to peace made an entrée into the region more feasible. The United Nations first became involved in El Salvador in 1981 to report on the human rights situation. The installation of the UN’s first Latin American secretary general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in the same year brought a slow but increasing attention to the region. In 1983 the UN formally supported the actions of the Contadora Group, consisting of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, in its efforts to promote peace in the region. However, it was 1989 before the UN became involved in more than a supporting role. At a summit of Central American presidents in February 1989, leaders of the five Central American countries called on the United Nations to take a more active role in the verification of the security aspects of the Esquipulas agreements.2 In essence, they invited the participation of the United Nations in the region, and the UN responded favorably. In July 1989 the United Nations Security Council published Resolution 637, commending the Central American leaders for their continued commitment to the Esquipulas agreements and pledging to take any steps necessary to support the secretary general in promoting peace in the region.3 Resolution 637 opened the door for unprecedented UN involvement in Central America.
In an effort to salvage the peace process and the reputation of his administration—both of which were badly damaged following the October 1989 FENESTRAS bombings and the November 16, 1989, Jesuit murders—Cristiani personally solicited Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar to mediate peace talks between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN following a similar request by the FMLN in late 1989.4 In an unprecedented decision, the secretary general agreed to aid in peace negotiations between the two parties.5 The Salvadoran peace process was the first in which the United Nations had acted as mediator in a civil war.
As other works have described in great detail, the United Nations played an indispensible role as mediator during the negotiations.6 The use of good offices and the personal commitment of Pérez de Cuéllar demonstrated the importance of third parties in resolving this seemingly intractable conflict. By most accounts, the government of El Salvador (GOES), the FMLN, and the UN worked together to resolve most disputes. That said, the UN and the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) occasionally experienced great difficulty in overcoming ARENA’s resistance to the implementation of various elements of the accords. This was particularly true with regard to police and judicial reform.
The Contents of the Negotiations and the Accords
As with most other UN-mediated settlements, the content of the peace accords focused on conflict resolution (moving the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box) as opposed to conflict transformation (addressing the underlying causes of the conflict as well as changing the relationships between and attitudes of the parties).7 As such, negotiations focused on structural changes to formal institutions. The framework for the peace accords developed through a series of six agreements over a two-year period. The Geneva Agreement (April 1990) established the parties’ commitment to negotiations, as well as an agreement for secret, continuous negotiations with the support of the secretary general’s office. As stated in the Geneva Agreement, the purpose of the peace negotiations was “to end armed conflict by political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadoran society.”8 This language provides not only for the end of the war but extends to cover sociopolitical issues aimed at restructuring Salvadoran society. Although the terms of the agreement mandated that the negotiation process was confidential, there was also an acknowledgment that civil-society organizations “have an important role to play in achieving peace.”9 As such, the parties were permitted to consult these organizations “when it is deemed appropriate and on the basis of mutual agreement.”10 However, the agreement did not establish any official channel for consultation. This established a pattern of popular exclusion that would characterize not only the peace process but extend well beyond the implementation phase. The following month in Caracas, the parties agreed to an agenda and timetable, albeit vague, for future talks. Issues on the agenda included the armed forces, human rights, judicial and electoral reform, economic and social issues, and the reintegration of the FMLN. It also affirmed that a ceasefire would be postponed until the political agreements had been reached.11 The postponement of the ceasefire was vital to the participation of the FMLN, as the FMLN (with the backing of the secretary general) claimed that they would lose any leverage if the ceasefire was imposed before the agreements.
Military reform had become a quagmire in the negotiations early on, a testament to both its controversy and its immense importance to the proceedings. In an effort to advance negotiations, the parties agreed to focus on human rights in the San José Agreement (July 1990). This agreement assured the parties’ commitment to human rights as they existed under both Salvadoran law and in accordance with international standards and treaties. The most significant agreement, however, was the verification of the accords by the UN through the creation of ONUSAL.12 The mission’s main purpose was to verify the observance of human rights by both sides and to promote respect for human rights. It would be the first and most extensive of its kind, conducting in situ verification of human rights following the ceasefire. Furthermore, the parties agreed to the “full guarantee of the freedom and integrity of the person,” prohibiting the arrest of persons for political reasons and “torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.”13 The San José Agreement also provided for support of habeas corpus and freedom of expression and association, including trade union freedom and enjoyment of labor rights.
The Mexico Agreement (April 1991) reflected agreements on constitutional reforms to the armed forces, judiciary, and electoral system. The agreement laid the groundwork for the restructuring of the military. The reforms included the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities and a redefinition of mission to defend the sovereignty of the state, creation of a new civilian police force, placing the military and police under different ministries, and dismantling paramilitary forces. Building on the agreements reached in the San José Agreement, the parties also agreed to the creation of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH), whose purpose was to “promote and ensure respect for human rights” (and which was to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly), as well as to the creation of a Truth Commission to investigate “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently requires that the public should know the truth.”14 The main element of electoral reform was the creation of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) as the ruling administrative authority. Wary of the politicization that had characterized its predecessor, the Central Election Council (CCE), the agreement stipulated that “the composition of the Tribunal shall be determined by secondary legislation, making sure that no party or coalition of parties predominates it. It has also been agreed that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall include members without any party affiliation, elected by a majority of the Legislative Assembly.”15 A special commission would later suggest changes to the electoral code.
The agreement provided for the separation of the judiciary and executive through the reorganization of the Supreme Court and established a new procedure for the elections of Supreme Court judges, requiring a two-thirds majority of deputies in the Legislative Assembly. This same formula was applied to the election of the attorney general and the PDDH. The parties also agreed to a set allocation of the national budget for the judiciary at 6 percent. The restructuring of the National Judiciary Council made it responsible for nominating judges and running the judicial training school.16 The government did not agree to FMLN proposals for replacing the Supreme Court, evaluating and purging the judiciary, or a number of other reforms of criminal procedure.17 The proposed reforms were insufficient to modernize El Salvador’s judiciary, but the FMLN was not equipped to advance the agenda. As Margaret Popkin has observed, “a guerrilla insurgency with minimal experience in the legal system is not the ideal protagonist for profound judicial reform.”18
The stalemate on the reduction of the armed forces was finally broken when the FMLN agreed to drop the demand that FMLN forces be incorporated into the armed forces
