prominence was also evident in its designation as one of the EU’s strategic partners and its election to two terms on the UN Security Council (2007–8 and 2011–12), where it had a voice, if not a veto, on matters relating to foreign intervention in Africa. As a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, South Africa was susceptible to external pressure. It sometimes broke with AU positions to support those of the Western powers, as it did when it voted to establish a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011. However, it endorsed the AU’s call for UN reforms that would grant African countries two permanent and five rotating seats on the Security Council. South Africa, like Nigeria, aspired to assume a veto-wielding position.
Pretoria’s increasingly forceful presence in Africa and on the world stage was embraced by some on the continent as an example of Africans finding solutions for African problems. However, others charged that South Africa subordinated subregional and regional interests to its own interests—or to those of global capital. While Northern powers looked to Pretoria to protect their interests, Nigeria resisted South Africa’s heightened continental profile, and neighboring states remained wary of the subregional giant, which, no longer fettered by international sanctions, aggressively expanded its economic reach. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya—with their growing economies and strong ties to the West—joined Nigeria in challenging South Africa’s presumed right to represent the continent in global bodies.
International Jihadist Organizations and Their African Branches and Affiliates
Nonstate actors also intervened in Africa after the Cold War. The most significant of these were the international jihadist networks, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and affiliates.
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda’s origins can be traced to the Cold War and to the intervention of outside powers in Afghanistan (see chapter 2). In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to assert control over a weak Afghan government that had failed to quash a Sunni insurgency that challenged Moscow’s hegemony in Central Asia. During the ensuing Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89), the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and their allies recruited, trained, and financed tens of thousands of Sunni militants from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America to topple the Soviet-backed Afghan regime. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the militants dispersed, fortified by sophisticated weaponry and new training in terror tactics. In the decades that followed, they established terrorist organizations and networks on several continents. Among the most significant was al-Qaeda, a Salafi jihadist organization that had established training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the war.18 In 1991 al-Qaeda moved its headquarters to Sudan, where it initiated a network of cells and allied organizations that operated in the Greater Horn.
AL-QAEDA’S AFRICAN AFFILIATES
In 2017, al-Qaeda had two important African branches: al-Shabaab (The Youth), which was based in Somalia and launched attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operated in North Africa and the Western Sahel.19 Al-Qaeda also claimed a number of local affiliates and associated organizations. Some of these had splintered from AQIM because of internal disputes; others were the result of mergers between AQIM and groups that were indigenous to the region. Most of the African entities emerged from local conditions and turned to al-Qaeda for political, material, and propaganda aid after they were established. The following list, organized by country, is based on data collected in 2017. It is subject to change as allegiances fluctuate, existing organizations dissolve, and new ones form.
Algeria: Al-Mulathameen (Masked Brigade)—also known as al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those Who Sign with Blood Brigade)—was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the Soviet-Afghan and Algerian wars and a former AQIM leader. The organization cut ties to AQIM in December 2012 and reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership.
Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House) was established in the Sinai Peninsula after the 2011 ouster of the Mubarak regime. Although the organization’s ideology was influenced by al-Qaeda, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis’s focus was primarily local, and it was not a formal al-Qaeda affiliate. The group’s activities intensified following the 2013 military coup that removed a democratically elected Islamist president and led to a brutal crackdown on Islamists and other opponents of the new regime. In 2014, the organization split when numerous members in the Nile Valley retained links to al-Qaeda, while many in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. Another al-Qaeda associate, Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam), was established in Sinai in 2013. After initial activity and a four-year hiatus, it reemerged in 2017. The same year, Ansar al-Islam (Followers of Islam), a new al-Qaeda-linked organization, began operating in the desert southwest of Cairo.20
Libya: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was founded in 1995 by Libyan veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. Al-Qaeda members have held prominent leadership positions in the organization. Al-Qaeda-linked groups that emerged in Libya after the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi include Ansar al-Shari’a (Followers of Islamic Law) in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte, and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade. The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council was formed in 2015 by Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade to counter the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna, which supported the Islamic State.
Mali: Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) was established in 2011 and gained AQIM support after its founding. Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) splintered from AQIM in 2011 but continued to collaborate with it. Al-Mourabitoun (The Sentinels), which reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership, was formed in August 2013 as a merger of the Algerian-based al-Mulathameen and a MUJWA faction. Al-Mourabitoun fractured in 2015, with some members maintaining their ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. In late 2015, al-Mourabitoun’s al-Qaeda faction affiliated with AQIM. The Macina Liberation Front, which aspires to reinstate the nineteenth-century Macina Empire in modern Mali, originated among Fulanis in central Mali in 2015. Although it was led by a fundamentalist cleric and collaborated with AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar Dine, the organization presented itself as a liberation movement rather than a jihadist organization. In March 2017, Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front merged to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims).
Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), established in 2002, is commonly known as Boko Haram (Western Education Is Forbidden). In 2014, the UN Security Council listed the organization as an associate of AQIM. However, in 2015 Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and began to refer to itself as the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru, splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. In 2014, the UN Security Council listed Ansaru as an associate of AQIM.
Somalia: Al-Shabaab (The Youth), inspired by Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, originated as a youth militia linked to the Islamic Courts Union. It established ties to al-Qaeda following a US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and became an official branch of al-Qaeda in 2012. Its focus was primarily local. However, it also attacked Ethiopia and countries that contributed to an AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
Tunisia: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, established in 2011, had strong links to al-Qaeda. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which drew much of its membership from Ansar al-Shari’a, described itself as an AQIM battalion. In 2014 some members of both groups switched their allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
prominence was also evident in its designation as one of the EU’s strategic partners and its election to two terms on the UN Security Council (2007–8 and 2011–12), where it had a voice, if not a veto, on matters relating to foreign intervention in Africa. As a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, South Africa was susceptible to external pressure. It sometimes broke with AU positions to support those of the Western powers, as it did when it voted to establish a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011. However, it endorsed the AU’s call for UN reforms that would grant African countries two permanent and five rotating seats on the Security Council. South Africa, like Nigeria, aspired to assume a veto-wielding position.
