them into the Somali army while collectively punishing their clan members. Encouraging clan rivalry to disrupt his opponents and strengthen his hold on power, his regime was increasingly dominated by his Darod clan family members and their allies.6
By 1989, clans that had suffered from harassment or discrimination, and Islamists, who had been repressed by the dictatorship, were united in their hatred of the Siad Barre regime. In the north, where a large number of war refugees had been resettled on Isaaq clan land and government policies threatened Isaaq economic interests, the Ethiopian-backed Somali National Movement instigated an insurgency. Somali military planes, piloted by white South African and former Rhodesian mercenaries, bombed the northern city of Hargeisa, and government forces killed tens of thousands of Isaaq clan members. In the south, Islamist opposition was spearheaded by a Salafist study group, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (Islamic Union). Many of the group’s leaders had worked or studied in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Kuwait, where they had been exposed to fundamentalist teachings. Most of the members were students or faculty from Somali secondary schools and colleges, or from the Somali National University. The massacre of 450 Islamist protesters in the capital city of Mogadishu in July 1989 prompted the transformation of al-Itihaad from a nonviolent association calling people to the faith into a jihadist organization whose goal was to establish an Islamic state in Greater Somalia. The new agenda attracted Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, who played a major role in al-Itihaad’s metamorphosis. With their knowledge of military strategy and their training in guerrilla and terror tactics, the war veterans recast al-Itihaad as Somalia’s most powerful military force following the breakdown of the central government in 1991.
Collapse of the Dictatorship, Rise of Warlords, and Foreign Intervention (1991–95)
While Somalia faltered, the Cold War also took a new turn. In the late 1980s the Soviet Union faced a severe political and economic crisis, and the alliance with Somalia was no longer critical to the United States. After the 1989 Mogadishu massacre, the George H. W. Bush administration expressed newfound concern about Siad Barre’s human rights abuses, and Congress suspended military and economic aid. Without US support, the Siad Barre government was an easy target. In January 1991, the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid and dominated by the Hawiye clan family, overthrew the regime, and the USC’s Ali Mahdi Mohamed was elected interim president. After the central government failed, personal, clan, and other rivalries split the opposition.7 A war between the Aidid and Ali Mahdi factions destroyed much of Mogadishu in 1991–92. The formal economy ceased to function, and southern Somalia disintegrated into fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords and their militias. Followers were mobilized and opponents objectified through clan-based hate narratives. Clan cleansing, although instigated by Siad Barre, became a defining instrument of warlord control.8
As the fighting intensified in 1991, war-induced famine, compounded by drought, threatened the lives of 60 percent of the population, primarily in the southern and central regions.9 Massive population displacement, the theft of food and livestock by marauding soldiers and militia members, and crop failure put 4.5 million people at risk of starvation. Mogadishu’s port and airport were controlled by warlords who confiscated food aid and manipulated food supplies to reward their supporters, punish their opponents, and finance the purchase of weapons. By late 1992, some 300,000 Somalis had died from starvation and war-related disease and violence, and 2 million people had fled their homes.
The failure of the UN to respond to the crisis was criticized by many Somalis and international NGOs. Largely absent in 1991, the UN took a more active role in 1992 under the leadership of the new secretary-general, Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a onetime supporter of Siad Barre who was deeply hostile to Aidid and determined to undermine his power. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo in January 1992, which prohibited the delivery of any weapons or military equipment to Somalia. In April, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established with a Chapter VI mandate to monitor a ceasefire signed in March and to escort and protect aid convoys. It was authorized to include 50 unarmed observers and 500 armed guards. Boutros-Ghali appointed Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun both as his special representative in Somalia and as the head of UNOSOM. Intent on procuring a lasting political solution, Sahnoun mediated a series of negotiations that included warlords, patrilineage leaders, and community elders, as well as intellectuals, merchants, women, and youth. In July, the UN secretary-general brought attention to the humanitarian crisis when he charged that the Security Council was “fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.”10
If the UN was slow to act, divisions within the US government also hindered a rapid American response. In December 1991, Andrew Natsios, a high-level official in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), called Somalia “the worst humanitarian crisis today” and advocated American action.11 In the State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, the East Africa Desk, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs also called for a strong US response. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, who was under mounting pressure to demonstrate US leadership in response to humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Somalia, believed that a limited military operation in Somalia, although not desirable, would be more manageable than one in the Balkans. Those opposed to US military engagement included Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs John Bolton, who argued that Somalia was not strategic to US interests and thus did not warrant US help, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who worried about the lack of an exit strategy. Leading officials in the Defense Department and in the US Central Command (CENTCOM), along with experienced ambassadors in the region, also warned against hasty military involvement without a clear plan or objective.12
These concerns notwithstanding, a major humanitarian disaster so close to the US presidential elections could not be ignored. In July 1992, the United States agreed to fund and transport 500 Pakistani troops to guard humanitarian shipments as part of the UNOSOM I mission. In August, while awaiting the Somali principals’ acceptance of the UN force, President Bush announced the launch of a unilateral US military airlift. Operation Provide Relief supplied the equivalent of 12 million meals to Somalia between August and November. By October, the rains had begun and death rates were declining. Although highly effective in the short run, the operation also had drawbacks. Insecurity had not abated, and in some places it had grown more dire than previously. The massive increase in food supplies provided new opportunities for warlords and bandits to weaponize food, and in some ways it contributed to a widening of the conflict. Similarly, the introduction of foreign military forces generated hostility in some quarters and rendered a political solution more difficult.
Among the strongest critics of the use of military force was UN Special Representative Sahnoun. Although he credited the US airlift with saving lives, he opposed further militarization of the UN operation. Political negotiations were making progress, even if they were slowed by painstaking attention to local sensitivities. Faction leaders and community elders from all regions had endorsed the idea of a national conference to discuss national reconciliation. Aidid, Ali Mahdi, and other powerful faction leaders had agreed to permit 500 UN peacekeepers to deploy in Mogadishu; the port had been reopened, and food distribution had commenced. Alternatives to military intervention, including mediation by subregional bodies and the application of sanctions, had not been fully explored, and military intervention would undermine these delicate processes. Sahnoun publicly criticized the provision of military supplies and money to Ali Mahdi’s forces in a UN plane, which contributed to Aidid’s mounting distrust of the UN; Sahnoun also opposed the increase of the UNOSOM I force to 3,500 troops, authorized in August without warning to Sahnoun or consultation with Somali leaders. Irked by Sahnoun’s public criticisms and his willingness to work with Aidid, Boutros-Ghali dismissed his special representative in late October. Sahnoun’s successors failed to garner the same degree of trust among Somalis, and efforts to thwart the rising tensions between the Ali Mahdi and Aidid factions fell apart, as did agreements that allowed the safe passage of relief shipments.
