for the past century, were becoming more dangerous for elite interests.
President Pio Romero Bosque, a reformer who had been critical of the civil-rights violations of previous administrations, promoted labor unions and allowed competitive presidential elections. The growing strength of labor unions and peasant activism, coupled with the founding of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), in 1930, raised concerns among the elites. In 1931, Labor Party candidate Arturo Araujo, a sugar and coffee producer, was elected president. Araujo’s campaign promised land reform and labor rights, both of which were in direct conflict with the interests of the coffee elites. In December 1931, Araujo was overthrown by the military and replaced by his vice president, Gen. Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. Tensions were exacerbated by the electoral fraud of the January 1932 municipal elections, in which the government suspended elections in strongholds of the PCS and refused to certify results in areas where the PCS claimed victory.33 Days later a peasant uprising led by Communist Party founder Augustín Farabundo Martí would dramatically alter the future of El Salvador. The military acted swiftly and ruthlessly. In the end, as many as thirty thousand peasants, most of whom were not actual participants the rebellion, were dead, including Martí.34 La Matanza (the Massacre), as it came to be known, resulted in the implementation of a military-oligarchy coalition that would rule El Salvador for another five decades. Whether the threat of mass rebellion was real or perceived, the oligarchy reached an agreement with the military to maintain stability and protect elite economic interests. William Stanley suggests that the military may have exaggerated the extent of the “Communist threat” in order to gain control of the state apparatus.35 Martínez, who initially had very little support among elites or the armed forces, consolidated power through the centralization of decision making, public works, and services; replacing civilians with officers at the municipal and local level; discouraging labor unions, and prohibiting peasant organizations.36 Martínez also established the National Party of the Fatherland (Pro Patria), an extensive hierarchical party network, to guarantee his victory in the 1935 presidential and municipal elections. The party’s success (and the consolidation of broader powers) relied on the incorporation of workers and peasants into the party’s corporatist structure, offering modest protection from elites in exchange for support.37
Martínez and the coffee elites had differing interpretations of the causes of the 1932 rebellion. While Martínez seemed to have a general understanding of the structural causes of the rebellion, elites believed the uprising was the result of naïve peasants (mostly Indians) who were influenced by imported communism. They denied that there was any exploitation present, and argued that class stratification was an inevitable feature of any society.38 The narrative developed by elites to explain the 1932 uprising shaped elite policy preferences and alliances for the next five decades—longer among some of the more recalcitrant elements. They viewed themselves the driving force behind El Salvador’s development, nationalists threatened by nefarious communist forces.39 Thus, while elites disagreed with Martínez’s social reforms, they were willing to support him (at least initially) because they approved of his crushing response to the massacre and economic policies in the midst of the Great Depression. The development of what Stanley describes as “quasi-statal financial institutions” during the period demonstrates the depth of the relationship between the state and coffee elites.40 The Central Bank and Banco Hipotecario, an agricultural bank, were established in 1934, and the Salvadoran Coffee Company (Compañía Salvadoreña de Café) was established in 1942 to provide loans and regulate coffee prices. The relationship between the banking and coffee sectors was rather incestuous—the Cafetelera owned 75 percent of Hipotacario.41
Martínez was overthrown in 1944 for attempting to seek a third term in office and was succeeded by Gen. Salvador Castañeda Castro in May 1945.42 Castañeda Castro represented the old guard of the Salvadoran armed forces and was relatively isolated from the junior officers. In an attempt to keep the junior officers in check and reduce the possibility of another coup, he sent many overseas for further military training.43 Those officers returned in 1948, on the eve of a hastily arranged presidential election. When Castañeda Castro attempted to extend his term as president, he was summarily overthrown in what was referred to as the 1948 “revolution.”44 The 1948 coup summarily ended the caudillo state in El Salvador and paved the way for significant institutional change.
Institutional Military Rule
For nearly a century, elites had maintained power through coercive mechanisms designed to protect them from the socioeconomic exclusion produced by their policies. By the mid-nineteenth century, cracks were beginning to emerge in the model. The 1948 “revolution,” which effectively ended caudillo rule, was primarily the result of a fissure between junior officers and older generals.45 Junior officers were mostly of working-class backgrounds who did not benefit from the spoils system that had enriched the generals.46 Because of their socioeconomic background, junior officers tended to favor policies that benefited the poor.47 This is not to suggest that their beliefs were entirely altruistic. While some junior officers favored reforms on their own merit, others simply believed them necessary to ensure political stability.48 They agreed, however, on the importance of democratic governance and economic reform for creating growth and stability.49 The Revolutionary Council of Government, composed of three military and two civilian representatives, sought to institutionalize democracy and modernize the Salvadoran state. The platform of the Revolutionary Council was embodied in the “fourteen points,” a platform expressing a commitment to a democratic regime with free and fair elections, a professionalized military, and universal suffrage.50 Despite the noted commitment to democracy, the Revolutionary Council banned political parties affiliated with religious groups, those receiving foreign aid, and the Communist Party. The economic components of the platform focused on increased social services and, more significantly, increased state intervention in the economy to promote industrialization.51
The period from 1948 through 1979 is punctuated by a succession of reformist coups encouraging political liberalization followed by increasingly repressive coups.52 Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter describe this phenomenon as “a state of continuous tension between those lines of thought that would try to prevent crisis by promoting change of varying degrees and those who would seek to prevent even expressions of the need for change.”53 While regime change during this period was frequent (sixteen different governments between 1944 and 1979), there are certain characteristics that define this period as a whole. First, the regime type is best described as a procedural democracy in which the military held elections and ruled through official parties.54 With the exception of the PCS, the party system in El Salvador was developed after Martínez’s departure and was used to consolidate the oligarchy’s rule through “official” military parties, such as the Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD). Elections were frequently organized around “mini-parties” created to promote various candidates representative of the different strains of thought within the military.55 Much like their predecessors, political parties of this era were ill-equipped, at best, to perform the typical functions of a party system—channeling the demands of the population—and, in fact, functioned solely for the purpose of elections. To that end, the party system merely served as a means by which the oligarchy could reassert its control through military regimes. In fact, despite encouraging opposition parties to participate, from 1952 to 1961 the opposition never held a seat in the Legislative Assembly.56 Second, these regimes often pledged varying degrees of socioeconomic reform, though never enough to redress the country’s inequalities or affect the interests of the oligarchy. Finally, when liberalization went too far—that is, encroached upon the interests of the oligarchy—repression increased and the state used force to maintain order.57
Mobilization and Electoral Competition
The 1960s in El Salvador witnessed unprecedented political and economic change. The decade was characterized by relatively competitive elections, albeit far from open, and the growth of popular organizations, including Christian
