group uses force to impose its views on another, the reaction of the suppressed group tends to be severe, particularly if the latter group happens to be in the majority. The Muʿtazilites exploited the political patronage and financial backing that they received from the government during a substantial part of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty (132/750–656/1258), and particularly during the reigns of Ma’mūn al-Rashīd (d. 218/833), al-Muʿtaṣim (d. 227/841), and al-Wāthiq (d. 232/846) to impose their radical views forcefully on all. They became aggressive and intolerant in clear violation of Islamic teachings and introduced the miḥnah or testing (inquisition) into the Muslim world. They went around questioning people about their beliefs and threatened to punish those who held different views: “No faqīh, muḥaddith, mu’adhdhin or muʿallim” was left untested.”12 Freedom of expression, which had been an important characteristic of the Muslim society before this, almost disappeared.13 Furthermore, they jailed and tortured their opponents so as to impose their unacceptable views: “The prisons were full of those who had denied the miḥnah.”14 Some prisoners like Muḥammad ibn Nūḥ (d. 218/833), Naʿīm ibn Ḥammād (d. 228/842), Yūsuf al-Buwayṭī (d. 231/845), and Aḥmad al-Khuzāʿī (d. 231/845) even died in prison as a result of torturing.15 Aḥmad al-Khuzāʿī’s head was “placed on public view in Baghdad as a grisly warning to potential nonconformists, while his cadaver stayed in Samarra’, also on display.”16 Even prominent jurists like Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), who were held in high esteem by the masses for their piety and scholarship, were not spared. He was flogged on the orders of al-Muʿtaṣim until he became unconscious.17 All this, because he was not willing to accept the Muʿtazilite view that the Qur’ān was created. They even went to the extent of inscribing on the mosques of Fustat that “There is no god but God, the Lord of the created Qur’ān”,18 thereby making the concept of the ‘created Qur’ān’ an incontestable part of Islamic belief.
The question is why were the ʿulamā’ so aggravated over an issue which would not be of great significance to a number of people now? The use of force and persecution had the effect of creating bitterness and giving a hostile tone to an otherwise intellectual debate. It created suspicion among the ʿulamā’ about the motives of the government, making them feel, rightly or wrongly, that the state was trying to have a say in the definition of Islam.19 The concept of the ‘created Qur’ān’ made them afraid that its acceptance would imply that the Qur’ān was not eternally true and could be changed or overridden by illegitimate and corrupt rulers. This they could not stand and steadfastly defended their position without being deterred by imprisonment or merciless flogging.
The miḥnah and the resultant bitterness it generated among the ʿulamā’ against the government led to rising unrest and discontent among the population, particularly in Baghdad. This made even the illegitimate political leadership of that time realize, though belatedly and after the damage had been done, that the miḥnah was unpopular and incapable of working. Al-Mutawakkil (d. 247/861), therefore, put an end to it in 234/849. Aḥmad ibn Abī Du’ād, the Chief Qāḍī, who was perhaps the most
