of intentionality—the directedness of the consciousness toward the object of consciousness—that the experiencing subject considers not only the intended, experienced phenomenon, but also the act of experiencing itself. As Kockelmans suggests, “the transcendental reduction leads from all-that-is-given and can be given to its ultimate condition and presupposition, the transcendental subject.”64
Husserl’s phenomenological method intuitively leads to the description of the “pure I and pure consciousness.”65 Beginning with the adoption of the phenomenological attitude through the epoché—the completely presuppositionless reflection upon the experience of consciousness as a consciousness of something—and continuing by exercising the phenomenological or transcendental reduction, the experiencing subject, in reflecting upon the experiencing or meditating I, reaches the originating ground of cognition: the transcendental I and the transcendental consciousness.
Martin Heidegger: Ontological Phenomenology
The phenomenology of Martin Heidegger differs significantly from that of Husserl. While Husserl considered transcendental consciousness as the “wonder of all wonders,” for Heidegger, the wonder of all wonders is the disclosure of Being—simply, “that beings are.”66 As Moran observes, Heidegger’s “whole life’s work was a single-minded attempt to reexamine the question of Being, a question he saw as inaugurated in ancient Greek philosophy, but which had rigidified into an arid metaphysics, generally neglected in his time.”67 Immediately, in the introductory pages to Being and Time, Heidegger sets out to retrieve the question of Being—a question, as he argues, that is forgotten by contemporary philosophical inquiry. This, he insists, is fundamentally a phenomenological project, since, for Heidegger, “phenomenology is the science of the being of beings—ontology.”68
Heidegger distinguishes—and distances—his work from Husserl-ian phenomenology in a direct comparison of their phenomenological reductions:
For Husserl the phenomenological reduction . . . is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).69
Heidegger is concerned with the disclosure of Being through beings, and therefore begins his phenomenological investigation with an ontology of the human person as Dasein (literally, as “Being-there” or “There-being”) and with the corresponding comportment of Dasein toward Being. As Herbert Spiegelberg observes, for Heidegger, it is Being that reveals itself: Being is “in a sense self-determining. All that our thinking can do is to ‘let Being be’ (Seinlassen).”70
Heidegger proposes a description of Dasein as “this being which we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being.”71 The human person is thus described phenomenologically in terms of this essential relation to Being. It is important to note again here an important distinction between Heidegger and Husserl. Heidegger defines phenomenology as “apophainesthai ta phainomena—to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.”72 When Heidegger references Husserl’s maxim, “To the things themselves!,” it is a return to the thing itself as a disclosure of Being—to the thing as it shows forth Being and allows Being to come to light. Heidegger’s ontology of the human person as Dasein is a phenomenological investigation into Dasein as both a showing-forth and coming-to-light of Being, and as the unique being who sees and interprets the showing-forth and coming-to-light of Being.
For Heidegger, it is Dasein—the human being—who holds a special relation to Being: “Of all beings, only the human being, called upon by the voice of being, experiences the wonder of all wonders: that beings are.”73 Dasein discloses itself as being-in-the-world in relation to other beings and grounded in temporality.74 As Moran observes, for Heidegger, “Human being and Being are caught in an ontological revealing and concealing dynamic which is at the very heart of what it means to be, to come to presence, to appear in time.”75
Heidegger’s definition of the phenomenological method through the Greek words λόγος and φαινεσθαί allows him to argue that a phenomenology of Dasein is properly hermeneutics. Phenomenology understood as “λέγειν τὰ ϕαινόμενα” (letting something be seen) or “ἀποϕαίνεσθαι τὰ ϕαινόμενα” (letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in the manner in which it shows itself) emphasizes the interpretive function of phenomenological description.76 Heidegger argues that “because the function of logos lies in letting something be seen straightforwardly, in letting beings be apprehended, logos can mean reason.”77 Moreover, the understanding of λόγος as etymologically related to λέγειν (setting forth) and λεγόμενον (that which is set forth) enables Heidegger to bring out the relation of the showing-itself, the seeing, and the as-such of the seen. Being appears—Being shows itself—through beings. Dasein sees this appearing, and interprets these semblances of Being as Being: “Wievel Schein jedoch, so viel ‘Sein.’”78
For Heidegger, phenomenology is an investigation into the question of the meaning of the Being of beings. Any phenomenological description of Dasein, the human being who experiences the wonder of Being, must also describe Being. Phenomenology, Heidegger argues, is hermeneutical:
The logos of the phenomenology of Da-sein has the character of hermēneuein, through which the proper meaning of being and the basic structures of the very being of Da-sein are made known to the understanding of being that belongs to Da-sein. Phenomenology of Da-sein is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word, which designates the work of interpretation.79
Phenomenology and ontology are thus linked in Heidegger’s hermeneutics: “Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.”80 Phenomenology, as hermeneutics, describes and interprets the appearing and self-showing of Being.
For Heidegger, the true essence of Dasein is experienced as transcendence—as at once being and Being—with Being as the horizon of this transcendence. As a human being, Dasein is an individual event of Being: “Das ‘Wesen’ des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz.”81 What uniquely characterizes Dasein among all other beings is that Dasein is concerned with comprehending the possibilities of Being: Dasein seeks to interpret and understand Being. Authentic Dasein raises the question of the Being of beings. As William Richardson observes, “It is comprehension which constitutes the inner possibility of existence so that in turn existence constitutes the interior possibility
