be a violation of the accords. The security forces were officially dissolved by the end of June 1992, although there was little doubt that some members continued to function on their own. Additionally, the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) was dissolved and replaced by a new civilian State Intelligence Organ (OIE) in June 1992.
The FMLN’s registration as a political party was dependent on certification of its demobilization. In January 1992 the Legislative Assembly passed a law on national reconciliation that permitted the return of FMLN members from abroad, including the General Command. On February 1 the FMLN began the process of establishing itself as a political party by collecting signatures and presenting them to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. By May the FMLN began to press for its legalization as a political party, going so far as to hold a rally to mark its beginnings as a political party later that month.49 On July 30, 1992, the FMLN was officially recognized by the government of El Salvador as a “political party in formation.” However, the government also submitted a request to the TSE that the FMLN not be formally recognized until it had fully demobilized. The TSE responded that the FMLN’s final registration would not be granted until ONUSAL verified its total disarmament and demobilization.50 The United Nations certified on December 15, 1992, that the FMLN had successfully disarmed and it was registered as a political party.
The FMLN’s failure to completely disarm was exposed when an arms cache belonging to the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) was discovered following an explosion in Managua, Nicaragua, in June 1993. In a letter to the UN secretary general, FPL leader Salvador Sánchez Cerén stated that the FPL had retained the arms only out of profound distrust for the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) and had no intention of remilitarizing the conflict.51 The FMLN subsequently disclosed more than one hundred additional arms deposits in El Salvador and neighboring countries. In August 1993, ONUSAL was able to verify that all FMLN arms had been destroyed and that the FMLN no longer constituted a combatant force. Despite this transgression, the FMLN’s status as a political party was not revoked and the ceasefire was never broken.
The deployment of the new National Civil Police (PNC) began in March 1993 under the guise of ONUSAL’s police division, which was deployed in February 1992.52 Recruits for the new force were drawn from the existing police (20 percent), the FMLN (20 percent), and new recruits (60 percent), provided they met requirements laid out in the New York Agreement. Dismantling old policing structures, however, did not proceed as quickly or as cleanly as hoped. Funding shortfalls and delays in opening the new National Academy for Public Security (ANSP) resulted in the deferred deployment of the new police force.53 Although the agreements clearly stated that the National Police would be responsible for public security until its units could be replaced by the PNC, there was also the expectation that the National Police would be phased out as the PNC was deployed. Instead, the National Police training school continued to operate and graduate students, which contributed to the growth of the National Police.54 The continued functioning of the National Police deprived the PNC of vital resources. During the transition period (1992–94), the National Police received $77 million while the PNC received only $45 million and the ANSP received $22 million.55 Moreover, more than one thousand personnel from the National Guard and Treasury Police, and entire BIRI units were transferred into the National Police. In December 1992, the GOES and the FMLN agreed, without consulting the UN, to the transfer of low-ranking officers from the armed forces and other units. Known as Plan 600, the agreement provided FMLN guerrillas with benefits in a time of scare resources.56 ONUSAL complained that such transfers were “incompatible with the thrust of the accords and contravene their spirit,” which had clearly mandated the screening of PNC personnel in response to FMLN concerns about human rights records of National Police officers.57 The government justified these actions based on growing crime rates (see chapter 5).58
Concerns about the lack of adequate training, impunity and continuing human rights abuses were common during the transition.59 Some members of the former security apparatuses were reluctant to submit to the new institutions and they quickly came to dominate the new police force, although cases of strife between former FMLN and former security officers were relatively few.60 In June 1993 the government appointed former military officer Oscar Peña Durán as the PNC’s operations director. During his ten months in office, Peña transferred two units of the National Police into the PNC—the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Anti-Narcotics Division (UEA), for the latter of which Peña was the former head—a clear violation of the peace accords. Peña not only flagrantly violated the peace accords through the appointments and his refusal to allow ONUSAL’s continued training of new units, but he also evaded COPAZ consultations that were mandated by the accords. ONUSAL described the refusal of its police training as “a self-defeating move,” though later evidence would suggest that the decision was, in fact, designed to preserve elite control over the new police force.61 Despite protests from ONUSAL and increasing reports of human rights violations by the PNC, the Cristiani administration exhibited little political will in enforcing these aspects of the accords. In fact, Cristiani attempted to delay the dissolution of the PN until June 1994, presumably in hopes that a new administration would be able to shirk international verification and any responsibilities of further compliance with the accords.62 The veil of impunity, however, was lifted in June 1994 when a dozen agents in National Police uniforms robbed a bank in broad daylight, killing six and wounding five others. The incident, which generated public outrage and exposed the extent of the ongoing impunity, was caught on video and broadcast on television and in print media.63 Shortly thereafter, it was announced that the National Police would be dissolved. Despite significant delays, the PNC was fully deployed in October 1994 and had a force of seventy-two hundred officers by 1995. By then, however, the damage to the PNC had been done.64
Socioeconomic Reforms
The final stage of the ONUSAL mission concentrated on the socioeconomic issues addressed in the Chapúltepec Accords. The three main provisions of the socioeconomic section of the accords addressed land transfer, the creation of the Foro, and a national development plan. The Land Transfer Program (PTT) was intended primarily as a process by which to reintegrate FMLN combatants and their supporters into society, not as a means to redress the serious land issue that had plagued the country for more than one hundred years.65 The land transfer program was complicated by titling and verification problems, as well as political disputes. Determining ownership before occupation and designating proper recipients was time consuming and sometimes impossible.66 Additionally, the process was confusing for beneficiaries. Many misunderstood the terms of the accords and were surprised to discover that they would actually have to purchase the land, albeit on favorable terms (6 percent interest and a thirty-year repayment plan). There was also significant political tension and mistrust between the FMLN and ARENA that delayed the transfers, particularly with regard to ARENA’s notion that land transfers were considered “rewards” for FMLN supporters in advance of the 1994 elections.67 At one point, the FMLN halted demobilization and the government responded by stalling on the purification of the armed forces.68 In October 1992 the UN developed a plan designed to distribute one hundred thousand manzanas of land to some 25,000 civilians and 22,500 ex-combatants (15,000 soldiers and 7,500 FMLN, about three manzanas (about two hectares) each.69 The agreement did not resolve the many problems associated with the program. Some beneficiaries did not want to move, some could not be located, some died, while still others complained about the quality of the land. Landowners were not willing to sell or resented the bureaucracy of the Land Bank. Land costs, which had been depressed by the war, increased significantly after the conclusion of the conflict. Despite numerous delays and much political wrangling, the land transfer process was near completion in 1997. By the time the Land Bank was dissolved in January 1998, 36,089 beneficiaries had received some 103,300 hectares, or 10 percent of agricultural land.70
The Foro, which was intended as a forum for government, business, and labor to address issues such as labor rights, wages, privatization and other issues, died shortly after
