The opening of political space, however limited, was accompanied by changing economic policy and respectable levels of growth. By the mid-1970s, however, this political opening would give way to repression, and the fallacy behind economic growth was revealed.
The political system opened significantly in the 1960s. Following a reformist coup—and three months later, a countercoup in late 1960 and early 1961—the PRUD reorganized itself to create the National Conciliation Party (PCN), modeled after the PRI in Mexico, in anticipation of the 1962 elections.58 Opposition parties, including the newly formed Christian Democratic Party (PDC), abstained from participating in those elections due to questionable behavior by the PCN. After soundly defeating a donkey—the only opposition candidate—in the 1962 presidential elections, PCN president Julio Adalberto Rivera called for open elections and established a system of proportional representation.59 As such, opposition parties were allowed to participate in the 1964 municipal elections. The PDC fared well and even won the mayoral race in San Salvador. The PDC emerged as a significant opposition force during the 1960s, more than doubling the number of municipalities it controlled from 1964 to 1966 (37 to 83). Much of this success can be attributed to the PDC’s emphasis on developing a relationship with the working class. During his tenure as mayor of San Salvador, José Napoleón Duarte developed Acción Comunitaria, a neighborhood action program that encouraged community development.60 This strategy of developing a middle-class and urban working class–constituency also benefited the PDC in the 1967 presidential elections. While the PCN won handily, the PDC garnered 21.6 percent of the vote.61 In Salvadoran terms, the PDC was becoming a well-organized opposition party.
The period from 1972 to 1979 was a major turning point in Salvadoran politics. Throughout the 1960s the military government had permitted the participation of opposition political parties, such as the PDC, and had even tolerated their expansion. By the early 1970s, however, the increasing success of the opposition became too close for comfort. The rise of the PDC was also accompanied by increasing mobilization among labor, peasant organizations, and Christian base communities, which made the military increasingly nervous. Rather than permit the further expansion of the opposition, the military regime sought to diminish the power of the opposition, first through electoral fraud and later through repression. This seizure of political space resulted in a severe deterioration of the sociopolitical environment and eventually led to the breakdown of Salvadoran society as a whole.
In September 1971 the PDC joined a coalition with two other left-wing parties, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN). Together the three parties formed the National Opposition Union (UNO) to participate in the 1972 elections, selecting José Napoleón Duarte, the popular mayor of San Salvador, as their presidential candidate. Even though Duarte was leading in the polls when radio election coverage was terminated, the final tally favored the PCN. According to official reports, the PCN won 334,600 votes to UNO’s 324,756, while UNO’s tally attributed 317,535 to the PCN and 326, 968 votes to UNO.62 Protests followed and attempts were made to nullify the election. In the end, PCN candidate Col. Arturo Molina assumed the presidency and Duarte was forced into exile.
The 1972 presidential elections were a critical juncture in Salvadoran politics. For more than a decade, various regimes had tolerated the growth of the PDC and other opposition parties, and the opposition had shown its growing organizational and electoral capacity. The growth and success of the PDC and other opposition parties was alarming to elites, who feared that a win by the opposition would result in land reform and threaten their very livelihood.63 The victory of Marxist Popular Unity presidential candidate, Salvador Allende, in Chile following a Christian Democratic president, fueled fears among the Salvadoran elites and the more conservative members of the military that a victory by the PDC would “serve as a bridge for the left to take power.”64 Thus, while the Salvadoran Christian Democrats served a valuable role in legitimizing the electoral process, they were not allowed to ascend to power. The 1972 elections demonstrated that reform through elections was unattainable.65 It was in this environment that popular mobilization and repression intensified.
Repression as a Response to Mobilization
Popular mobilization and repression intensified following the 1972 elections. While anticommunist military and paramilitary organizations were not new to El Salvador, their activities increased significantly following the 1972 elections. The Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN) was formed in 1966 by the military for thwarting communism by way of indoctrination—or murder, if deemed necessary. ORDEN soon was followed by the emergence of more ruthless and ubiquitous “death squads.” By 1975 paramilitary organizations and death squads, such as the Anticommunist Wars of Elimination Liberation Armed Forces (FALANGE) and Mano Blanca (White Hand), patrolled the countryside with the explicit goal of exterminating “communists,” whether they were priests, students, union leaders, peasants, or progressive politicians.66 Maj. Roberto D’Aubuisson, former chief of intelligence, was instrumental in the development of these groups. D’Aubuisson was the head of the White Warriors’ Union (Unión Guerrera Blanca), a death squad that targeted priests. His relationship with a group of wealthy businessmen, collectively known as the Broad Nationalist Front (FAN), ensured their financing.67 The motto “Be a Patriot, Kill a Priest,” was more than just bravado. D’Aubuisson’s group threatened to kill forty-six Jesuits unless they left the country. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, priests and layworkers were increasingly the victims of death squads. The assassination of Father Rutilio Grande of Aguilares, in March 1977, just one month after the elections, was intended to deliver a clear message to the church about its “political activism.”
The 1977 presidential election took place amid increasing protest and social violence. Throughout the 1970s, both sides had become increasingly radicalized. The 1977 elections were further testament that reform via elections did not exist. The electoral fraud of 1972 was repeated in 1977 when PCN candidate Carlos Humberto Romero defeated the UNO candidate, retired Col. Ernesto Claramount. Not surprisingly, voting irregularities were rampant. To protest, Claramount and his supporters (a crowd that grew to fifty thousand in a few days) gathered in the Plaza Libertad in San Salvador. National police opened fire on the crowd, killing dozens.68 Claramount fled into exile and Romero assumed the presidency, as planned. While the 1977 election results merely reinforced the fraud of the 1972 elections, the ending was a decidedly more violent demonstration of what was to come.
Descent into War
In October 1979 junior officers of the armed forces carried out a reformist coup against the Romero government. The first junta consisted of two officers and three civilians; members of the political opposition served in various administrative positions. The objectives of the junta included support for the fundamental elements of citizen participation, guarantees of human rights, dissolution of ORDEN and other death squads, and the more equitable distribution of economic resources.69 In short, the intended goal of the coup was to establish an environment for free elections by curtailing violence and providing an agrarian reform program aimed at easing tensions created by the inequitable distribution of wealth and land. Ultimately, the coup failed to redefine the role of the military vis-à-vis the state, and the oligarchy remained in control of the economy.70
The reforms proposed by the junta included agrarian reform and the nationalization of the banks and the coffee sector. In December 1979 the junta passed Decree 75, which nationalized the coffee export process and created the National Coffee Institute (INCAFE) to manage those exports.71 Elites viewed these programs as radical and interpreted them and the mass mobilization of the 1970s through the lens of the 1932 uprising. The solution was to unleash a repressive response akin to La Matanza, relying on increasing, albeit inconsistent, levels of violence.72 The first junta collapsed in January 1980 when the three civilian members of the junta resigned to protest the violence. Under pressure from the United States, the military extended junta leadership to the PDC in January 1980, a tactical move to ensure legitimacy at home and military funds from the United States. The PDC
